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CVE-2025-70042

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Server-Side Request Forgery in ThermaKube Master

CVE-2025-70042

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Internal Network Access and Potential Remote Code Execution via SSRF

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the ThermaKube master component allows crafted requests to cause the server to initiate network connections on the attacker's behalf.

When exposed to untrusted input, this flaw can let an attacker pivot through the ThermaKube master to access internal services, metadata endpoints, or other protected network resources.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments where the ThermaKube master:

  • Accepts or processes URLs, hostnames, or other remote resource locators influenced by user input
  • Can reach internal or otherwise non-public network endpoints
  • Performs outbound HTTP(S) or similar protocol requests on behalf of the caller

The risk is highest when the ThermaKube master has broad network visibility, access to cloud metadata services, or connectivity to management APIs that are not independently authenticated.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible interfaces of the ThermaKube master (e.g., HTTP(S) APIs, web dashboards, or control endpoints).
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests or parameters that influence where the master makes outbound network calls; this may be via authenticated or unauthenticated APIs depending on deployment.
  • Trigger point: Any functionality that fetches or proxies remote resources based on user-controlled input (URLs, host headers, IPs, paths, or redirect targets).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server trusts and uses user-controlled input to construct internal network requests without adequate validation, restriction, or separation between external and internal targets.

Why this happens

This issue arises when the ThermaKube master constructs outbound requests using data that can be directly or indirectly controlled by an external party.

Instead of strictly validating and constraining destination addresses, the server treats user-supplied URLs or host information as trustworthy and passes them to HTTP or RPC clients.

This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an attacker leverages the application's network position to reach internal or sensitive endpoints that would otherwise be inaccessible.

Potential impact

  • Discovery and interaction with internal services or APIs that are not exposed to the public Internet
  • Access to cloud or orchestration metadata endpoints, potentially revealing credentials or instance secrets
  • Pivoting into management planes or control APIs that can modify cluster configuration or workloads
  • Exfiltration of sensitive data from internal services reachable by the ThermaKube master
  • In certain environments, potential progression to remote code execution through exploitation of internal services

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining outbound requests and reducing trust in user-supplied destinations:

  • Introduce strict allowlists for outbound destinations, limiting which hosts or networks the ThermaKube master can contact.
  • Normalize and validate user-provided URLs or hostnames, rejecting local addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.0/8, ::1), link-local, and internal ranges that should not be reachable.
  • Separate responsibilities so that components exposed to untrusted input cannot directly reach sensitive management or metadata endpoints.
  • Apply network-layer controls such as egress firewalls, service meshes, or policy engines to restrict which internal services the master can access.
  • Design APIs to accept logical resource identifiers instead of raw URLs or hostnames wherever possible, resolving them through trusted configuration rather than user input.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Use static analysis to flag code paths where user-controlled input flows into HTTP clients, proxy logic, or URL constructors without validation or destination checks.
  • During code review, look for functions that fetch remote resources, follow redirects, or proxy requests based on parameters, query strings, or headers.
  • Enforce architectural policies that prohibit direct use of raw user-supplied URLs in outbound requests, and verify these policies in CI with automated code scanning tools.
  • Monitor runtime logs and network telemetry for unusual outbound connections from the ThermaKube master, especially to internal ranges or metadata endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/zcxlighthouse/5a6d15611456de619e4be36f7d2a0ee7
github.comgithub.com/oslabs-beta
github.comgithub.com/oslabs-beta/ThermaKube

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be remotely exploitable if the ThermaKube master exposes interfaces that accept input from external users or services and use that input to make outbound requests.

Not necessarily. Exploitation depends on how the affected endpoints are deployed. In some setups, public or weakly protected endpoints may allow unauthenticated users to influence outbound requests; in others, authenticated API access may be required.

The safest pattern is to avoid using raw user-supplied URLs for outbound requests. Instead, rely on predefined destinations, apply strict allowlists, and validate that any requested targets fall within permitted hosts or services.

Establish architectural guidelines that separate untrusted input handling from privileged network access, enforce outbound network policies, and include SSRF-specific checks in code review and automated security testing pipelines.

Find out what's already
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