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CVE-2025-70064

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Broken Access Control / Privilege Escalation in PHPGurukul

CVE-2025-70064

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control / Privilege Escalation

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Full Application Compromise by Low-Privilege Users

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

PHPGurukul Hospital Management System v4.0 contains a broken access control issue that allows a low-privileged Patient user to directly access the Administrator dashboard and its sub-modules by browsing to the /admin/ directory after logging in.

This misconfiguration enables any authenticated, self-registered user to escalate privileges, view confidential information, and modify critical system data without being an actual administrator.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects deployments of PHPGurukul Hospital Management System v4.0 where:

  • Patient registration and login are enabled.
  • The /admin/ area is deployed and reachable via the web server.
  • Access controls are implemented only via menu visibility or client-side checks, and not enforced on the server side for each admin page.

In such setups, any authenticated Patient user can manually navigate to admin URLs and be treated as an administrator, bypassing intended role restrictions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application interface (HTTP/S).
  • Required access: Valid low-privileged user account (e.g., Patient) that can log into the system.
  • Trigger point: Manually requesting admin URLs such as /admin/ and its sub-modules after authentication.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not enforce server-side authorization checks on the admin routes, so the presence of a valid session is treated as sufficient, regardless of the user's role.

Why this happens

This issue is rooted in missing or inadequate server-side authorization checks for administrative functionality.

Instead of verifying the user's role or privilege level on each request to protected resources, the application appears to rely on weaker mechanisms such as:

  • Hiding admin links in the UI for non-admin roles.
  • Assuming that only administrators will know or use the /admin/ path.

This pattern maps directly to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where privileged operations are not properly restricted to authorized principals, allowing low-privilege accounts to access and perform admin actions.

Potential impact

  • Untrusted Patient users can access the full Administrator dashboard.
  • Viewing and exfiltrating confidential user and system logs.
  • Modifying doctor management data, appointments, and other critical medical records.
  • Creating, editing, or deleting administrative accounts or other high-privilege entities.
  • Tampering with system configuration leading to denial of service or data integrity issues.
  • Complete takeover of the application's business logic and stored data by any self-registered user.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing robust server-side authorization for all administrative endpoints:

  • Implement role-based access control (RBAC) where each request to /admin/ and its sub-modules checks that the authenticated user has an administrator role.
  • Centralize authorization logic (e.g., middleware, filters, or guards) so all admin controllers and actions consistently verify permissions.
  • Treat URL paths as untrusted; do not rely on obscurity or hidden menu items as a security boundary.
  • Define explicit permission checks around sensitive actions (user management, logs, configuration) instead of assuming any logged-in user is trusted.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege, ensuring Patient and other low-privileged roles are granted only the minimum access needed for their workflow.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached from both development and operations angles:

  • Code review: Look for admin controllers or /admin/ routes that check only for "isAuthenticated" rather than verifying specific roles or permissions; review access control filters and middleware coverage.
  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag controller actions or routes that:
  • Are labeled as admin or sensitive but lack authorization checks.
  • Bypass centralized RBAC or permission verification logic.
  • Dynamic testing: As a low-privileged user, attempt direct access to /admin/ URLs and sensitive functions (e.g., user logs, doctor management) to confirm that access is denied.
  • Logging and monitoring: Monitor access logs for low-privileged accounts accessing admin paths; configure alerts when non-admin roles are served responses from administrative endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/Sanka1pp/c6f20cd6db1fbb1f0e7e199ead66691d
packetstorm.newspacketstorm.news/files/id/213711

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can register or obtain a Patient account and reach the web application over the network can exploit this by manually browsing to the /admin/ area.

No special or insider access is required beyond having a valid low-privileged login (e.g., a self-registered Patient account). Once authenticated, the attacker can access admin URLs directly.

Introduce strict server-side authorization checks for all administrative endpoints, using a consistent RBAC or permission system that verifies the user's role before serving admin pages or executing admin actions.

Design access control as a first-class concern: centralize authorization logic, enforce "deny by default" for sensitive routes, cover all admin and high-impact actions with explicit role/permission checks, and regularly test for direct URL access to privileged functions during security reviews.

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