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CVE-2025-71057

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Improper Session Management in D‑Link DSL-124 Web Interface

CVE-2025-71057

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Session Management

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-345, CWE-384

Impact:

Session Hijacking and Unauthorized Administrative Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The D-Link Wireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router DSL-124 ME_1.00 suffers from improper session management that ties authentication too closely to a user's IP address.

An attacker who can spoof the IP address of an authenticated user may hijack that user's web management session and gain unauthorized access to the router's administrative interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the web administration interface of the D-Link DSL-124 ME_1.00 router, where authenticated sessions are tracked in part by the client's IP address.

It becomes relevant in environments where:

  • The router's management interface is exposed over a network reachable by potential attackers (LAN or WAN)
  • Multiple users or devices may share network paths where IP spoofing or traffic manipulation is possible
  • Session tokens and user identity are implicitly trusted based on IP rather than robust, per-client credentials

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the router's web-based management console
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted packets to the router while spoofing the IP address of a currently authenticated user
  • Trigger point: The router accepts management requests as belonging to an authenticated session when they originate from the spoofed IP
  • Why exploitation is possible: Session state is insufficiently bound to strong, per-client identifiers (e.g., secure cookies, tokens) and overly depends on the source IP address, enabling session hijacking when IP spoofing is feasible

Why this happens

The core issue is improper session management (CWE-384) combined with weak authentication and identity verification practices (CWE-287, CWE-345).

The router relies on the client's IP address as a key factor for associating HTTP requests with an authenticated session, rather than using robust, cryptographically strong session tokens that are unique per client and resistant to spoofing.

This design pattern conflates network-layer identifiers with application-layer identity, making it possible for an attacker who can forge traffic that appears to come from a legitimate IP address to be treated as the authenticated user.

As a result, session hijacking is possible without needing to steal credentials or session cookies directly.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may gain unauthorized access to the router's administrative web interface
  • Configuration changes can be made, including DNS, firewall, and port-forwarding rules
  • Network traffic may be intercepted, redirected, or monitored via malicious DNS or routing changes
  • Security features such as WPA/WPA2 keys, admin passwords, and remote management settings can be modified
  • The router could be enrolled into a botnet or used as a foothold for further attacks on internal devices

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening session management and reducing trust in network-layer attributes:

  • Use strong, random, per-session identifiers stored in secure cookies or headers, independent of client IP
  • Bind sessions to multiple properties (e.g., session token + user agent + additional integrity checks) rather than IP alone
  • Enforce short session lifetimes and inactivity timeouts to reduce the window of opportunity for hijacking
  • Restrict access to the management interface to trusted networks only, and disable remote administration where it is not essential
  • Apply least-privilege principles for accounts and avoid sharing admin credentials among multiple users

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-level review and runtime monitoring:

  • Code review / design analysis: Check authentication and session tracking logic for reliance on IP addresses or other weak identifiers; verify that session tokens are random, unique, and validated on every request
  • Static analysis: Use rules that flag uses of client IP or similar network metadata as primary authentication or session-binding mechanisms
  • Configuration and policy checks: Validate that management interfaces are not unnecessarily exposed to untrusted networks and that remote administration is disabled or tightly restricted
  • Log analysis: Monitor for suspicious patterns such as multiple administrative actions from different network paths appearing to originate from the same IP or sudden bursts of management traffic during unusual times

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/theShinigami/CVE-Disclosures/tree/main/CVE-2025-71057
dlink.comdlink.com/en/security-bulletin/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the router's management interface is exposed. If remote administration is enabled or if the attacker has network-level access (for example, on the same LAN or able to manipulate routing), session hijacking via IP spoofing may be feasible.

The attacker needs the ability to send packets to the router while spoofing the IP address of an authenticated user. In some network setups this may require being on the same local network or having control over upstream routing or a compromised device.

The safest pattern is to implement robust session management: use cryptographically strong, per-client session tokens that are required and validated on every request, avoid using IP addresses as the primary binding for session identity, and apply strict session timeouts and re-authentication for sensitive actions.

Future designs should treat network-layer data as untrusted context, rely on well-established authentication and session management mechanisms (secure cookies, tokens, TLS), follow secure framework defaults where possible, and subject authentication and session logic to focused security reviews and testing.

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