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CVE-2025-70031

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CSRF in SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4

CVE-2025-70031

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CWE:

CWE-352

Impact:

Unauthorized Actions Performed on Behalf of Authenticated Users

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Sunbird-Ed SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4 allows attackers to trick authenticated users' browsers into performing unintended actions on the portal.

When a victim is logged in and visits a malicious page, their existing session can be abused to submit forged requests, potentially changing data or invoking privileged operations without their explicit consent.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the web application layer of SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4 where state-changing HTTP endpoints can be triggered via the user's browser.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • Users authenticate via browser-based sessions (cookies, tokens in browser storage)
  • Critical actions can be executed through standard POST/GET/PUT/DELETE requests
  • CSRF protections (such as anti-CSRF tokens or same-site cookie controls) are missing, inconsistent, or not properly enforced

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web-facing endpoints of the SunbirdEd-portal accessed via a browser.
  • Required access: The attacker does not need direct access to the portal but must cause an authenticated user to load attacker-controlled content (e.g., a web page, HTML email, or embedded iframe).
  • Victim state: The victim must be logged in to the SunbirdEd-portal, or have a valid session or persistent authentication cookie.
  • Trigger point: A crafted request (form submission, image URL, script-triggered request, or hidden iframe) is automatically sent by the victim's browser to the vulnerable endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application relies on ambient authentication (such as cookies) and does not reliably verify that state-changing requests originated from a legitimate user interaction or trusted origin.

Why this happens

The underlying issue corresponds to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).

The application accepts state-changing requests that are authenticated solely by automatically attached credentials (like cookies or other bearer mechanisms in the browser) without requiring a request-specific, user-bound authenticity check.

In abstract terms, the bug class is:

  • Lack of per-request CSRF tokens or equivalent proof-of-intent mechanisms for sensitive operations.
  • Overreliance on session cookies or ambient credentials without binding them to user-initiated actions.
  • Insufficient use of browser features (such as same-site cookie attributes or origin checking) to restrict cross-origin request execution for sensitive endpoints.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could trigger unauthorized changes to user profiles or account settings.
  • An attacker could cause users to enroll in or leave courses, programs, or content they did not intend to interact with.
  • An attacker could perform administrative or moderator actions (where the victim has such privileges), such as managing content or user permissions.
  • An attacker could manipulate application state, preferences, or data submissions, leading to integrity issues and loss of user trust.
  • In combination with other weaknesses, CSRF could be leveraged to pivot into broader account or data compromise scenarios.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on enforcing robust request authenticity checks and minimizing implicit trust in browser-supplied credentials:

  • Introduce or standardize anti-CSRF tokens for all state-changing endpoints; tokens should be unique per session, unpredictable, and validated server-side.
  • Require sensitive operations (e.g., role changes, configuration updates, content management actions) to use HTTP methods that are not trivially triggered by third-party content (typically POST with CSRF protections).
  • Apply the SameSite attribute to session cookies (e.g., SameSite=Lax or Strict where compatible with application flows) to reduce cross-site request contexts.
  • Validate the Origin and/or Referer headers for critical endpoints to ensure requests originate from legitimate pages of the portal, accounting for known deployment domains.
  • Encourage explicit re-authentication or step-up verification for high-risk actions to further bind operations to deliberate user intent.
  • Partition and limit the scope of privileges associated with long-lived sessions, so that a compromised or abused session cannot perform broad administrative changes.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically focuses on identifying unprotected, state-changing endpoints and patterns of suspicious cross-origin traffic:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag controller methods or routes that modify server-side state and lack CSRF token validation.
  • Verify that HTML forms and asynchronous requests for sensitive operations include and validate anti-CSRF tokens.
  • Examine framework middleware configuration to ensure CSRF protections are enabled and not bypassed for critical routes.
  • Configuration review:
  • Inspect session and authentication cookie configuration for missing or weak SameSite, Secure, and HttpOnly attributes.
  • Confirm that reverse proxies or gateways preserve relevant headers (Origin, Referer) used for CSRF validation.
  • Runtime and log analysis:
  • Monitor for unusual patterns of sensitive actions originating from unexpected referrers or external domains.
  • Identify sudden bursts of identical sensitive operations originating from many users but similar cross-origin paths.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use application security testing tools (DAST and SAST) configured with rules for CSRF to scan for endpoints performing updates without token checks.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/zcxlighthouse/470214b2f6fb0c82caecb9f369159006
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed/SunbirdEd-portal

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker can host malicious content on any website or send it via email. If a user who is logged in to the SunbirdEd-portal interacts with or simply loads that content in a browser, the malicious page can trigger forged requests to the portal.

The attacker does not need an account on the SunbirdEd-portal itself. They only need the ability to induce a logged-in user—especially a user with elevated privileges—to visit a page that they control or that they can inject content into.

The most robust fix is to consistently enforce CSRF protection on all state-changing actions by using server-side validated anti-CSRF tokens or equivalent mechanisms, combined with secure cookie attributes and origin/referrer checks for high-risk endpoints.

Adopt a security-first design that includes CSRF protection as a default framework or middleware feature, require explicit justification before disabling it on any route, and enforce secure cookie configurations. Incorporate automated tests and code review checklists that verify all state-changing endpoints are covered by CSRF defenses.

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