/

CVE-2025-67840

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in Cohesity TranZman Web API Scheduler

CVE-2025-67840

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution with Root Privileges

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Multiple OS command injection flaws in the Cohesity (formerly Stone Ram) TranZman 4.0 web application API allow authenticated administrators to inject arbitrary shell commands into system-level operations.

By modifying request parameters during job creation or execution, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the appliance, bypassing the intended CLISH restricted shell confinement.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects the TranZman 4.0 appliance web interface and its API endpoints, including but not limited to the Scheduler and Actions pages.

It arises when backend logic constructs system commands by directly concatenating user-supplied parameters without robust validation or escaping.

This behavior is exposed in workflows such as job creation, scheduling, and execution where administrative users can influence command parameters that are later executed by the OS with elevated privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web management interface and associated HTTP(S) API endpoints (Scheduler, Actions, and related job/ task APIs).
  • Required access: Authenticated administrative access or any role permitted to create, modify, or run jobs via the web UI or API.
  • Trigger point: Interception and modification of legitimate HTTP requests (e.g., via a proxy) where request parameters are passed to backend command-line invocations.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application builds shell commands by concatenating untrusted parameters into command strings executed with root privileges, allowing shell metacharacters and injected subcommands to be interpreted by the OS.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

Backend components take values from HTTP request parameters and insert them directly into shell command strings executed via the operating system, without strict input validation, argument separation, or proper escaping.

This pattern effectively treats user input as part of the command language, giving attackers control over shell syntax and allowing additional commands to be injected and executed.

The presence of a restricted CLISH shell does not mitigate this bug because the vulnerable components bypass that interface and invoke OS commands directly with root privileges.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with root privileges on the TranZman appliance
  • Complete compromise of the underlying operating system and application stack
  • Exfiltration, modification, or deletion of backup data and configuration
  • Installation of persistence mechanisms, backdoors, or tooling for further lateral movement
  • Disablement or tampering with backup, restore, and recovery operations
  • Use of the compromised appliance as a pivot point into connected infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing the ability for user input to influence shell syntax and ensuring commands execute in a controlled manner:

  • Replace shell command construction with API- or library-based operations wherever possible, avoiding external process invocation.
  • When external commands are unavoidable, use well-structured process invocation APIs that pass arguments as arrays (e.g., exec-style calls without a shell) rather than building command strings.
  • Apply strict allow-list validation to all parameters that influence command invocation, constraining inputs to expected formats (e.g., fixed enums, numeric ranges, or rigorously validated paths).
  • Normalize and validate all user-controllable fields that eventually reach command execution, explicitly rejecting or neutralizing shell metacharacters and unexpected tokens.
  • Enforce least privilege for the process executing system commands, reducing the impact of any command execution bug by avoiding root where not strictly necessary.
  • Introduce architectural boundaries so that web-facing components cannot directly issue high-privilege OS commands without going through a well-validated control layer.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor for this class of vulnerability through several approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules or custom queries to flag string concatenation or interpolation used to build shell commands, especially where input originates from HTTP parameters or request bodies.
  • Code review: During security-focused reviews, trace any path from web handlers or controllers to OS command execution APIs, checking for the use of shells, untrusted arguments, and absence of validation/escaping.
  • Dynamic testing: Use authenticated web application security testing to probe endpoints that trigger system-level operations, watching for abnormal behavior when special shell characters are supplied.
  • Runtime monitoring: Collect and review process creation logs from the appliance OS where possible, looking for unexpected command lines, abnormal arguments, or commands executed in response to web requests.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding guidelines into CI/CD pipelines, blocking changes that introduce unsanitized calls to command execution helpers without accompanying validation and tests.

Sources

SourceLink
cohesity.comcohesity.com
gist.github.comgist.github.com/GregDurys/ef7fc6a36646df927374bba8e7279270
github.comgithub.com/GregDurys/Cohesity-TranZman-CVEs

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the web management interface or API is reachable over the network and an attacker can authenticate with sufficient privileges, they can exploit the vulnerable endpoints remotely.

The vulnerability description indicates that an authenticated admin user can exploit it. In practice, any role that can invoke the affected Scheduler or Actions operations with user-controlled parameters would be sufficient, so role permissions should be carefully evaluated.

The most robust fix is to eliminate shell-based command construction from web-facing code, instead using native APIs or non-shell process invocation that treats user input strictly as data arguments, combined with strong validation and least-privilege execution.

Adopt secure coding standards that prohibit direct shell command construction from web inputs, enforce allow-listed validation for any parameters that affect system operations, add automated checks for command injection patterns, and ensure that security review is mandatory for any feature that interacts with the underlying OS.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.