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CVE-2025-70043

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Improper Certificate Validation in Ayms node-To Master

CVE-2025-70043

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Man-in-the-Middle and Confidentiality/Integrity Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Ayms node-To master disables TLS/SSL certificate validation by setting rejectUnauthorized: false in its TLS socket options, effectively trusting any presented certificate.

Under these conditions, an active network attacker can intercept or tamper with supposedly secure connections, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, data theft, and session compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in contexts where Ayms node-To master establishes outbound TLS connections using Node.js-style socket options.

By explicitly disabling certificate validation, the client treats all certificates as trustworthy, regardless of signer, hostname, or validity period.

The issue is most critical when these TLS channels carry authentication credentials, API tokens, session data, or other sensitive information across untrusted or semi-trusted networks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network path between Ayms node-To master and its TLS peer (e.g., server, API endpoint)
  • Required access: Ability to observe and modify network traffic (e.g., on the same Wi-Fi, compromised router, hostile ISP, or internal network adversary)
  • Trigger point: Any TLS connection initiated with rejectUnauthorized: false in the TLS options
  • Why exploitation is possible: The client does not verify the authenticity of the server certificate, allowing an attacker to present any certificate—including self-signed or spoofed—and successfully complete the TLS handshake

Why this happens

The core issue stems from explicitly disabling TLS certificate validation within the client's configuration, an instance of CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation.

Instead of performing standard PKI checks (certificate chain verification, hostname validation, expiration, and revocation), the code sets rejectUnauthorized: false, which instructs the runtime to accept all certificates without scrutiny.

This pattern breaks the trust model of TLS, turning what should be an authenticated, confidential channel into an unauthenticated encrypted tunnel that is vulnerable to impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.

Potential impact

  • Attacker-controlled man-in-the-middle on "secure" connections
  • Theft of credentials, API keys, session cookies, or tokens sent over TLS
  • Unauthorized modification of data in transit (e.g., commands, configuration, or business transactions)
  • Injection of malicious responses leading to downstream compromise of dependent systems
  • Loss of integrity and non-repudiation for logs or audit trails transmitted over the affected TLS channel

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on restoring strict certificate validation and minimizing trust in the network:

  • Use the platform's default TLS verification behavior and avoid explicitly disabling checks (do not set rejectUnauthorized: false)
  • Ensure proper use of system or application trust stores, with correctly installed root and intermediate certificates
  • Enable hostname verification and pin TLS connections to expected hostnames or certificates where appropriate
  • Prefer configuration-driven toggles that fail safe (validation enabled by default, no silent bypass options)
  • Separate development/test overrides from production configurations, and guard any debugging shortcuts behind strict policies
  • Apply least-privilege credentials on these connections so that, even if compromised, blast radius is limited

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and manage this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules that flag insecure TLS options such as rejectUnauthorized: false, disabled verification flags, or custom agents that skip certificate checks
  • Code review checklists that require scrutinizing all TLS/HTTPS client configuration and reject any validation bypasses
  • Configuration scanning for environment variables or config files that disable TLS checks or introduce custom trust stores without proper controls
  • Runtime telemetry and policy enforcement that monitor TLS handshakes for unexpected certificate acceptance behavior
  • Periodic dependency and configuration audits to ensure debugging or "temporary" validation bypasses are not present in production code paths

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/zcxlighthouse/33cc4342dfe650664548b4531d16b655
github.comgithub.com/Ayms
github.comgithub.com/Ayms/node-To

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can position themselves on the network path between Ayms node-To master and its TLS peer can remotely exploit the issue to intercept or alter traffic.

It does not require local access to the host. The attacker only needs network-level access to observe and manipulate traffic; no authentication to the application itself is required to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.

Re-enable proper TLS certificate validation by removing rejectUnauthorized: false and relying on the default validation logic, ensuring the correct trust store is used, and enabling hostname verification. Any temporary debugging or "trust-all" settings should be removed from production paths.

Establish coding standards that forbid disabling TLS verification, enforce static analysis checks for dangerous TLS options, segregate debug-only configuration from production builds, and regularly review transport security settings during security-focused code reviews and architecture assessments.

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