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CVE-2025-69986

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in LSC Indoor Camera ONVIF

CVE-2025-69986

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Stack-Based Buffer Overflow

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-121

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The ONVIF GetStreamUri implementation in LSC Indoor Camera V7.6.32 contains a stack-based buffer overflow due to missing length validation on the Protocol parameter within the Transport element of a SOAP request.

By sending an oversized Protocol string, an attacker can overwrite the return instruction pointer and potentially crash the device or execute arbitrary code within the ONVIF service context.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the ONVIF service handling GetStreamUri requests on LSC Indoor Camera V7.6.32.

It manifests when the device parses incoming SOAP messages and copies the Protocol value from the Transport element into a fixed-size stack buffer without sufficient bounds checking.

Installations exposing the ONVIF interface to untrusted networks, or where an attacker can send crafted ONVIF SOAP requests, are more likely to be at risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible ONVIF interface (SOAP over HTTP/HTTPS).
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted ONVIF GetStreamUri requests to the camera (typically network-level access; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration).
  • Trigger point: Processing of the Transport/Protocol field inside a GetStreamUri SOAP request where the Protocol value exceeds the size of the internal stack buffer.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation copies the Protocol string into a stack-allocated buffer without validating its length or enforcing bounds, allowing attacker-controlled data to overwrite adjacent stack memory, including the return instruction pointer.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121) coupled with insufficient input validation (CWE-20).

The GetStreamUri handler assumes that the Protocol parameter will fit into a fixed-size stack buffer and performs an unchecked copy or formatting operation.

Because the Protocol field is sourced directly from the incoming SOAP request and is not length-checked against the buffer size, an attacker can supply an excessively long value that overwrites stack memory.

This insecure pattern—trusting externally supplied string lengths when writing into fixed-size buffers—is a common memory safety flaw in C/C++ network services.

Potential impact

  • The camera may crash, resulting in denial of service until it is manually power-cycled or rebooted.
  • Attackers could potentially execute arbitrary code within the ONVIF service process.
  • Compromise of the ONVIF service may allow unauthorized access to video streams or camera configuration.
  • An attacker with code execution could pivot to other components of the device firmware or use the camera as a foothold inside the local network.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict bounds and reducing trust in network-supplied data:

  • Replace unsafe string operations with bounded alternatives that always respect the destination buffer size.
  • Validate the length of all externally supplied fields (such as Protocol) before copying them into fixed-size buffers, rejecting or truncating inputs that exceed defined limits.
  • Prefer dynamic or automatically sized data structures where possible, avoiding fixed-size stack buffers for untrusted input.
  • Introduce centralized input validation logic for SOAP/ONVIF parameters, ensuring that protocol fields conform to expected formats and lengths.
  • Run the ONVIF service with least-privilege permissions and apply exploit mitigations provided by the platform (e.g., stack canaries, ASLR, DEP/NX) to reduce the impact of memory safety bugs.
  • Restrict exposure of the ONVIF interface to trusted networks and isolate management interfaces from general user or guest segments.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and vendors can detect and monitor for this type of vulnerability through:

  • Static analysis rules that flag unsafe C/C++ functions (e.g., unbounded string copies, formatting functions without size limits) on network-parsed fields.
  • Code review checklists that require verifying length checks for all user- or network-controlled buffers, especially in protocol parsing code.
  • Fuzz testing of ONVIF/SOAP endpoints, injecting oversized values into fields like Protocol to discover crashes or anomalous behavior.
  • Runtime protections and logging that capture process crashes, stack corruption signals, or unusual restarts of the ONVIF service as indicators of possible exploitation attempts.
  • Integration of automated SAST/DAST tools into CI pipelines to surface buffer handling issues early in the development lifecycle.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/victorGoeman/LSC-Indoor-Camera-Security-Research/blob/main/CVE-2025-69986.md

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be remotely exploitable if the ONVIF interface is reachable over the network. An attacker who can send crafted SOAP GetStreamUri requests to the camera may be able to trigger the overflow.

That depends on how the ONVIF service is configured. If GetStreamUri can be invoked without authentication or with easily guessable credentials, the barrier to exploitation is low. Even when authentication is required, compromised or shared credentials could enable an attacker to reach the vulnerable code path.

The most robust fix is to implement strict bounds checking for all copies into fixed-size buffers and to use safe string and buffer APIs that require maximum lengths. Any field, such as Protocol, should be validated against a defined maximum length and rejected if it exceeds that limit.

Adopting secure coding guidelines for memory management, mandating the use of bounded buffer operations, and performing regular static analysis and fuzzing of protocol handlers can significantly reduce the likelihood of similar buffer overflows. Designing protocol parsers to treat all incoming data as untrusted and enforcing explicit length and format constraints is key.

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