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CVE-2025-70029

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Certificate Validation in SunbirdEd Portal HTTP

CVE-2025-70029

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure via Man-in-the-Middle

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Sunbird-Ed SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4 disables TLS/SSL certificate validation in its HTTP client configuration by setting rejectUnauthorized: false.

This behavior allows attackers on the network path or controlling a rogue TLS endpoint to intercept, read, or modify supposedly secure traffic, exposing sensitive information and undermining the confidentiality guarantees of HTTPS.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in SunbirdEd-portal when it performs outbound HTTPS requests using HTTP options that explicitly disable certificate verification (rejectUnauthorized: false).

It is most relevant in environments where:

  • The portal communicates with backend services, APIs, or identity providers over TLS, and
  • Network paths may be partially untrusted (e.g., shared infrastructure, cloud networks, Wi-Fi, or ISP-controlled segments).

In such setups, the trust that TLS is supposed to provide is weakened because any certificate, including self-signed or attacker-controlled ones, will be accepted.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Encrypted (HTTPS) connections initiated by the portal to its upstream services.
  • Required access: Ability to position on or influence the network path between the portal and its target services (e.g., local network access, compromised router, malicious proxy, or upstream ISP control), or ability to operate a rogue TLS endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Any outbound HTTPS request made by the portal while certificate verification is disabled.
  • Why exploitation is possible: With rejectUnauthorized: false, the client does not verify the server's certificate chain or hostname, allowing an attacker to present any certificate and successfully terminate TLS, enabling decryption and manipulation of traffic.

Why this happens

This issue is a textbook example of CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation.

Instead of relying on the default behavior of the TLS stack to verify server identity against trusted certificate authorities and hostnames, the implementation explicitly instructs the HTTP client to skip these checks using rejectUnauthorized: false.

At an abstract level, this is an "accept all certificates" pattern: the application treats all TLS endpoints as equally trustworthy, collapsing the trust model of HTTPS and enabling transparent interception of "secure" connections.

Potential impact

  • Attackers on the network path may decrypt and read sensitive data transmitted over HTTPS, including tokens, session identifiers, or user information.
  • HTTPS requests and responses can be modified in transit, enabling injection or alteration of data and API parameters.
  • Authentication flows and API calls can be hijacked, potentially leading to account compromise or privilege escalation in downstream systems.
  • Integrity of data received from backend services can no longer be trusted, enabling subtle data corruption or response spoofing.
  • Overall reduction in the security assurance of the deployment, as operators may falsely assume TLS is providing end-to-end confidentiality and integrity.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on restoring strict TLS validation and designing for secure-by-default communication patterns:

  • Remove any configuration that disables certificate verification (such as rejectUnauthorized: false) and rely on default strict validation.
  • Use officially trusted certificates issued by reputable CAs, or configure a private CA properly installed in the system trust store when internal services are used.
  • Apply explicit hostname verification where supported, ensuring the certificate's subject or SAN matches the expected service name.
  • Centralize HTTP/TLS configuration so developers cannot easily bypass verification on a per-request basis.
  • Prefer configuration-driven mechanisms (environment variables, secure configuration files) to manage trust anchors rather than hard-coding insecure flags in code.
  • Implement the principle of least privilege for service credentials, so that any exposure of intercepted traffic yields minimal additional access.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting improper certificate validation generally involves a combination of code inspection and policy enforcement:

  • Use static analysis rules or grep-based checks to flag insecure options such as rejectUnauthorized: false, "trustAll," or similar "accept all certificates" flags in HTTP/TLS clients.
  • Incorporate secure coding guidelines into code review, specifically requiring reviewers to verify that any TLS-related configuration preserves hostname and certificate chain validation.
  • Enforce CI/CD policies that fail builds when insecure TLS patterns are introduced or modified.
  • Maintain an inventory of outbound connections and periodically test them with tools that simulate invalid or self-signed certificates to confirm clients correctly reject them.
  • Consider using automated application security testing tools that understand common TLS misconfiguration APIs in the project's language and framework.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/zcxlighthouse/e662c8316f98a1c72735cda4f6bfcfe6
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed/SunbirdEd-portal

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if an attacker can position themselves on, or influence, the network path between the portal and its backend services (for example, via compromised routers, malicious Wi-Fi access points, or upstream network control), they can potentially intercept and manipulate TLS traffic because certificate validation is disabled.

The attacker typically needs network-level access or control over an upstream network segment or proxy.

They do not need credentials to the application itself, but must be able to present a rogue TLS endpoint or manipulate routing so that portal traffic reaches their server.

The most robust fix is to re-enable strict TLS verification by removing any flags that disable certificate checks and ensuring that all outbound HTTPS requests validate both the certificate chain and the server hostname against a trusted CA store.

Where internal services use private CAs, those CAs should be properly installed and managed rather than bypassing validation.

Establish a security baseline that forbids "trust all" or "no verification" TLS settings, enforce it through code review and automated checks, and use shared HTTP/TLS client utilities that are configured securely by default.

Training developers on the risks of disabling TLS verification and documenting approved patterns for internal and external service communication further reduces the likelihood of recurrence.

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