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CVE-2025-69602

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Session Management / Session Fixation in 66biolinks

CVE-2025-69602

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Session Management / Session Fixation

CWE:

CWE-384

Impact:

Account Takeover / Session Hijacking

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A session fixation vulnerability in 66biolinks v62.0.0 arises because the application does not regenerate the session identifier after a user successfully authenticates.

This allows an attacker who can set or predict a session ID before login to later hijack the victim's authenticated session when that same identifier is reused.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the authentication and session management logic of 66biolinks when users log in through the web interface.

It manifests in environments where:

  • Session identifiers are established before authentication and
  • The same session ID is preserved after successful login without regeneration.

This is particularly risky when an attacker can influence or observe the session cookie used in the browser prior to the victim authenticating, such as through shared systems, controlled links, or pre-set cookies.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web login endpoint and any functionality that relies on session cookies for authentication.
  • Required access: Ability to cause a victim to use a session ID chosen or observed by the attacker (e.g., pre-set cookie, shared browser environment, or predictable session tokens).
  • Trigger point: The victim logs in using the application's normal authentication flow while bound to the attacker-controlled session identifier.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application fails to regenerate the session identifier on successful authentication, so the pre-authentication session ID persists and becomes bound to the authenticated user, allowing the attacker to reuse that same identifier to access the victim's session.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper session lifecycle management during authentication, mapped to CWE-384: Session Fixation.

The application issues or reuses a session identifier prior to authentication and then does not invalidate or regenerate that identifier once the user successfully logs in.

As a result, the pre-authentication session ID, which may be known or controllable by an attacker, becomes the long-lived authenticated session token.

This design conflates anonymous and authenticated states within the same persistent session identifier, breaking the assumption that a post-login session ID is secret and unpredictable.

Potential impact

  • Attacker may hijack authenticated user sessions and act as the victim.
  • Attacker could access or modify user data within the compromised account.
  • Attacker may perform privileged actions if the victim has elevated roles.
  • Attacker could chain the hijacked session with other vulnerabilities to escalate impact (e.g., data exfiltration or configuration changes).

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on robust session lifecycle controls around login and sensitive state transitions:

  • Regenerate session identifiers after successful authentication and whenever user privileges change.
  • Ensure that pre-authentication session IDs are invalidated and cannot be reused as authenticated sessions.
  • Use cryptographically strong, unpredictable session identifiers and transport them only over secure channels (e.g., HTTPS with secure, HttpOnly cookies).
  • Reduce cross-context cookie sharing (e.g., by using appropriate domain, path, and SameSite attributes) to limit an attacker's ability to inject or reuse session IDs.
  • Apply least-privilege principles in application actions so that a single compromised session limits the blast radius.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached at both code and behavior levels:

  • Code review / static analysis:
  • Look for authentication handlers that set user identity or roles without calling a session regeneration function.
  • Identify frameworks or custom session code where the same session ID persists across anonymous and authenticated states.
  • Flag patterns where session creation happens early (e.g., on first request) and no explicit regeneration occurs after login.
  • Runtime and log analysis:
  • Monitor authentication logs for cases where the session ID before and after login remains identical.
  • Look for repeated use of the same session identifier across different IP addresses, user agents, or users.
  • Policy and tooling:
  • Enforce security guidelines that mandate session regeneration on login and privilege elevation.
  • Use automated security testing tools that simulate session fixation scenarios during QA or CI pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/Waqar-Arain/c8117308325a91b8f3b7829646915275

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If an attacker can induce a victim to use a session ID that the attacker controls or knows (for example, via pre-set cookies or crafted links), the attacker can later use that same ID to access the victim's authenticated session remotely.

The attacker needs the ability to influence or predict the victim's session identifier before the victim logs in, or to operate in a context where they can share or control the browser environment (such as on a shared or compromised device).

The most robust pattern is to regenerate the session ID immediately after successful authentication (and on any privilege elevation), invalidating the old identifier so that pre-login sessions cannot be reused in an authenticated state.

Adopt a standard session management strategy that: regenerates session IDs after login, uses secure and unpredictable tokens, limits cookie scope, and is verified through security-focused code reviews and automated tests specifically covering session lifecycle behavior.

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