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CVE-2025-69215

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

SQL Injection in OpenSTAManager Stampe Module

CVE-2025-69215

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise and Potential Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenSTAManager versions 2.9.8 and prior contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the Stampe module, where user-controlled input can influence database queries without proper sanitization.

Under typical deployment conditions, this could allow an attacker to read, modify, or delete data in the application database and, in some environments, escalate to full compromise of the underlying system.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the Stampe module of OpenSTAManager when user-supplied data is incorporated into SQL queries without robust parameterization or filtering.

It is most relevant in deployments where the application is internet-accessible or reachable from untrusted internal networks, and where the database user has broad privileges (such as access to sensitive tables or administrative capabilities).

Actual exploitability depends on the specific query paths affected, database configuration, and how input flows from the user interface or API into the underlying query builder.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface or HTTP-based endpoints that interact with the Stampe module.
  • Required access: Network access to the OpenSTAManager instance; typically no more than standard user-level access if vulnerable parameters are exposed without strong authentication.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted input into fields or parameters handled by the Stampe module that are later interpolated into SQL statements.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL from user input without using strict prepared statements or equivalent parameterized mechanisms, allowing attacker-controlled tokens to alter the structure and logic of the query.

Why this happens

This issue stems from dynamic SQL construction that concatenates or interpolates user-controlled values directly into query strings.

Instead of using parameterized queries or a safe query builder, the code path in the Stampe module appears to treat input as trusted and passes it verbatim (or insufficiently sanitized) to the database.

This behavior maps directly to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where metacharacters such as quotes, delimiters, or control operators are not neutralized, allowing attackers to modify query semantics.

Potential impact

  • Retrieval of sensitive customer, invoice, or technical assistance data from the database.
  • Modification or deletion of records, including invoices, customer details, or configuration data.
  • Creation of backdoor accounts or manipulation of application roles and permissions, depending on schema design.
  • Execution of database-specific functions or procedures that may lead to file access or code execution on the database host.
  • Disruption of business operations through deliberate data corruption or service instability.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation should focus on eliminating dynamic query construction and enforcing strict separation of code and data in all database operations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Refactoring all affected queries in the Stampe module to rely on prepared statements or parameterized queries, never concatenating raw user input into SQL strings.
  • Using a robust ORM or query builder that enforces parameterization by default and discourages raw SQL where possible.
  • Centralizing input handling for database access, applying strong server-side validation and normalization to ensure only expected types and value ranges reach the query layer.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to the database user account, limiting it to only the tables and operations required for the module's functionality.
  • Separating duties so that the web application cannot perform administrative database actions such as schema changes or OS-level operations.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters to flag string concatenation used to build SQL queries, direct use of untrusted variables in query strings, and bypasses of ORM safe APIs.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, look for patterns such as "SELECT ... " . $_REQUEST[...] or similar constructs in PHP or other languages, focusing on the Stampe module and any shared query utilities it relies on.
  • Dynamic testing: Use web application scanners or targeted penetration tests to send crafted payloads through Stampe-related forms and endpoints and monitor for SQL errors, unexpected responses, or timing differences.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable database logging for anomalous queries, such as those containing tautologies, stacked statements (if supported), or unusual comment markers, then correlate them with incoming HTTP requests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-qx9p-w3vj-q24q

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the OpenSTAManager instance is reachable over a network and the vulnerable Stampe module endpoints are accessible, an attacker can typically exploit this remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests.

In many configurations, only basic network reachability is required. Depending on how the module is exposed, the attacker may need low-privileged application credentials, but SQL injection often becomes possible even at the lowest accessible permission level.

The most robust fix is to replace all dynamic SQL that incorporates user input with parameterized queries or ORM calls that strictly bind variables, combined with strong server-side validation for all Stampe module inputs and least-privilege database accounts.

Adopt a development standard that forbids string-based SQL built from user input, enforce automated checks in CI for unsafe query patterns, use frameworks that default to parameterization, and pair this with ongoing security testing focused on input handling and query-related code paths.

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