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CVE-2025-68719

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Information Exposure / Insecure Configuration Management

CVE-2025-68719

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Exposure / Insecure Configuration Management

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-552

Impact:

Exposure of Credentials and Full Device Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

KAYSUS KS-WR3600 routers running firmware 1.0.5.9.1 expose a configuration backup endpoint that can be queried whenever any user maintains an active session.

An attacker who can reach the management interface while a user is logged in may download a full configuration archive containing sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, enabling credential recovery and potential full device compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects KAYSUS KS-WR3600 routers using firmware 1.0.5.9.1 where the web-based management interface is accessible (e.g., from the local network or, in some deployments, from the internet).

The issue manifests when the device allows configuration backup requests to succeed as long as any authenticated session exists, instead of strictly binding access control to the requesting user and enforcing proper authorization for the backup operation.

Environments that expose the admin interface broadly, reuse sessions, or lack proper network segmentation are more susceptible to exploitation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web management interface of the router (HTTP/HTTPS).
  • Required access: Network reachability to the router's management IP/port; at least one valid user session must be active on the device.
  • Trigger point: Direct HTTP(S) request to the configuration backup endpoint while another user session remains authenticated.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The backup endpoint relies on weak or indirect session/authorization checks, allowing requests to succeed based on the mere existence of an active session rather than per-request user identity and privilege validation.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a combination of information exposure (CWE-200) and improper access to files or directories (CWE-552).

The firmware's configuration management logic exposes a backup endpoint that returns a complete configuration archive, including sensitive system files like /etc/shadow, without enforcing strict per-request authorization.

Instead of tightly coupling backup operations to a specific authenticated user and enforcing least-privilege access, the implementation appears to treat the presence of any active session as sufficient, effectively bypassing proper access control on highly sensitive configuration data.

This design flaw results in a broad exposure of sensitive information that should never be downloadable in bulk without strong authentication, authorization, and data minimization controls.

Potential impact

  • Recovery of password hashes from /etc/shadow and other credential stores.
  • Offline cracking of administrative and user credentials, potentially leading to full device takeover.
  • Disclosure of Wi‑Fi security settings (SSID, PSK) and VPN or DDNS credentials stored in the configuration.
  • Pivoting from the router to internal network assets using recovered credentials or modified configuration.
  • Loss of confidentiality for ISP account information and other embedded secrets in the configuration archive.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strengthening access control around configuration operations and minimizing sensitive data exposure:

  • Enforce strict, per-request authorization checks on backup endpoints, ensuring only explicitly authenticated and privileged users can invoke configuration exports.
  • Limit the contents of configuration backups to necessary device settings and avoid bundling system-level files such as /etc/shadow or other credential stores.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to the web management interface, separating high-risk operations (backup, restore, firmware update) from routine configuration pages.
  • Where possible, encrypt stored credentials and sensitive configuration items, reducing their value if a backup is obtained.
  • Encourage deployment patterns that restrict access to the management interface through network segmentation, management VLANs, and disabling WAN-side administration by default.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and testers can look for this class of issues using:

  • Static analysis and firmware review: Inspect web application handlers for backup/export features that return archives without robust session and privilege checks; flag any direct access to files like /etc/shadow from HTTP endpoints.
  • Dynamic testing: While an authenticated session is active in one client, attempt direct requests to backup or export endpoints from another client without logging in; monitor whether the device returns configuration data.
  • Logging and monitoring: Where logging is available, review HTTP access logs for repeated or anomalous requests to backup endpoints, especially from unexpected IPs or user agents.
  • Security policy enforcement: Establish internal guidelines that require explicit authorization gates around any endpoint that returns bulk configuration or sensitive system files and verify adherence during code review.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/actuator/cve/blob/main/KAYSUS/CVE-2025-68719.txt
github.comgithub.com/actuator/cve/tree/main/KAYSUS
kaysus.comkaysus.com/ks_wr3600__wifi_7_be3600_wireless_router.html

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only if the router's management interface is exposed beyond the local network (for example, if remote administration is enabled or port forwarding is misconfigured). In many default setups, the attack surface is limited to the local network unless the interface is explicitly exposed.

The attacker must be able to reach the web management interface over the network and exploit the condition where at least one valid user session is already active. They do not necessarily need to know the credentials themselves if the implementation accepts their backup request based solely on the existence of another user's session.

The safest pattern is to enforce strong, per-request authentication and authorization for all backup and export operations, restrict these features to high-privilege roles, and ensure that highly sensitive system files are never included in downloadable archives.

Apply secure-by-design principles: design management interfaces with explicit access control on every sensitive endpoint, minimize the sensitive data exposed through configuration exports, segregate high-risk operations, and subject configuration management features to dedicated security review and testing before release.

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