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CVE-2025-69822

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Improper Authentication and Session Handling in Atomberg

CVE-2025-69822

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication and Session Handling

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-287, CWE-294

Impact:

Sensitive Information Exposure and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

Atomberg Erica Smart Fan firmware version V1.0.36 contains a flaw where crafted Wi‑Fi deauthentication (deauth) frames can be abused to access sensitive information and gain elevated privileges.

When an attacker is able to inject or spoof deauth frames against the fan's wireless connection, they may leverage resulting insecure states to observe or obtain sensitive data and escalate their access on the device or its associated control channel.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Atomberg Erica Smart Fans running firmware V1.0.36 that are connected over Wi‑Fi and respond to management frames such as deauthentication requests.

The issue is relevant in environments where:

  • The fan is reachable over the local wireless network, and
  • An attacker can transmit crafted 802.11 deauthentication frames within range, and
  • The device's firmware reacts to those frames in a way that weakens or bypasses normal authentication or access controls.

Cloud connectivity or mobile app control may amplify impact, depending on how sessions and credentials are managed when the wireless link is disrupted or reset.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Wireless (802.11) network interface of the smart fan.
  • Required access: Ability to transmit crafted Wi‑Fi deauthentication frames within radio range of the target device; no logical authentication is required to send these frames.
  • Trigger point: The moment the device receives and processes a maliciously crafted deauth frame, potentially causing session resets, forced reconnection, or fallback to insecure modes.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The firmware appears to trust or mishandle deauth frames and subsequent connection states, leading to insecure authentication flows, exposure of sensitive information during or after reconnection, and opportunities to obtain elevated privileges.

Why this happens

The underlying problem is a combination of improper authentication and authorization handling (CWE-287, CWE-284) and information exposure (CWE-200) in response to crafted deauthentication events.

The firmware likely treats certain wireless management frames and subsequent connection transitions as implicitly trustworthy, failing to:

  • Rigorously validate authentication state after a forced disconnect,
  • Enforce strict access control on sensitive operations during reconnection or recovery,
  • Avoid leaking sensitive information through debug responses, configuration APIs, or pairing flows triggered after deauth.

This aligns with patterns described in CWE-294 (Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay) when management frames or session states can be spoofed or replayed to bypass proper checks.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized access to sensitive information such as configuration data, device identifiers, or network-related details.
  • Privilege escalation from a low-privilege or unauthenticated state to higher-privilege control of the fan or associated services.
  • Hijacking of device control functions within the local network, potentially allowing persistent unauthorized management.
  • Facilitation of broader network reconnaissance using information leaked by the device.
  • Degradation of availability or reliability of the smart fan's connectivity as a side effect of repeated deauth abuse.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on hardening authentication flows and limiting information exposure, especially around connection resets and pairing:

  • Enforce strict, stateful authentication checks that are not implicitly reset or downgraded when a deauth frame is seen.
  • Design reconnection and pairing flows so they never expose sensitive information or elevated operations without explicit, cryptographically bound authentication.
  • Minimize sensitive data returned in responses during error, pairing, or diagnostic states triggered by connectivity loss.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to device APIs so that unauthenticated or low-privilege requests can access only non-sensitive functions and metadata.
  • Consider defensive handling of management frames and rate-limiting or throttling behaviors that are triggered by repeated deauth events.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and vendors can use a combination of firmware analysis, testing, and behavioral monitoring to detect similar issues:

  • Static analysis: Review wireless stack and authentication code for branches that change authentication or authorization state in response to deauth or similar management frames, especially where sensitive operations become available.
  • Code review: Look for APIs that return configuration or identity information during pairing, reconnection, or error states, and verify enforcement of authentication and authorization checks at each entry point.
  • Dynamic testing: Use Wi‑Fi testing tools to inject crafted deauth frames and observe whether the device exposes additional information, weakens authentication requirements, or elevates permissions.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding guidelines and automated checks focused on session management, recovery flows, and information disclosure in embedded and IoT firmware development pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/CipherX1802/CVE-2025-69822-Atomberg_Erica_SmatFan_Security_Assessment.git
github.comgithub.com/CipherX1802/CVE-2025-69822-Atomberg_Erica_SmatFan_Security_Assessment/blob/main/Atomberg_Erica_SmatFan_Security_Assessment_Report.pdf

Frequently asked

questions

Typically, exploitation requires proximity to the wireless network, since the attacker must send crafted deauth frames within radio range of the device. Indirect internet-based exploitation would depend on additional weaknesses in remote access or cloud integration that are not implied by this issue alone.

The attacker generally needs physical proximity sufficient to interact with the Wi‑Fi network (e.g., within range of the fan's access point or connected router). They do not necessarily need to know the Wi‑Fi password to transmit spoofed deauth frames, but further privilege escalation may depend on subsequent protocol behavior.

Vendors should harden the firmware's authentication and session handling logic around deauth and reconnection, ensuring that no privileged operations or sensitive data are exposed without explicit, validated credentials. Recovery or pairing modes should be tightly scoped, rate-limited, and designed so that they never implicitly trust network events like deauth as a signal to relax security.

Prevention strategies include modeling Wi‑Fi management frames as untrusted input, enforcing strong, cryptographically bound authentication on every privileged operation, minimizing information returned in all low-trust states, and performing dedicated security reviews of pairing, reconnection, and error-handling flows. Incorporating security testing with crafted wireless frames into the development lifecycle can help catch these issues before release.

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