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CVE-2025-63624

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in Shandong Kede IoT Smart Water Meter

CVE-2025-63624

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via SQL Injection

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the imei_list.aspx endpoint of the Shandong Kede IoT smart water meter monitoring platform v1.0 allows untrusted input to be concatenated directly into database queries.

A remote attacker can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary SQL commands and, in common deployment setups, potentially escalate to arbitrary code execution on the underlying server.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of the Shandong Kede Electronics Co., Ltd IoT smart water meter monitoring platform version 1.0, specifically requests that reach the imei_list.aspx page or its backing handler.

The issue typically manifests where user-supplied parameters (for example, IMEI identifiers, search filters, or pagination controls) are processed by server-side logic and passed directly into SQL queries without robust input validation or parameterization.

Environments with database accounts that have broad privileges, or that are integrated with OS-level features (e.g., extended stored procedures, command execution, or linked servers), are at higher risk of full system compromise.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface exposed by the IoT smart water meter monitoring platform, specifically requests targeting imei_list.aspx.
  • Required access: Remote network access to the web application; no special privileges are assumed beyond the ability to send crafted HTTP requests. In some configurations, authenticated access to reach imei_list.aspx may be required.
  • Trigger point: Query parameters or form fields consumed by imei_list.aspx that are interpolated into SQL statements used to retrieve or manage water meter/IMEI data.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side code composing SQL queries does not consistently use parameterized statements or safe query builders, allowing attacker-controlled data to alter the structure of the SQL command rather than being treated purely as data.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Application logic behind imei_list.aspx appears to build SQL queries by concatenating user-provided values—such as IMEI numbers, filter criteria, or sort options—directly into query strings.

Without strict parameterization and proper neutralization of metacharacters (quotes, comment markers, delimiters), the database interprets parts of the input as executable SQL rather than as literal values.

This pattern breaks the intended separation between code and data, allowing attackers to inject additional clauses, union queries, or database-specific commands, and in privileged configurations, pivot from data access to OS-level code execution.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of water meter, customer, or operational data stored in the database
  • Modification or deletion of metering records, billing information, or device configuration data
  • Bypass of authentication or authorization checks implemented at the database layer
  • Creation of new privileged application or database accounts to maintain persistent access
  • Execution of database-native procedures that can lead to arbitrary code execution on the host
  • Potential lateral movement to other systems connected to the same database or network segment

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct string concatenation of untrusted input in SQL queries and minimizing the blast radius of any database compromise.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all database interactions, ensuring user input is always bound as data, not concatenated into SQL strings.
  • Using well-maintained ORM or query-builder abstractions that default to safe parameterization and discourage raw SQL construction.
  • Applying strict server-side validation and normalization for all fields accepted by imei_list.aspx (e.g., validating IMEI format, length, and character set) before they reach the data access layer.
  • Implementing least-privilege database accounts, granting only the minimal set of permissions required for the application's normal behavior, and avoiding ownership or administrative rights for application connections.
  • Segmenting infrastructure so that even if the application database is compromised, access to the underlying OS or other critical services is constrained.
  • Centralizing error handling to avoid exposing raw SQL errors or stack traces that could assist an attacker in refining injection attempts.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can combine static analysis, runtime monitoring, and review practices to catch SQL injection patterns early:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules or linters to flag dynamic SQL construction, string concatenation in data-access code, and use of unsafe APIs, especially in handlers associated with imei_list.aspx.
  • Code review: Establish review checklists that require verification of parameterized queries for every data access path, paying particular attention to filter, search, and sorting parameters.
  • Runtime monitoring: Inspect web server and database logs for suspicious patterns such as:
  • Repeated use of SQL metacharacters in parameters (';--, ' OR ', UNION, SELECT, etc.).
  • Unusual spikes in error responses involving database exceptions.
  • Anomalous queries that deviate from known application-generated patterns.
  • Security testing: Integrate automated DAST tools and fuzzers into CI/CD to probe imei_list.aspx endpoints with injection payloads and identify exploitable query paths.
  • Policy enforcement: Use web application firewalls or API gateways with rulesets that detect and block common SQL injection signatures as an additional compensating control.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/songqb-xx/Internet-of-Things-Smart-Water-Meter-Monitoring-Platform-Unauthorized-RCE

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As long as the imei_list.aspx endpoint is reachable over the network, a remote attacker can attempt SQL injection without local system access.

It depends on how the platform is deployed. If imei_list.aspx is exposed only after login, an attacker would first need valid credentials or another way to access an authenticated session. If the endpoint is public, no authentication is required.

Refactor all database interactions behind imei_list.aspx to use parameterized queries or safe ORM APIs, combined with strict input validation and least-privilege database accounts. Avoid any direct concatenation of user input into SQL strings.

Adopt a secure coding standard that mandates parameterization, invest in automated static and dynamic security testing for every release, and ensure security-focused code reviews for all data-access logic, especially in exposed web endpoints like imei_list.aspx.

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