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CVE-2025-69902

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection in kubectl-mcp-server minimal_wrapper.py

CVE-2025-69902

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via Command Injection

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection flaw in the minimal_wrapper.py component of kubectl-mcp-server v1.2.0 allows arbitrary shell commands to be executed when user-controlled input is passed to the underlying shell.

If an attacker can influence the arguments processed by this wrapper, they may execute system commands with the privileges of the kubectl-mcp-server process, leading to full host or container compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in environments running kubectl-mcp-server v1.2.0 where minimal_wrapper.py constructs and invokes shell commands using input that is not fully controlled or sanitized.

It is most relevant when:

  • User or API-supplied parameters are passed through the wrapper to system utilities
  • The wrapper runs with elevated or service-level privileges
  • The execution model relies on shell interpretation (e.g., /bin/sh, /bin/bash) instead of direct, argument-safe system calls

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Interfaces or APIs that accept parameters eventually processed by minimal_wrapper.py (e.g., HTTP endpoints, CLI frontends, RPC calls).
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence the command arguments handled by kubectl-mcp-server (authenticated or unauthenticated, depending on deployment).
  • Trigger point: The moment minimal_wrapper.py builds a shell command string from attacker-controlled input and executes it through a shell interpreter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input is concatenated into a shell command without strict validation or escaping, allowing shell metacharacters (such as command separators, redirections, or subshell operators) to alter the intended command and inject additional arbitrary commands.

Why this happens

The core issue is the construction of shell commands from untrusted input and executing them through a shell, rather than using argument-safe system calls.

Instead of treating external input as opaque data, the vulnerable code treats it as part of the command line, giving the shell a chance to interpret metacharacters and control operators.

This pattern maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where attacker-controlled data becomes part of executable content—in this case, shell commands interpreted as code by the command processor.

Abstractly, the unsafe pattern is: command = base + user_input followed by os.system(command) or equivalent, without strict whitelisting or robust quoting.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of kubectl-mcp-server
  • Complete compromise of the affected container or host, depending on the deployment model
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting sensitive files accessible to the service account
  • Lateral movement within the Kubernetes cluster via kubectl or similar tooling, if available
  • Disruption of services through process termination, resource exhaustion, or configuration tampering

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on preventing untrusted input from being interpreted as executable code by the shell.

Recommended design-level patterns include:

  • Avoid invoking a shell: use APIs such as subprocess.run([...], shell=False) or equivalent to pass arguments as a list, not a concatenated string.
  • Implement strict input validation and whitelisting for all parameters that influence command execution (e.g., only allow known subcommands, flags, and resource identifiers).
  • Remove reliance on dynamic command generation where possible; map high-level operations to fixed, parameterized command templates with typed arguments.
  • Run kubectl-mcp-server with least privilege, restricting file system, network, and Kubernetes API permissions to the minimum required.
  • Isolate components that execute external commands into hardened, minimal-security domains (e.g., dedicated service accounts, constrained pods, or sandboxes).

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of vulnerability using multiple approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or custom linters to flag uses of os.system, subprocess with shell=True, or similar APIs where arguments involve untrusted or concatenated input.
  • Code review: During manual review, scrutinize any code that builds command strings, especially in wrapper scripts or orchestration utilities, and verify that inputs are strictly validated and that shells are not invoked.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use command auditing, eBPF-based tracing, or OS-level logging to detect unexpected command patterns or user-controlled values appearing in executed commands.
  • Policy enforcement: Apply CI/CD policies that block merges when unsafe process invocation patterns are detected, and enforce infrastructure policies that restrict high-risk binaries or shells in production containers.

Sources

SourceLink
asec.ahnlab.comasec.ahnlab.com/ko/92922/
github.comgithub.com/rohitg00/kubectl-mcp-server
github.comgithub.com/rohitg00/kubectl-mcp-server/blob/main/kubectl_mcp_tool/minimal_wrapper.py
pypi.orgpypi.org/project/kubectl-mcp-tool

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if kubectl-mcp-server exposes a network-accessible interface or is driven by remote inputs that control its arguments. Remote attackers who can reach the service and influence those inputs may exploit the issue.

The attacker must be able to supply or manipulate the parameters that minimal_wrapper.py passes to the shell. Depending on the deployment, this might be anonymous web access, authenticated API calls, or indirect control via another service.

Replace shell-based execution with argument-safe system calls that do not invoke a command shell, enforce strict allowlists for all command parameters, and avoid constructing command strings from raw user input.

Adopt secure coding guidelines that prohibit shell invocation with untrusted input, enforce code review and static analysis rules around command execution, and design APIs so user input is treated as data only—never as part of executable commands.

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