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CVE-2025-64427

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ZimaOS

CVE-2025-64427

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Internal Network Services and Information Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

ZimaOS versions 1.5.0 and prior contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) issue that allows authenticated local users to direct the system to make HTTP/HTTPS requests to internal IP addresses and services.

Under these conditions, an attacker can interact with internal endpoints that are not normally exposed, potentially accessing sensitive information or abusing internal-only APIs.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects ZimaOS deployments where the operating system exposes HTTP-based functionality that proxies or fetches URLs on behalf of an authenticated local user.

The issue is present when the URL parameters accepted by ZimaOS are not constrained to safe, external destinations and can be pointed at loopback or private network addresses.

It is most relevant on systems where the host runs administrative, monitoring, or metadata services bound to localhost or private interfaces that were not intended to be reachable by regular users.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: ZimaOS HTTP interface or related components that perform outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests based on user-supplied URLs.
  • Required access: Authenticated local user access to the ZimaOS interface or API endpoint that accepts a target URL or host parameter.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted request that specifies an internal IP address or hostname (e.g., 127.0.0.1, localhost, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 172.16–31.x.x).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not sufficiently validate or restrict the destination of outgoing requests, allowing user-controlled URLs to target internal services reachable from the ZimaOS host.

Why this happens

The core bug is a server-side request forgery pattern where the server trusts user-provided URLs without enforcing network or host-based restrictions.

Logic that is intended to fetch or proxy external resources is reused with attacker-controlled input and no guardrails against internal or loopback addresses.

This maps primarily to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where a server is tricked into making requests to arbitrary locations, and secondarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information, as internal services may disclose data not meant for unprivileged users.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP/HTTPS services that are not exposed externally
  • Retrieval of sensitive configuration data, service metadata, or system status pages
  • Interaction with administrative or control endpoints intended only for trusted components
  • Use of the ZimaOS host as a pivot point for further exploration of the local or private network
  • Possible modification of internal state if internal services support write or administrative operations

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation strategies generally focus on constraining where server-initiated requests can go and reducing trust in user-controlled URLs:

  • Enforce strict allowlists of domains or IP ranges that outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests are permitted to reach.
  • Block loopback, link-local, and private address ranges at the application layer when handling user-supplied URLs.
  • Normalize and parse user input using robust URL and IP handling libraries to avoid bypasses via encodings or DNS tricks.
  • Separate internal administrative services from components that process user input, and bind sensitive services to isolated interfaces or namespaces where feasible.
  • Apply least-privilege network policies (e.g., host firewall rules, container/network segmentation) so that the component handling URLs can reach only what it truly needs.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection typically combines code-level review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Look for functions or handlers that accept URLs or hostnames from users and then call HTTP client libraries.
  • Flag patterns where no validation exists on the destination host, IP range, or protocol.
  • Review any proxy, webhook, or "URL fetch" functionality for signs of unrestricted target selection.
  • Policy and automated checks:
  • Implement linting or SAST rules that require network egress checks before performing server-side HTTP requests based on user input.
  • Enforce review policies for any feature that fetches external resources on behalf of the user.
  • Operational monitoring:
  • Monitor logs for repeated requests to loopback or private IP ranges originating from the ZimaOS service.
  • Alert on unusual patterns of internal network access coming from application processes that handle user input.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/IceWhaleTech/ZimaOS/security/advisories/GHSA-m8hj-7xg5-p375

Frequently asked

questions

It typically requires authenticated local user access to the ZimaOS interface. However, if that interface is exposed remotely and reachable by external users, the SSRF behavior may be triggered from remote locations as well.

The attacker must be an authenticated local user with permission to interact with the ZimaOS component that accepts target URLs. They do not need direct network access to the internal services themselves; the system issues the requests on their behalf.

The most robust pattern is to strictly restrict where server-side HTTP/HTTPS requests can go—typically by allowlisting approved domains or IPs and explicitly blocking loopback and private ranges at the application layer, combined with network-level egress controls.

Treat any user-controlled URL or host parameter as untrusted, require explicit validation and normalization before use, integrate SSRF-focused checks into code review and automated testing, and design internal services so they are not reachable from components that process untrusted input unless absolutely necessary.

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