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CVE-2025-65340

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in Hospital Management System

CVE-2025-65340

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Authentication bypass, data exfiltration, and potential full database compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical SQL injection flaw in the Hospital Management System 4.0 allows attackers to manipulate database queries via the /betweendates-detailsreports.php endpoint.

When user-controlled data is interpolated directly into SQL statements, an attacker can bypass access controls, extract sensitive medical records, or modify application data.

A critical SQL injection flaw in the Hospital Management System 4.0 allows attackers to manipulate database queries via the /betweendates-detailsreports.php endpoint.

When user-controlled data is interpolated directly into SQL statements, an attacker can bypass access controls, extract sensitive medical records, or modify application data.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the reporting functionality exposed by /betweendates-detailsreports.php within Hospital Management System 4.0.

It is relevant in deployments where HTTP request parameters (such as dates, identifiers, or filters) are used to build SQL queries without reliable parameterization.

Systems that run the application with database accounts having broad privileges and that expose the reporting feature to authenticated or semi-trusted users are more susceptible to severe impact.

The vulnerability occurs in the reporting functionality exposed by /betweendates-detailsreports.php within Hospital Management System 4.0.

It is relevant in deployments where HTTP request parameters (such as dates, identifiers, or filters) are used to build SQL queries without reliable parameterization.

Systems that run the application with database accounts having broad privileges and that expose the reporting feature to authenticated or semi-trusted users are more susceptible to severe impact.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface, specifically the /betweendates-detailsreports.php endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the reporting page (often as an authenticated user, but sometimes via exposed endpoints)
  • Trigger point: Unsanitized request parameters are concatenated directly into SQL queries used to generate between-dates reports
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL statements using string interpolation instead of prepared statements, allowing attacker-provided input to alter the query's structure and logic
  • Attack surface: Web interface, specifically the /betweendates-detailsreports.php endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the reporting page (often as an authenticated user, but sometimes via exposed endpoints)
  • Trigger point: Unsanitized request parameters are concatenated directly into SQL queries used to generate between-dates reports
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL statements using string interpolation instead of prepared statements, allowing attacker-provided input to alter the query's structure and logic

Why this happens

This issue stems from building SQL queries by concatenating user-controlled data in application code, a classic instance of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Rather than treating user input as data bound through parameters, the code interpolates raw values into the WHERE clause and other SQL segments.

As a result, special characters such as quotes and SQL keywords are interpreted by the database server as part of executable query logic, enabling attackers to inject additional conditions, union queries, or destructive statements.

This issue stems from building SQL queries by concatenating user-controlled data in application code, a classic instance of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Rather than treating user input as data bound through parameters, the code interpolates raw values into the WHERE clause and other SQL segments.

As a result, special characters such as quotes and SQL keywords are interpreted by the database server as part of executable query logic, enabling attackers to inject additional conditions, union queries, or destructive statements.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may access sensitive patient records and administrative information.
  • Attackers could modify or delete medical data, appointment records, or billing information.
  • Attackers can bypass authentication or authorization checks by manipulating SQL logic.
  • Attackers may gain full control over the underlying database, including creating new accounts or dumping entire tables.
  • Attackers could chain the database compromise into broader system compromise if the database account has elevated privileges (e.g., file access, stored procedures).
  • Attackers may access sensitive patient records and administrative information.
  • Attackers could modify or delete medical data, appointment records, or billing information.
  • Attackers can bypass authentication or authorization checks by manipulating SQL logic.
  • Attackers may gain full control over the underlying database, including creating new accounts or dumping entire tables.
  • Attackers could chain the database compromise into broader system compromise if the database account has elevated privileges (e.g., file access, stored procedures).

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation emphasizes treating all external input as untrusted and ensuring it cannot change SQL query structure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements consistently for all database operations.
  • Applying strict input validation and type checking (e.g., enforcing date formats or numeric IDs) before interacting with the database.
  • Centralizing data access logic so unsafe query construction patterns are easier to spot and eliminate.
  • Assigning least-privilege credentials to the application's database user to limit damage if injection occurs.
  • Implementing defense-in-depth controls such as query whitelisting or ORM layers that abstract direct SQL string construction.

Effective mitigation emphasizes treating all external input as untrusted and ensuring it cannot change SQL query structure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements consistently for all database operations.
  • Applying strict input validation and type checking (e.g., enforcing date formats or numeric IDs) before interacting with the database.
  • Centralizing data access logic so unsafe query construction patterns are easier to spot and eliminate.
  • Assigning least-privilege credentials to the application's database user to limit damage if injection occurs.
  • Implementing defense-in-depth controls such as query whitelisting or ORM layers that abstract direct SQL string construction.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level review with security testing:

  • Static analysis rules that flag direct concatenation of request parameters into SQL strings, especially within PHP files handling reports and search functionality.
  • Manual code review focused on data-access layers and report-generation scripts to identify non-parameterized query patterns.
  • Security testing with automated scanners or fuzzers to probe endpoints like /betweendates-detailsreports.php for injectable parameters.
  • Enforcing development policies that require prepared statements and disallow ad-hoc query construction, backed by CI checks or automated code review tools.

Detection typically combines code-level review with security testing:

  • Static analysis rules that flag direct concatenation of request parameters into SQL strings, especially within PHP files handling reports and search functionality.
  • Manual code review focused on data-access layers and report-generation scripts to identify non-parameterized query patterns.
  • Security testing with automated scanners or fuzzers to probe endpoints like /betweendates-detailsreports.php for injectable parameters.
  • Enforcing development policies that require prepared statements and disallow ad-hoc query construction, backed by CI checks or automated code review tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/um-dsp/TaintRadar/blob/main/sql_injection_cves/hospitalmanagementsystemproject/20250811-hospital-management-system-betweendates-detailsreports.php-fromdate-sqli/20250811-hospital-management-system-betweendates-detailsreports.php-fromdate-sqli.md#injection-techniques-as-identified-by-sqlmap

Frequently asked

questions

It can be widely exploitable wherever the reporting endpoint is reachable. If the page is accessible to regular users or exposed unintentionally, attackers can remotely exploit it via crafted HTTP requests.

Typically, the attacker must be able to interact with the Hospital Management System's web interface, which may require an application login but could also be possible anonymously in misconfigured deployments.

Refactor all affected queries to use parameterized statements or an ORM that binds user input as data only, combined with strict input validation and least-privilege database accounts.

Establish coding standards that mandate prepared statements, integrate static analysis to flag unsafe query construction, review data-access code during pull requests, and train developers to never concatenate raw user input into SQL strings.

It can be widely exploitable wherever the reporting endpoint is reachable. If the page is accessible to regular users or exposed unintentionally, attackers can remotely exploit it via crafted HTTP requests.

Typically, the attacker must be able to interact with the Hospital Management System's web interface, which may require an application login but could also be possible anonymously in misconfigured deployments.

Refactor all affected queries to use parameterized statements or an ORM that binds user input as data only, combined with strict input validation and least-privilege database accounts.

Establish coding standards that mandate prepared statements, integrate static analysis to flag unsafe query construction, review data-access code during pull requests, and train developers to never concatenate raw user input into SQL strings.

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