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CVE-2025-64423

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Improper Authentication in Coolify Invitation Link Handling

CVE-2025-64423

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Privilege Escalation to Administrator

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Coolify versions up to and including v4.0.0-beta.434 contain an authentication flaw where low-privileged members can access and use invitation links intended for administrators.

If a member uses an admin invitation link before the legitimate recipient, they can log in as that administrator and effectively escalate their privileges to an admin role.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Coolify instances that use invitation-based onboarding for administrators and other users.

The issue arises where:

  • Invitation links grant access to an administrator account or role,
  • Links are not strongly bound to a specific recipient or identity,
  • Low-privileged users (members) can discover or reuse invitation URLs intended for administrators.

It is relevant in deployments where members and admins share the same Coolify instance and where invitation URLs can be exposed or reused.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application (Coolify UI / invitation flow)
  • Required access: Existing low-privileged account (member) in the same Coolify instance
  • Knowledge/visibility: Ability to see or obtain invitation links that were generated for an administrator
  • Trigger point: Using the admin invitation URL before the intended recipient completes the process
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authentication and onboarding flow trusts possession of the invitation link as proof of identity and does not sufficiently bind the invite to the intended recipient, allowing a different authenticated user to claim the administrator session or role.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an improper authentication pattern where control of an invitation URL is incorrectly treated as equivalent to authenticated ownership of the target account or role.

Instead of strictly binding invitations to a specific, pre-verified identity (such as a known email address or user account) and enforcing that binding at redemption time, the system appears to:

  • Accept whoever presents the invitation link, and
  • Allow that user to assume the administrator's identity or role.

This corresponds to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the system fails to adequately verify that the entity redeeming the invitation is the intended administrator, relying too heavily on a bearer-style token (the invite link) that can be observed or reused by another party.

Potential impact

  • A member can escalate privileges to full administrator access.
  • Unauthorized users may gain control over server, application, and database management within Coolify.
  • Attackers with member access could modify deployments, configurations, and secrets managed by Coolify.
  • Administrative audit trails and accountability can be compromised if attackers act under another admin's identity.
  • Further compromise of infrastructure managed through Coolify (e.g., changing deployments, adding backdoors, or exfiltrating configuration data) can occur.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening the invitation and authentication flow so that possession of a link alone is not enough to assume an administrative identity.

Common patterns include:

  • Recipient binding: Tie each invitation to a specific identity (for example, a verified email address) and enforce that only the matching identity can redeem it.
  • Context-aware redemption: Require additional verification (e.g., email verification, out-of-band confirmation, or admin approval) before granting administrator privileges when an invitation is used.
  • Scope and role constraints: Treat invitation links as grant tokens for narrowly scoped actions (e.g., initial registration) rather than direct role assignment, and require explicit, separate step-up to administrator roles.
  • Single-use and expiration: Ensure that invitations are single-use, short-lived, and invalidated once redeemed or canceled, reducing the window for misuse.
  • Least privilege defaults: Avoid defaulting new users to high-privilege roles based solely on invitation links; require explicit administrative confirmation for any elevation.
  • Access separation: Where possible, limit visibility of administrative invitations to only the intended recipient and avoid displaying them in shared user interfaces or logs accessible to lower-privileged users.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of problem using:

  • Code review signals:
  • Invitation or magic-link logic that assigns roles or logs users in without verifying the redeeming identity.
  • Bearer-style tokens (long URLs, opaque tokens) that directly encode high-privilege access without secondary checks.
  • Flows where user role decisions are made purely on the presence of an invite token rather than on verified user attributes.
  • Static analysis patterns:
  • Identifying endpoints that accept invitation or token parameters and grant high-privilege sessions or roles without authentication or identity binding.
  • Rules that flag direct role assignment in account creation paths triggered by URL parameters.
  • Runtime and log-based detection:
  • Monitoring for unusual patterns where multiple different low-privilege accounts or IPs redeem admin invitations.
  • Alerts when a non-admin account's session is followed immediately by the creation or takeover of an admin account from the same context.
  • Policy enforcement:
  • CI/CD checks that require security review for changes affecting invitation, magic-link, or SSO flows.
  • Automated tools that scan for authentication flows relying solely on possession of a URL or token to grant elevated roles.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/coollabsio/coolify/security/advisories/GHSA-4fqm-797g-7m6j

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is constrained to users who already have low-privileged member access and can obtain an administrator's invitation link. However, in environments where invitation URLs are easily exposed (for example, shared channels or logs), the practical risk can be high because a member can turn that access into full administrative control.

Yes, the described scenario assumes the attacker is a low-privileged member within the same Coolify instance. They must be able to see and reuse an invitation link that was intended for an administrator and redeem it before the legitimate recipient.

The most robust pattern is to bind each invitation to a specific, pre-verified identity and enforce strict checks at redemption time, ensuring that only the intended recipient can use the invitation. Additionally, invitations should be single-use, short-lived, and should not directly grant administrative roles without additional verification or approval.

When designing login, invitation, or magic-link flows, treat tokens as one factor of authentication rather than complete proof of identity. Combine them with strong identity binding, explicit role assignment checks, and least privilege defaults, and include security-focused code review and automated checks for any logic that automatically assigns high-privilege roles based on URL tokens or invitations.

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