Summary
The ONVIF GetStreamUri implementation in LSC Indoor Camera V7.6.32 contains a stack-based buffer overflow due to missing length validation on the Protocol parameter within the Transport element of a SOAP request.
By sending an oversized Protocol string, an attacker can overwrite the return instruction pointer and potentially crash the device or execute arbitrary code within the ONVIF service context.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in the ONVIF service handling GetStreamUri requests on LSC Indoor Camera V7.6.32.
It manifests when the device parses incoming SOAP messages and copies the Protocol value from the Transport element into a fixed-size stack buffer without sufficient bounds checking.
Installations exposing the ONVIF interface to untrusted networks, or where an attacker can send crafted ONVIF SOAP requests, are more likely to be at risk.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible ONVIF interface (SOAP over HTTP/HTTPS).
- Required access: Ability to send crafted ONVIF GetStreamUri requests to the camera (typically network-level access; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration).
- Trigger point: Processing of the Transport/Protocol field inside a GetStreamUri SOAP request where the Protocol value exceeds the size of the internal stack buffer.
- Why exploitation is possible: The implementation copies the Protocol string into a stack-allocated buffer without validating its length or enforcing bounds, allowing attacker-controlled data to overwrite adjacent stack memory, including the return instruction pointer.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a classic stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121) coupled with insufficient input validation (CWE-20).
The GetStreamUri handler assumes that the Protocol parameter will fit into a fixed-size stack buffer and performs an unchecked copy or formatting operation.
Because the Protocol field is sourced directly from the incoming SOAP request and is not length-checked against the buffer size, an attacker can supply an excessively long value that overwrites stack memory.
This insecure pattern—trusting externally supplied string lengths when writing into fixed-size buffers—is a common memory safety flaw in C/C++ network services.
Potential impact
- The camera may crash, resulting in denial of service until it is manually power-cycled or rebooted.
- Attackers could potentially execute arbitrary code within the ONVIF service process.
- Compromise of the ONVIF service may allow unauthorized access to video streams or camera configuration.
- An attacker with code execution could pivot to other components of the device firmware or use the camera as a foothold inside the local network.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict bounds and reducing trust in network-supplied data:
- Replace unsafe string operations with bounded alternatives that always respect the destination buffer size.
- Validate the length of all externally supplied fields (such as Protocol) before copying them into fixed-size buffers, rejecting or truncating inputs that exceed defined limits.
- Prefer dynamic or automatically sized data structures where possible, avoiding fixed-size stack buffers for untrusted input.
- Introduce centralized input validation logic for SOAP/ONVIF parameters, ensuring that protocol fields conform to expected formats and lengths.
- Run the ONVIF service with least-privilege permissions and apply exploit mitigations provided by the platform (e.g., stack canaries, ASLR, DEP/NX) to reduce the impact of memory safety bugs.
- Restrict exposure of the ONVIF interface to trusted networks and isolate management interfaces from general user or guest segments.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations and vendors can detect and monitor for this type of vulnerability through:
- Static analysis rules that flag unsafe C/C++ functions (e.g., unbounded string copies, formatting functions without size limits) on network-parsed fields.
- Code review checklists that require verifying length checks for all user- or network-controlled buffers, especially in protocol parsing code.
- Fuzz testing of ONVIF/SOAP endpoints, injecting oversized values into fields like Protocol to discover crashes or anomalous behavior.
- Runtime protections and logging that capture process crashes, stack corruption signals, or unusual restarts of the ONVIF service as indicators of possible exploitation attempts.
- Integration of automated SAST/DAST tools into CI pipelines to surface buffer handling issues early in the development lifecycle.

