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CVE-2025-69600

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Command Injection in Raynet rvia Java Discovery Logic

CVE-2025-69600

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Local Code Execution / Command Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Raynet rvia 12.6.4392.49 contains a command injection vulnerability where an improperly constructed find command is used to locate a Java runtime without correctly terminating or sanitizing user-controllable input.

A local attacker who can create crafted directory structures or influence certain arguments (such as getconfig, upload URL, or oracle via -o) may cause the application to execute arbitrary Java code or shell commands in the context of the rvia process.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Raynet rvia 12.6.4392.49 on Linux systems where the application dynamically searches for a Java executable at runtime.

The issue is present when:

  • rvia invokes the find command to locate a Java runtime
  • The search criteria (path and/or name patterns) can be influenced by local file system layout or argument-controlled paths (e.g., through getconfig, upload URL parameters, or the -o flag)
  • The resulting shell command is constructed without proper quoting, termination, or sanitization

It is most relevant on systems where unprivileged users can create or manipulate directory structures that rvia subsequently scans.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Local system where Raynet rvia is installed and executed.
  • Required access:
  • Ability to create or modify directories and file names on the file system that rvia will traverse; and/or
  • Ability to influence arguments that are concatenated into the find command (for example, parameters associated with getconfig, upload URL, or the -o flag).
  • Trigger point: Execution of the internal Java discovery routine or related functionality that calls find with attacker-influenced search criteria.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The find command is built by concatenating untrusted data directly into a shell command string without robust quoting or parameterization, allowing crafted directory paths or arguments to be interpreted as additional shell tokens or commands.

Why this happens

The core defect is an argument injection flaw in a shell command used to locate a Java runtime.

rvia constructs a find command using untrusted input (directory paths, flags, or derived values) and passes it to the shell without:

  • Treating each component as a separate, safely escaped argument, and
  • Ensuring that user-controllable data cannot break out of the intended search expression.

This behavior aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), where user-controllable input is incorporated into a command line in a way that allows execution of unintended commands.

Unlike classic PATH order hijacking, the flaw stems from the internal search logic: the search query itself is malformed, enabling attackers to craft paths that satisfy the search condition while injecting additional semantics into the command execution.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary Java code under the permissions of the rvia process.
  • Execution of arbitrary shell commands on the local system (command injection).
  • Local privilege escalation if rvia runs with elevated or service-level privileges.
  • Tampering with application behavior, including configuration retrieval (getconfig) or upload workflows, to exfiltrate data or alter system state.
  • Potential pivot into broader system compromise if combined with other local weaknesses.

General mitigation guidance

Defenses should focus on eliminating direct shell command construction and tightening trust boundaries around search paths:

  • Replace shell-based find invocation with safe, language-native directory traversal APIs that accept structured parameters rather than raw command strings.
  • If external tools must be used, invoke them without going through a shell and pass all parameters as discrete, properly escaped arguments.
  • Enforce strict canonicalization and whitelisting of search roots (e.g., fixed, known-safe base directories) rather than allowing arbitrary or user-controlled paths.
  • Remove or minimize dependence on user-influenced values when constructing search expressions; avoid embedding parameter values directly in search predicates.
  • Run the rvia process with least privilege and restrict file system permissions so low-privileged users cannot create or tamper with directories in search paths used by the application.
  • Adopt secure-by-default configuration for Java discovery, preferring explicit, administratively configured Java paths over dynamic scanning when feasible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-level inspection with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Search for dynamic command construction that calls find, sh, or similar tools with concatenated strings containing variables derived from directory paths, URLs, or command-line options.
  • Flag any use of generic shell execution APIs (e.g., system, popen, exec* with a single string argument) where arguments are not clearly separated or quoted.
  • Review Java discovery or environment probing routines for reliance on shell commands instead of native APIs.
  • Policy and configuration checks:
  • Enforce organizational coding standards that prohibit shell invocation with untrusted input and require parameterized process execution.
  • Integrate secure coding guidelines into CI checks, ensuring new or modified command execution paths are flagged for security review.
  • Runtime and operational monitoring:
  • Monitor process execution logs for unusual find invocations spawned by rvia, especially those containing unexpected directory names or characters (such as semicolons, backticks, or shell metacharacters).
  • Use host intrusion detection or EDR tooling to alert on anomalous child processes launched from the rvia process, which can indicate successful command injection.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Wise-Security/CVE-2025-69600
support.raynet.desupport.raynet.de/hc/en-us/articles/19518792826132-RVY200865-RayVentory-12-6
support.raynet.desupport.raynet.de/hc/en-us/articles/46163185339284-RSEC200966-Command-Injection-via-Unsafe-System-Calls-CVE-2025-69600

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is primarily local because it relies on crafting directory structures or influencing arguments on the host where rvia runs. However, if an attacker can control those inputs indirectly via another remote interface that rvia trusts (for example, remote file deployment or path configuration), the exposure could expand.

An attacker typically needs local access sufficient to create or manipulate directories and files in locations that rvia will search, or to influence arguments associated with features like getconfig, upload URLs, or the -o flag. The impact increases significantly if rvia runs with elevated privileges.

The most robust fix is to remove shell command construction altogether in the Java discovery logic and to use language-native file system and process APIs with strictly separated arguments. Any remaining external command invocations should avoid the shell and must treat all inputs as data, not as part of a command line.

Prevention relies on secure patterns: forbid concatenation of untrusted data into shell commands, standardize on safe process execution utilities, and perform security-focused reviews of any code that launches external tools. Combine these practices with least-privilege deployment, fixed search paths for critical binaries like Java, and automated checks that flag risky command execution patterns during development.

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