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CVE-2025-69212

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection in OpenSTAManager P7M File Decoding

CVE-2025-69212

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Server

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenSTAManager versions 2.9.8 and earlier contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the P7M (signed XML) file decoding feature, where crafted filenames from uploaded .p7m files are incorporated into system-level operations.

An authenticated attacker who can upload ZIP archives containing a maliciously named .p7m file may be able to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server with the application's privileges.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects OpenSTAManager deployments that use the P7M (signed XML) file decoding functionality and allow authenticated users to upload ZIP archives for processing.

The issue arises when the application processes the contents of a ZIP file and passes the extracted .p7m filename into system-level utilities or shell commands without robust sanitization or safe invocation.

Environments where application processes run with elevated or shared privileges are at higher risk, as successful exploitation may impact broader system components.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application interface exposing P7M decoding and ZIP upload functionality.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account with permission to upload ZIP files containing .p7m documents.
  • Trigger point: Server-side processing of the uploaded ZIP, specifically when the P7M filename is used to construct or invoke an OS-level command.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled filename data from inside the ZIP is incorporated into shell or system command execution without proper escaping, validation, or use of safer APIs, enabling command injection.

Why this happens

The root cause falls under CWE-78: OS Command Injection, where untrusted input is used to build or influence operating system commands.

In this case, the application likely takes the filename of an uploaded .p7m file (extracted from a ZIP archive) and concatenates it into a command string or passes it unsafely to a shell interpreter.

Because filenames from user-controlled archives are not strictly validated, normalized, or safely parameterized, attackers can embed shell metacharacters or additional command sequences in the filename, causing the system to execute arbitrary commands during P7M decoding.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the OpenSTAManager application process.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by the application or available on the host system.
  • Installation of backdoors, web shells, or other persistence mechanisms on the server.
  • Lateral movement to other systems or services reachable from the compromised host.
  • Disruption of service availability through destructive commands or resource exhaustion.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct use of untrusted data in OS command construction and hardening file-processing workflows:

  • Replace shell-based invocations with high-level language APIs or libraries that perform P7M decoding without calling external commands where possible.
  • If external utilities are necessary, use parameterized command execution (e.g., non-shell exec functions that take argument lists) instead of concatenating strings and passing them to a shell.
  • Apply strict validation and normalization to uploaded filenames: enforce a safe character set, maximum length, and expected extensions; reject or rewrite suspicious names.
  • Ensure that uploaded files are stored and processed in controlled directories with no reliance on user-supplied paths or path fragments.
  • Run the application and any helper processes with least-privilege accounts and constrained OS permissions to reduce blast radius if a flaw is exploited.
  • Introduce defense-in-depth controls, such as application-level allowlists for acceptable operations and OS-level security frameworks (e.g., process sandboxing, MAC policies) where feasible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for uses of shell-executing functions (e.g., system calls, shell_exec, popen, backticks) that incorporate filename variables or other user-derived inputs.
  • Flag code paths where ZIP contents or uploaded filenames are used to build command strings or passed unescaped to subprocesses.
  • Review the P7M decoding workflow for reliance on shell pipelines, temporary files, or command-line utilities that accept user-controlled parameters.
  • Policy and CI enforcement:
  • Define secure coding guidelines that prohibit direct shell command construction with user input and enforce them via CI checks.
  • Integrate security-focused linters or SAST tools configured to highlight CWE-78 patterns in the codebase.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor server logs and process execution logs for unusual command patterns triggered during file upload or P7M processing.
  • Set up alerts for failed or anomalous subprocess invocations associated with the upload endpoints or P7M decoding routines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-25fp-8w8p-mx36

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the OpenSTAManager instance is exposed over the network and an attacker can obtain valid credentials with access to the P7M upload functionality. The attack is launched remotely through the web interface but requires authentication.

The attacker needs an authenticated account that can upload ZIP files containing .p7m documents to the vulnerable functionality. No direct shell access is required; the exploitation occurs during server-side file processing.

The most robust fix is to eliminate shell-based command construction with user-controlled data by using safe, language-native APIs for P7M decoding. Where external tools are unavoidable, commands should be executed via parameterized subprocess APIs with strict validation and normalization of all arguments, especially filenames.

Adopt a defensive development practice that treats all external input—including filenames from archives—as untrusted; forbid direct string concatenation into shell commands; enforce secure coding standards via code review and automated tooling; and routinely test file-handling features for injection risks as part of security assessments.

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