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CVE-2025-67447

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Neterbit NW-431F Router Network Diagnosis Module

CVE-2025-67447

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Router via Web Interface

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The network diagnosis (ping) feature in the Neterbit NW-431F router improperly concatenates user-supplied IP address input into a system ping command without adequate sanitization.

An attacker who can access the router's web interface may inject additional shell metacharacters and commands, leading to arbitrary OS command execution with the web server's privileges.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects the web-based network diagnosis (ping) module of Neterbit NW-431F routers running firmware 20241014-IR03 and earlier.

It arises when user-controlled input from the IP address field is passed directly into the underlying operating system's ping command.

The issue is relevant whenever the diagnostic interface is exposed to untrusted users, such as LAN clients, guests, or remote users if the management UI is reachable over the internet or VPN.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the router's web management UI, specifically the network diagnosis (ping) page.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the ping endpoint (e.g., authenticated or unauthenticated access depending on router configuration).
  • Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted value in the IP address field that is concatenated into the ping system command.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs shell commands using user input without robust validation, escaping, or strict parameterization, enabling injection of additional commands via shell metacharacters.

Why this happens

The root cause maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

The router's web application appears to build a shell command string (e.g., invoking ping) by concatenating the user-supplied IP address directly into a command line and passing it to a shell or equivalent interface.

Because the input is not strictly validated against an expected format (such as IPv4/IPv6 only) and not safely escaped or parameterized, special characters like ;, &&, or | can break out of the intended command context.

This insecure pattern treats external input as part of executable shell syntax, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary additional commands executed with the web server's privileges.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router with the privileges of the web server process.
  • Installation or execution of malicious scripts or binaries on the router's underlying OS.
  • Retrieval or modification of configuration files, including potential exposure of credentials or network settings.
  • Disruption of router operations, including denial of service by altering system parameters or terminating critical processes.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot for further attacks against internal network devices.
  • Participation of the router in botnets, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns, or other coordinated malicious activities.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell command construction with user input and strictly constraining what the diagnostic feature can do:

  • Replace shell-based invocation of utilities like ping with library or API calls that do not require invoking a system shell, or use safe wrappers that accept only structured parameters.
  • Enforce strict input validation for the IP address field using allowlists (e.g., only valid IPv4/IPv6 formats), rejecting any unexpected characters or patterns.
  • Apply rigorous neutralization/escaping of any remaining user input that must be passed to system utilities, ensuring special shell characters cannot alter command structure.
  • Run the web server and diagnostic components with the least privileges necessary and minimize access to sensitive files or system functions to limit damage if exploitation occurs.
  • Design the diagnostic module to operate on predefined commands or fixed templates rather than dynamically assembling command strings from user-controlled data.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and developers can detect OS command injection risks in similar router or embedded web interfaces using:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag direct concatenation of HTTP parameter values into system calls (e.g., system, popen, exec*, backticks) or generic shell execution APIs.
  • Code review: Manual inspection for any code paths where user-controlled input reaches shell command construction, with particular attention to network tools (ping, traceroute, nslookup) implemented via command-line utilities.
  • Security testing: Targeted dynamic testing (including fuzzing and negative testing) of diagnostic forms by injecting shell metacharacters and observing anomalies in responses or device behavior.
  • Policy enforcement: Development and security guidelines that prohibit direct shell calls with untrusted input and encourage safe abstractions or libraries for network diagnostics.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fun-beep/CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2025-67447
neterbit.comneterbit.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on the router's configuration. If the web management interface or diagnostic tools are exposed to the internet (for example, via remote management or port forwarding), an external attacker could exploit the issue. If access is restricted to the local network, attackers would need a foothold on the LAN or VPN.

That depends on how the router's web UI is configured. If the ping tool is accessible without logging in, unauthenticated attackers may exploit it directly. Even when authentication is required, any user able to access the diagnostic page could attempt command injection.

Avoid building shell command strings with user input altogether. Instead, use high-level APIs or libraries to perform network diagnostics, apply strict allowlist validation to any parameters, and ensure no user-controlled data is ever interpreted as shell syntax.

Adopt secure design patterns that separate user input from command execution, enforce strong input validation early, and treat all external input as untrusted. Combine secure coding standards with automated checks and code review practices that explicitly look for shell invocation patterns and injection risks in diagnostic and administration features.

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