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CVE-2025-70231

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Path Traversal in D-Link DIR-513 getAuthCode Handler

CVE-2025-70231

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File Access on Router Filesystem (Potential Device Compromise)

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

D-Link DIR-513 firmware version 1.10 contains a critical path traversal vulnerability in the /goform/getAuthCode endpoint, reachable via POST requests to /goform/formLogin.

By manipulating the FILECODE parameter, an attacker can traverse directories on the device's filesystem and potentially access or interact with files outside the intended path, leading to device compromise in certain configurations.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web management interface of D-Link DIR-513 routers running firmware version 1.10.

It specifically affects the login verification flow where /goform/formLogin forwards verification-related requests to /goform/getAuthCode.

In this code path, the FILECODE parameter is incorporated into filesystem operations without sufficient normalization or validation, allowing directory traversal sequences to escape the expected directory scope.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface exposed by the router's web management UI.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted POST requests to /goform/formLogin (often available to any host that can reach the admin interface, which may be on the LAN or, if misconfigured, from the internet).
  • Trigger point: Submission of a POST request that causes the router to invoke /goform/getAuthCode with a user-controlled FILECODE parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The FILECODE value is used to construct filesystem paths without proper validation or canonicalization, allowing traversal tokens (e.g., parent-directory references) to influence which file is accessed.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper validation of a user-supplied path component used in file operations.

The FILECODE parameter is treated as trusted input and concatenated into a path without stripping or rejecting directory traversal sequences or enforcing a fixed, allowed directory root.

This aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the application fails to constrain file access to a safe subset of the filesystem.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read files on the router's filesystem that are outside the intended verification-code directory.
  • Sensitive configuration data (such as internal paths, logs, or other information) could be exposed and used to further compromise the device.
  • Depending on how file reads or related operations are implemented, an attacker could potentially influence authentication or verification logic, leading to unauthorized access.
  • If combined with other weaknesses (e.g., file write or command invocation paths), this could contribute to full router takeover.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on constraining how user input influences filesystem paths and reducing trust in HTTP parameters:

  • Normalize and validate any user-controlled path component before use, rejecting input that contains parent-directory references, absolute paths, or unexpected characters.
  • Use fixed, server-side mapping from identifiers (like codes or tokens) to actual filenames instead of passing filenames or file fragments directly from the client.
  • Enforce a hard-coded base directory and ensure that all resolved paths are checked to remain within this directory after canonicalization.
  • Limit the exposure of the web management interface to trusted networks only, and protect it with strong authentication and network-layer controls.
  • Run web components with minimal filesystem privileges so that even if a path traversal is attempted, the reachable data is strictly limited.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and researchers can detect similar issues by:

  • Performing static analysis to flag direct concatenation of HTTP parameters (e.g., FILECODE, filename, path) into file operations (open, read, include, etc.) without sanitization.
  • Reviewing router web code for any file access routines that consume unvalidated request parameters, paying particular attention to login and verification handlers.
  • Using dynamic testing or DAST tools to send path traversal payloads (with directory traversal sequences) to endpoints involved in file or resource retrieval and observing whether unexpected files are returned.
  • Implementing secure coding policies that prohibit direct use of user input in filesystem paths and enforcing these via automated code review tools in the development lifecycle.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/akuma-QAQ/CVEreport/tree/main/D-link/CVE-2025-70231
dlink.com.cndlink.com.cn/techsupport/ProductInfo.aspx?m=DIR-513
dlink.comdlink.com/en/security-bulletin/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on network exposure. If the router's web admin interface is reachable from the internet or from an untrusted segment, attackers can exploit it remotely by sending crafted POST requests.

The issue sits in the login verification flow, which often processes requests before full authentication is established. In many deployments, an attacker only needs network-level access to the management interface, not valid credentials.

Replace any direct use of request parameters in filesystem paths with a safe lookup mechanism, enforce strict validation and canonicalization of all path components, and ensure that file operations are limited to a well-defined, hard-coded directory.

Adopt a defense-in-depth approach: validate and normalize all input that may influence file paths, use indirect identifiers instead of raw filenames, enforce sandboxed directories with post-resolution checks, and incorporate static and dynamic security testing focused on file access patterns into the development lifecycle.

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