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CVE-2025-70887

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Improper Privilege Management in Signify signed_data.py and

CVE-2025-70887

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Signify versions before 0.9.2 contain an improper privilege management flaw in the signed_data.py and context.py components that can let a remote attacker gain higher privileges than intended.

When maliciously crafted inputs are processed in affected code paths, trust or authorization checks can be bypassed, enabling operations to run with escalated permissions.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects applications and services that integrate the ralphje Signify library in versions prior to 0.9.2, particularly where it is used for handling signed data and building or evaluating execution/security contexts.

The risk materializes when Signify is exposed to inputs controlled or influenced by remote users and when application logic relies on Signify's validation or context decisions to gate privileged actions or trust levels.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote, via any API or interface that processes untrusted or semi-trusted data using Signify's signed_data.py or context.py.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or manipulate data that the application passes into Signify (e.g., signed payloads, tokens, or contextual parameters).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of library routines that interpret signed data or derive privilege/authorization context from Signify's outputs.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization or trust decisions are improperly derived, allowing crafted inputs to be treated as more privileged than they should be, leading to privilege escalation.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where the system does not correctly enforce boundaries between different privilege levels.

In this case, logic within signed_data.py and context.py appears to conflate authenticity or structural correctness of data with authorization, or fails to apply strict checks when interpreting signed data and contextual attributes.

As a result, attacker-controlled data can influence how the library assigns or interprets privilege, enabling escalation to roles or capabilities that should be restricted.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers could gain access to operations normally restricted to higher-privileged users or services.
  • Critical configuration or security settings could be modified by unauthorized entities.
  • Sensitive data that should be limited to privileged roles could be exposed.
  • Attackers may pivot from a low-privileged foothold to broader compromise of the application or its backing services.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening authorization boundaries and hardening trust decisions around Signify usage:

  • Ensure that privilege and authorization checks are explicit in application logic and not implicitly derived from data structure or mere signature presence.
  • Apply strict validation of all inputs passed to signed_data.py and context.py, including format, origin, and allowed values.
  • Separate authentication (verifying data integrity or origin) from authorization (deciding what actions are allowed) and enforce both independently.
  • Implement least-privilege design patterns so that operations triggered through Signify results run with the minimum required permissions.
  • Add defense-in-depth controls, such as secondary checks before performing sensitive actions, even when Signify reports valid data.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection strategies typically rely on reviewing how Signify is used at integration points:

  • Static analysis & code review:
  • Look for code paths where Signify's signed_data or context outputs directly drive role assignment, access control, or privileged actions without additional checks.
  • Flag patterns where "valid signature" or "accepted context" is treated as equivalent to "authorized to perform X".
  • Identify any default or fallback branches that grant access when parsing or context evaluation fails.
  • Policy and automated checks:
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines around cryptographic verification and authorization separation in CI/CD pipelines.
  • Use automated tools or custom linters to search for high-privilege operations triggered solely by Signify validation outcomes.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Log and monitor privilege changes, especially when driven by incoming signed data or context transitions.
  • Alert on anomalous privilege assignments or unexpected high-privilege actions originating from low-trust sources.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/issues/475
github.comgithub.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/pull/477
github.comgithub.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/releases/tag/2.11
github.comgithub.com/ralphje/signify/commit/64f21c0cc06cea0536370686ca3ba7a01e4adaa8
github.comgithub.com/ralphje/signify/issues/60

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how an application integrates Signify. If remote users can influence the signed data or contextual information that Signify evaluates and the application uses that output for access control, the vulnerability may be remotely exploitable.

Not necessarily. The primary requirement is the ability to supply or manipulate data passed into Signify. In some deployments, this may be available to unauthenticated users; in others, a low-privileged account or limited interface access may be required.

Treat Signify strictly as a data-validation and integrity-checking component, and ensure that actual authorization and privilege decisions are handled by dedicated, explicit access-control logic. Apply strong validation to inputs and ensure that any derived context cannot silently grant higher privileges.

Adopt a clear separation between authentication, integrity verification, and authorization; enforce least-privilege by design; perform security-focused code reviews around libraries that influence identity or context; and integrate static checks and tests that verify privilege boundaries under both valid and malicious inputs.

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