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CVE-2025-69875

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Improper Privilege Management in Quick Heal Total Security

CVE-2025-69875

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269, CWE-281, CWE-552

Impact:

Local Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Quick Heal Total Security 23.0.0 contains a privilege management flaw in its quarantine management component that allows low-privileged local users to restore quarantined files into protected system directories.

By abusing insufficient path validation and improper permission handling, an attacker can place arbitrary files in high-privilege locations, which may lead to local privilege escalation.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the quarantine restore workflow of Quick Heal Total Security when quarantined files are written back to the file system.

It is relevant on systems where:

  • The security product's quarantine service or UI runs with elevated privileges
  • Restore operations can target arbitrary file paths
  • File system permissions or integrity controls are expected to prevent low-privileged users from writing into system or other protected directories

The issue manifests when restore path choices from a low-privileged context are honored by a higher-privileged component without adequate validation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Local system only (no remote network exposure)
  • Required access: Authenticated local user with low privileges (e.g., standard desktop account)
  • Trigger point: User-initiated restore of a quarantined file via the product's quarantine management UI or API
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The restore logic accepts user-controlled restore paths or locations without enforcing strict directory or privilege checks.
  • A higher-privileged service or component performs the actual write, effectively proxying the unprivileged user's request into privileged file system locations.
  • File and directory permission checks are either missing, incomplete, or performed in the wrong security context.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where security-relevant operations inherit or misuse elevated privileges instead of enforcing proper access control.

In this case, the quarantine restore mechanism appears to:

  • Trust user-controlled restore paths (relating to CWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties) and
  • Fail to enforce correct access restrictions on where files may be restored (relating to CWE-281: Improper Preservation of Permissions).

The high-privilege component responsible for writing quarantined files back to disk does not sufficiently constrain its behavior based on the caller's privileges or the destination path.

As a result, unprivileged users can cause privileged file writes into protected directories, breaking the intended separation between user-level and system-level file operations.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could restore files into system directories (e.g., application or OS paths) that are normally write-protected.
  • The attacker may be able to replace or plant executables, DLLs, or scripts that are later executed with elevated privileges.
  • The issue could enable privilege escalation from a standard user account to higher-privileged contexts, depending on what files are placed and how they are consumed by the system.
  • The attacker could abuse the restore mechanism to weaken system integrity controls, such as by restoring modified or malicious versions of files that security software previously quarantined.
  • In some environments, this could facilitate persistence or further lateral movement once higher privileges are attained.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict privilege boundaries and restoring quarantined content only to trusted, controlled locations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforce directory allowlists: Restrict restore destinations to a small set of user-appropriate, non-privileged locations and disallow system or application directories as restore targets.
  • Perform path normalization and validation: Normalize and validate all user-specified paths before use, rejecting paths that traverse outside approved directories, including via symlinks or junctions.
  • Honor least privilege for file writes: Wherever feasible, perform restore operations under the security context of the requesting user instead of a highly privileged account, so existing OS access controls apply naturally.
  • Separate duties between UI and service: Ensure that a privileged service enforces its own validation rules and does not rely solely on unprivileged UI-side checks for destination paths or permissions.
  • Preserve and enforce secure permissions: When restoring files, apply safe default permissions and ownership that do not grant elevated access or override system protections.
  • Treat quarantined content as untrusted: Handle quarantined files as potentially malicious, limiting how and where they can be reintroduced to the system, regardless of user request.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level review with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code scanning:
  • Flag privileged services that perform file writes based on user-provided paths.
  • Identify code paths where user-supplied locations bypass centralized authorization or directory allowlists.
  • Detect restore or file copy operations where the effective security context differs from the requesting user.
  • Manual code review:
  • Trace the quarantine restore flow from UI/API input to the final file system write, verifying that path validation and access checks occur in the privileged component.
  • Inspect for any use of raw user input in file system APIs (create, write, move, rename) without normalization, canonicalization, or privilege checks.
  • Review permission and ownership handling for restored files to ensure they do not inadvertently grant elevated access.
  • Runtime and policy enforcement:
  • Apply endpoint policies or application control rules that log or block unexpected writes to system directories by security product processes.
  • Monitor security logs for repeated or unusual restore operations, especially when destination paths are outside typical user directories.
  • Automated review tools:
  • Incorporate security-focused linters or SAST tools into CI pipelines to highlight privilege boundary crossings and file write sinks influenced by low-privileged input.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mertdas/QuickHealTotalSecurityPOC
semiconductor.samsung.comsemiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/cve-2025-59439/

Frequently asked

questions

No. The issue is local-only; an attacker must already have an account or code execution on the affected machine. The vulnerability then allows that local user to gain more privileges by abusing the quarantine restore behavior.

The attacker needs to be a low-privileged local user, such as a standard desktop user. From that position, they interact with the quarantine management component and choose restore locations that are honored by a higher-privileged process.

The most robust fix is to ensure that any file restoration or write operation performed by a privileged component is tightly constrained: validate and canonicalize destination paths, restrict restores to non-privileged locations, and, where possible, execute the write operation under the security context of the requesting user so that OS-level access controls cannot be bypassed.

Design privileged services with explicit privilege boundaries and treat all inputs from lower-privileged components as untrusted. Apply least privilege, enforce directory allowlists, normalize and validate file paths, and incorporate security reviews and automated analysis to catch patterns where untrusted input drives privileged file system operations.

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