Summary
The npm package next-npm-version version 1.0.1 contains a command injection vulnerability that allows untrusted input to be incorporated into system-level commands.
When attacker-controlled data reaches the vulnerable command execution path, it can be used to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the running Node.js process.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in applications that:
- Depend on
next-npm-versionv1.0.1 as a library or development tool - Use its functionality in a way that passes user-controlled or environment-derived values into its APIs or CLI
- Run these operations on CI/CD agents, build servers, or production hosts with shell command execution enabled
The risk increases when the package is used in automated pipelines or services that process untrusted input without strict validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Any interface that indirectly invokes
next-npm-version(CLI, scripts, build steps, or web endpoints wiring into it) - Required access: Ability to influence input parameters, configuration values, or environment variables consumed by the package
- Trigger point: Execution of
next-npm-versionfunctionality that constructs and runs shell/system commands - Why exploitation is possible: Input values are interpolated into a command string or arguments without proper neutralization, enabling injection of additional shell tokens or commands
Why this happens
The core issue aligns with CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), here expressed as command injection in a Node.js context.
The package likely builds command strings or invokes shell utilities (for versioning, Git operations, or packaging) directly from parameters without:
- Strictly validating or constraining allowed characters
- Separating data from commands (e.g., using safe exec APIs with argument arrays)
- Applying proper escaping or sanitization
This insecure pattern treats external input as part of executable logic, allowing attackers to extend or replace intended commands with arbitrary ones.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the Node.js process
- Theft or modification of sensitive files (source code, configuration, credentials)
- Compromise of CI/CD pipelines or build infrastructure
- Insertion of backdoors or malicious content into built artifacts
- Lateral movement within the affected host or network environment
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on separating data from commands and strictly constraining inputs:
- Replace shell-string-based execution with APIs that accept argument arrays and avoid shell parsing where possible
- Constrain all inputs used in command construction to an allowlist of safe values, types, and formats
- Avoid passing raw, user-controlled or environment-derived data into command contexts; derive commands from fixed templates and enumerated options instead
- Run any tooling that must execute system commands under least-privileged accounts and confined environments (e.g., containers, restricted CI workers)
- Treat build and release pipelines as high-value targets and minimize the use of generic shell execution in them
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines static analysis, code review, and pipeline controls:
- Configure static analysis or linters to flag use of dangerous Node.js APIs (e.g.,
child_process.exec,execSync,spawnwith shell) where arguments derive from external input - During code review, look for patterns where library or CLI parameters are directly concatenated into command strings or piped into shell utilities
- Implement CI policies that disallow or require explicit review for dynamic shell execution in build scripts and release tools
- Use security scanning tools that examine package dependencies and highlight known command injection patterns in third-party modules

