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CVE-2025-69971

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Hard-Coded Credentials in FUXA Authentication Helper

CVE-2025-69971

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hard-Coded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Account Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FUXA v1.2.7 uses a hard-coded secret key in its JWT helper to sign and verify authentication tokens.

If an attacker learns or reverse-engineers this static secret, they can forge valid administrator JWTs, bypass authentication, and obtain full administrative control over the application.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in FUXA deployments that rely on JWTs for session or API authentication and use the built-in server/api/jwt-helper.js logic.

The risk is elevated when:

  • The application is exposed over the network (e.g., web UI or API reachable from untrusted networks)
  • The same hard-coded secret is shared across deployments or not rotated
  • Attackers can access the application code, container images, or any artifact revealing the secret

Under these conditions, authentication trust is effectively reduced to secrecy of the static key.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed HTTP endpoints or APIs that accept JWTs for authentication.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests with attacker-controlled JWT tokens; knowledge of or access to the hard-coded secret (via source code, image inspection, or leakage).
  • Trigger point: The server's JWT verification step, where tokens signed with the hard-coded secret are treated as valid and associated with chosen identities/roles.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The JWT signing key is embedded in code as a constant value, making it discoverable and non-unique per deployment. Any party that learns this secret can generate arbitrary valid tokens, including tokens asserting administrative privileges, because the server does not differentiate legitimate issuers from forged ones.

Why this happens

The core issue is the use of a hard-coded, static secret for JWT signing and verification within jwt-helper.js.

This aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where sensitive authentication material (such as passwords, cryptographic keys, or API tokens) is embedded directly into source code or binaries.

By treating the constant as a long-term JWT signing key, the implementation couples the security of the entire authentication layer to an unchanging, easily discoverable value.

This violates key management principles—secrets are not environment-specific, not rotated, and not protected by configuration or secret-management systems—making token forgery straightforward once the key is known.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may forge arbitrary JWTs asserting administrative roles.
  • Attackers could bypass login flows and multi-step authentication checks entirely.
  • Full administrative access can enable modification of configuration, devices, and automation logic managed by FUXA.
  • Attackers may exfiltrate or alter operational and historical data.
  • Compromised admin access could be used as a foothold for lateral movement into connected systems or industrial control environments.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing hard-coded secrets and enforcing robust key management practices:

  • Replace hard-coded JWT secrets with externally managed secrets loaded from environment variables, configuration files managed by the operator, or a dedicated secrets manager.
  • Use unique, strong, per-deployment signing keys; avoid sharing the same secret across environments or customers.
  • Implement regular key rotation policies, including invalidation of existing tokens when keys change where operationally feasible.
  • Consider using asymmetric keys (public/private key pairs) for JWT signing to limit key distribution and support safer verification patterns.
  • Restrict the privileges associated with tokens to the minimum necessary and ensure administrative operations are protected by additional checks where appropriate.

These patterns shift trust from static application code to managed, revocable secrets aligned with standard operational security practices.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can apply several layers of detection and assurance:

  • Static analysis: Search codebases for hard-coded secrets, including JWT keys, passwords, or tokens. Simple regex or semantic rules can flag suspicious constants in authentication or crypto modules.
  • Code review: Treat any constant used in cryptographic operations (JWT signing, encryption, HMAC) as a review hotspot; ensure such values are sourced from secure configuration, not literals.
  • Configuration and policy enforcement: Enforce policies in CI/CD pipelines that prevent hard-coded secrets from being committed, using secret-scanning tools to block merges when credentials are detected.
  • Runtime monitoring: Log and monitor authentication behavior to detect anomalies such as sudden bursts of successful admin logins from unusual sources, which may indicate token forgery.
  • Dependency and container inspection: Periodically inspect images and packaged artifacts for embedded secrets to ensure build pipelines do not bake long-term keys into deployables.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/blob/master/server/api/jwt-helper.js

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is broadly exploitable in any accessible deployment where an attacker can interact with the application endpoints and obtain or infer the hard-coded JWT secret. Once the secret is known, token forgery can be performed remotely without further access.

No. With knowledge of the hard-coded JWT secret, an attacker does not need existing credentials. They can directly generate tokens that claim administrative privileges and present them to the server.

Remove the hard-coded secret from the code, load JWT signing keys from secure configuration or a secret-management system, and ensure that each deployment uses a strong, unique key. Where possible, rotate keys and invalidate old tokens during the transition.

Establish a strict policy that forbids embedding credentials or cryptographic secrets in source code. Integrate automated secret scanning into CI pipelines, adopt centralized secret management solutions, and require code reviews to verify that all authentication and cryptographic keys are externally configured and rotatable.

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