Summary
Comic Book Reader v1.0.95 contains an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in its file import logic, where attacker-controlled paths can be used to overwrite internal application files.
When an attacker can influence the imported file name or target path, they may overwrite configuration, executable, or data files, which can lead to arbitrary code execution or disclosure of sensitive information.
Affected context
The vulnerability arises in the file import feature of Comic Book Reader v1.0.95 when processing user-supplied files.
It is relevant in deployments where:
- User-provided archives or files are accepted and unpacked/imported by the application
- The application writes imported content to shared or internal directories on disk
- File paths inside archives or metadata are not strictly validated or normalized
In such environments, crafted imports can cause writes to locations outside the intended import directory, including internal resources or configuration files.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: File import interface (e.g., upload, sync, or import of comic book archives or documents)
- Required access: Ability to supply or control files consumed by the Comic Book Reader import process
- Trigger point: Application unpacks or writes imported content to disk using attacker-influenced file paths
- Why exploitation is possible: The import logic does not adequately sanitize or constrain destination paths, allowing directory traversal or arbitrary path selection that targets sensitive internal files
Why this happens
The core issue maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), specifically manifested as an arbitrary file overwrite.
The import process likely trusts file names or paths embedded within user-controlled input (such as archive entries or metadata) and concatenates them with a base directory without:
- Normalizing paths to eliminate
..segments or absolute path markers - Enforcing that the resolved path remains within a designated import or sandbox directory
- Handling symbolic links, junctions, or special filesystem semantics that may redirect writes
As a result, an attacker can craft a payload whose file paths resolve to critical internal locations, allowing unauthorized overwrites.
Potential impact
- Overwrite of configuration files, potentially altering application behavior
- Introduction or modification of scripts, plug-ins, or executables that could lead to arbitrary code execution
- Overwrite of authentication, session, or state files, possibly enabling privilege escalation or forced logouts
- Corruption or destruction of user data and application resources
- Exposure of sensitive information if logging or configuration is altered to leak internal data
- Facilitation of further attacks by planting backdoors or manipulating update mechanisms
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on strictly constraining where imported files can be written and refusing unsafe paths:
- Resolve and normalize all destination paths (e.g., removing
.., handling symlinks) before writing, and verify they remain within a predefined, dedicated import directory. - Implement a robust path-allowlist strategy: only relative paths without traversal sequences, absolute prefixes, or reserved names should be accepted.
- Use file-system level sandboxing where available (e.g., chroot-like environments, containerized volumes, or OS-level app sandboxes) so imported content cannot escape its designated area.
- Deny or remap symbolic links within imported archives or file sets to avoid unexpected write redirection.
- Apply least-privilege principles to the process performing imports so it has no permission to modify system-wide or sensitive application files.
- Treat all archive or packaged input formats as untrusted and validate contents before extraction.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect and manage this class of issue through:
- Static analysis: Rules that flag direct concatenation of user-controlled strings into filesystem paths, especially before file write operations, and that check for missing path normalization and boundary checks.
- Code review: Explicit review checklists for file and archive handling code, ensuring that every write path is validated against a restricted base directory and that symlink handling is considered.
- Runtime monitoring: Instrumentation or logging around file write operations to detect unexpected writes outside designated import folders; anomaly detection can highlight suspicious paths containing traversal sequences.
- Policy and testing: Security-focused tests (including fuzzing with malicious archives and filenames) integrated into CI/CD to ensure new changes do not reintroduce path traversal or arbitrary overwrite behavior.

