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CVE-2025-67601

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Improper Certificate Validation in Rancher Manager CLI

CVE-2025-67601

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

TLS Trust Boundary Weakening and Potential Man-in-the-Middle Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Rancher Manager's CLI login workflow can improperly handle TLS certificate validation when self-signed CA certificates are used with the -skip-verify flag but without the --cacert flag.

In this configuration, the CLI falls back to CA certificates stored in Rancher's cacerts setting, potentially weakening the intended trust boundary and exposing users to man-in-the-middle risks if those trust roots are not tightly controlled.

Affected context

This issue arises in Rancher environments where:

  • Rancher Manager is deployed with self-signed or custom CA certificates, and
  • Users authenticate with the Rancher CLI using the login command,
  • The -skip-verify flag is provided, but the --cacert flag is omitted.

In this state, instead of strictly honoring the user's explicit trust configuration, the CLI attempts to pull CA certificates from Rancher's cacerts setting, creating an ambiguous trust model that may not match the operator's security expectations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-level connection between Rancher CLI clients and Rancher Manager.
  • Required access: Capability to intercept, tamper with, or influence traffic or trust configuration (e.g., control of a network segment, DNS poisoning, or unauthorized modification of server-side cacerts).
  • Trigger point: A user runs rancher login with self-signed certificates configured on the server, uses -skip-verify, and omits --cacert, causing the CLI to rely on certificates sourced from Rancher's cacerts setting.
  • Why exploitation is possible: TLS certificate validation behavior diverges from a clear, explicit trust chain; the CLI implicitly trusts CA material derived from server-side configuration, which can expand or shift the effective trust boundary and make it easier for an attacker with influence over those trust roots or traffic routing to impersonate the Rancher endpoint.

Why this happens

The vulnerability is rooted in improper TLS certificate validation and trust handling, as captured by CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation.

Instead of cleanly separating "no verification" behavior from "explicit CA pinning," the CLI's logic in the described flag combination implicitly retrieves CA certificates from Rancher's cacerts setting.

This design couples client-side trust decisions to server-side configuration and weakens the clarity of the trust model: an operator who intends to bypass verification or explicitly pin a CA may unknowingly rely on a broader or differently managed trust store.

The underlying bug class is an unsafe trust fallback, where certificate validation behavior becomes context-dependent and does not strictly follow least surprise or least privilege principles for TLS trust stores.

Potential impact

  • An attacker with network control may be able to position themselves as a man-in-the-middle between the Rancher CLI and Rancher Manager.
  • Users could unknowingly establish TLS sessions anchored in CA material they did not explicitly choose or verify.
  • Sensitive Rancher access tokens or credentials used during CLI login could be exposed to an attacker in the path.
  • Administrative operations performed via the CLI could be issued against an attacker-controlled endpoint masquerading as Rancher Manager.
  • Auditability and compliance around TLS trust configuration may be reduced, as the effective trust store is not strictly tied to explicit CLI parameters.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on making TLS trust behavior explicit and minimizing implicit fallbacks:

  • Prefer explicit CA pinning for Rancher CLI connections by always specifying a trusted CA bundle when using self-signed or private CAs.
  • Avoid depending on mixed or server-driven trust sources; keep responsibility for client trust stores on the client side where possible.
  • Enforce configuration patterns where TLS verification is either:
  • fully enabled with a well-defined CA store, or
  • explicitly and temporarily disabled in controlled environments with strong compensating controls (e.g., isolated networks).
  • Review and limit who can modify Rancher's cacerts setting so that server-side trust configuration remains tightly governed.
  • Apply least privilege to Rancher CLI usage: do not reuse highly privileged credentials for low-trust or experimental environments, and segment administrative access.

These patterns help ensure that certificate validation behavior is predictable and that trust boundaries remain narrow and explicit.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor this class of issue by combining configuration review and runtime observation:

  • Configuration analysis: Periodically review Rancher Manager's cacerts setting to verify that only intended, well-managed CAs are present.
  • Client usage patterns: Log and analyze Rancher CLI usage to identify logins using -skip-verify without an accompanying --cacert, treating these as higher-risk events.
  • Policy enforcement: Use internal security policies or wrappers around the Rancher CLI that disallow or warn on unsafe flag combinations (e.g., -skip-verify in production environments).
  • Code and design review: When assessing CLI tools, examine how flags that affect TLS validation interact and ensure that there are no hidden fallbacks or implicit trust expansions.
  • Automated checks: Integrate static or configuration scanners into CI/CD and operational tooling that flag ambiguous TLS validation logic or reliance on server-provided CA stores.

Sources

SourceLink
bugzilla.suse.combugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2025-67601
github.comgithub.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-mc24-7m59-4q5p

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, under the right conditions. If an attacker can intercept or influence network traffic and the CLI is used with the risky flag combination, they may be able to impersonate the Rancher Manager endpoint, turning this into a remote man-in-the-middle scenario.

An attacker typically needs control over a network path (for example, through compromised infrastructure, local network access, or DNS manipulation) or the ability to alter trusted CA material (such as Rancher's cacerts setting or underlying system trust stores) to practically exploit this vulnerability.

The safest pattern is to ensure that TLS certificate validation is always performed against an explicitly defined and tightly scoped CA bundle, particularly for environments using self-signed or internal CAs, and to avoid reliance on implicit CA sources tied to server-side settings.

Design client tools so that TLS trust is transparent and strictly controlled: avoid hidden fallbacks, clearly separate "no verification" from "explicit CA pinning," enforce secure defaults, and use automated policy checks to prevent unsafe flag combinations or ambiguous trust configurations in production workflows.

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