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CVE-2025-70027

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

SSRF in SunbirdEd-Portal v1.13.4

CVE-2025-70027

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Exposure of Sensitive Information via Backend HTTP Requests

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in Sunbird-Ed SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4 allows attackers to manipulate the application into making unauthorized outbound requests.

By abusing server-initiated HTTP calls, an attacker may be able to reach internal services or protected endpoints and obtain sensitive information that is not directly exposed to users.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in parts of SunbirdEd-portal v1.13.4 where the server makes HTTP or similar network requests on behalf of a user, such as fetching remote resources or integrating with internal services.

It becomes relevant when user-controlled input (e.g., URLs, hostnames, or endpoints) is used to build outbound requests without sufficient validation or restriction.

In such configurations, the portal may act as a proxy into internal networks or metadata services that are normally not accessible from the outside.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application features that trigger server-side HTTP/HTTPS or similar protocol requests based on user-supplied parameters.
  • Required access: Network access to the web application (typically over HTTP/HTTPS); usually no direct access to internal infrastructure is needed.
  • Trigger point: Supplying crafted URLs or endpoints in request parameters, headers, or body fields that the server uses to construct outbound requests.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not sufficiently constrain or sanitize the destination of server-side requests, allowing attackers to direct requests to internal or sensitive resources.

Why this happens

This issue stems from trusting user input when constructing server-side network requests.

Instead of restricting outbound calls to a small, vetted set of external services, the application likely accepts arbitrary or loosely validated URLs/hosts and forwards them from the server.

This matches CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where the server is abused as an HTTP client to access resources that should not be reachable by the attacker, such as internal APIs, administrative interfaces, or cloud metadata endpoints.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP services that are not directly exposed to the internet.
  • Retrieval of sensitive configuration or operational data from internal APIs.
  • Discovery of network topology or internal service endpoints via error messages or response content.
  • Access to metadata or credentials services, potentially leading to further compromise.
  • Use of the application server as a pivot point for targeted attacks against internal infrastructure.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining server-side outbound requests and reducing trust in user-supplied URLs:

  • Enforce strict allowlists of permitted destination domains/IPs for any server-initiated request.
  • Disallow direct use of raw user-supplied URLs; instead, map user choices to predefined, vetted endpoints.
  • Implement robust URL validation that rejects private, loopback, link-local, and non-HTTP(S) schemes.
  • Introduce network-level egress controls (firewall rules, proxy policies) to prevent the application server from reaching internal or sensitive segments unnecessarily.
  • Apply least-privilege principles for any credentials or tokens used by outbound requests, limiting what data can be accessed even if SSRF is attempted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Flag patterns where user-controlled data flows into HTTP client libraries without domain or IP validation; look for direct use of URL parameters in outbound requests.
  • Code review: Examine features that fetch external content, integrate with webhooks, or consume user-provided endpoints, checking for strict allowlists and scheme/host validation.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Verify that outbound network access is restricted by firewall or proxy rules; ensure there are policies forbidding direct calls to internal address ranges from user-driven features.
  • Runtime monitoring: Analyze logs for unusual outbound requests, especially to internal IP ranges or metadata endpoints, and alert on anomalous patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/zcxlighthouse/6eac455e9094ae313a1c39c25d520b3d
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed
github.comgithub.com/Sunbird-Ed/SunbirdEd-portal

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can send HTTP requests to the SunbirdEd-portal instance and reach functionality that performs server-side HTTP calls can potentially exploit the SSRF remotely.

Typically only standard web access to the vulnerable feature is required. The attacker does not need direct access to internal services; they abuse the portal to reach those services on their behalf.

The most robust pattern is to strictly limit where the server can connect: use hardcoded or configuration-driven allowlists of acceptable domains, perform comprehensive URL validation (scheme, host, and resolved IP), and block private and loopback address ranges.

Design features so that users select from predefined endpoints instead of entering arbitrary URLs, enforce outbound network segmentation, adopt secure coding guidelines around HTTP clients, and include SSRF-focused checks in code reviews and automated security testing pipelines.

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