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CVE-2025-70798

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

Hardcoded Credentials in Tenda i24V3.0si Firmware

CVE-2025-70798

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hardcoded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-259

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Full Device Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

Tenda i24V3.0si V3.0.0.5 firmware contains a hardcoded password in /etc_ro/shadow, enabling authentication as the root user using credentials embedded in the device.

If an attacker can reach the management interface or another authentication entry point that relies on this account, they may gain full administrative control over the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Tenda i24V3.0si access points running firmware version V3.0.0.5, where the root user password is stored in a read-only shadow file (/etc_ro/shadow) and is identical across all devices using this firmware build.

The issue becomes especially risky in deployments where management interfaces are exposed to untrusted networks, default credentials are not changed, or additional controls such as IP-based restrictions and out-of-band management are absent.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any interface that accepts root credentials (e.g., web admin UI, SSH, telnet, console, or proprietary management services).
  • Required access: Network-level or physical access sufficient to reach the device's authentication endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Sending a login request using the hardcoded root credentials.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The firmware embeds a static root password in /etc_ro/shadow, meaning all devices share a known or discoverable credential that users cannot effectively change or remove.

Why this happens

The core issue is the embedding of a static, hardcoded password for the root account in the firmware image, mapped to CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password.

Instead of generating unique credentials per device or enforcing secure, user-configurable authentication at first boot, the device ships with a pre-defined root password stored in a read-only area (/etc_ro/shadow).

This pattern effectively turns the password into a shared secret across all deployed units, undermining the premise of password-based authentication and making compromise a matter of obtaining or guessing this fixed value once.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can log in as root and gain full administrative control over the device.
  • Configuration changes, including disabling security features, changing DNS, or modifying routing behavior.
  • Installation of persistent malware, backdoors, or traffic inspection tooling on the device.
  • Use of the device as a pivot point for lateral movement within the internal network.
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets for DDoS attacks or other coordinated abuse.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing reliance on static credentials and constraining management access.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Designing devices to generate unique, per-device administrative credentials and surface them securely (e.g., on a label or through a secure onboarding flow).
  • Enforcing credential change at first boot and preventing continued operation with factory-default or shared passwords.
  • Supporting robust alternative authentication mechanisms such as key-based SSH access, certificate-based management, or integration with centralized identity providers where appropriate.
  • Restricting management interfaces to trusted networks or dedicated management VLANs, and disabling remote management over the public internet by default.
  • Applying least-privilege principles so that not all authenticated sessions automatically receive root-level access, where technically feasible.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for hardcoded credential issues and misuse through:

  • Firmware and filesystem analysis (static analysis) to locate hardcoded hashes or passwords in files such as /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, or within binaries and configuration archives.
  • Configuration audits to verify that devices do not continue to operate with known default or vendor-supplied credentials.
  • Network monitoring for repeated successful logins using the same credentials across many devices, indicating shared-password usage.
  • Policy-based controls in procurement and deployment pipelines that flag or block devices which rely on hardcoded or non-rotatable administrative credentials.
  • Use of automated firmware security scanners or SCA-like tools specialized for embedded images to identify CWE-259 patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/vuln-1/vuln/blob/main/Tenda/i24V3.0si_V3.0.0.5/report-1.md
tendacn.comtendacn.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the device's management interface is exposed over the network (e.g., via HTTP/HTTPS, SSH, or other protocols) and reachable from untrusted hosts, such as the public internet or guest networks.

An attacker needs network or physical access sufficient to reach an authentication interface that accepts the root credentials. No prior authenticated access to the device is required beyond the use of the hardcoded password itself.

The safest pattern is to eliminate hardcoded passwords entirely, replacing them with unique per-device credentials, mandatory credential change on first use, or stronger authentication mechanisms such as cryptographic keys or certificates, combined with restricted management exposure.

Integrate secure-by-design principles into the device lifecycle: avoid embedding static secrets in firmware, implement secure onboarding flows, require strong unique credentials, and conduct regular security reviews of authentication mechanisms and configuration storage before release.

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