Summary
A flaw in FreshRSS's authentication logic for master authentication tokens allows access control restrictions on feed visibility to be bypassed in versions prior to 1.28.0.
When anonymous viewing is enabled, an attacker may be able to view feeds belonging to non-default users that should normally remain private.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects FreshRSS instances that:
- Are running versions prior to 1.28.0, and
- Have anonymous viewing enabled, and/or
- Rely on master authentication tokens to gate access to user-specific feeds.
In this context, FreshRSS is expected to restrict anonymous users to the default user's feed only, keeping other users' feeds private. Due to a bug in the auth logic around master authentication tokens, this separation may not reliably hold.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the FreshRSS instance.
- Required access: Network access to the FreshRSS web application; exploitation may occur without a valid user account when anonymous viewing is enabled.
- Trigger point: Requests that retrieve or list RSS feeds, particularly where master authentication tokens or anonymous-view logic is involved.
- Why exploitation is possible: The authorization checks for master authentication tokens do not correctly enforce per-user feed isolation, allowing a client to reach feeds that should require stronger access controls.
Why this happens
The issue stems from improper enforcement of authorization rules when handling master authentication tokens and anonymous access.
Instead of consistently validating whether a requesting client is authorized to read a specific user's feed, the logic allows the generic access granted by anonymous viewing or master tokens to extend to feeds that should remain private.
This corresponds to CWE-284: Improper Access Control and relates to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where identifiers or token-based mechanisms are not robustly bound to a specific user's privileges.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized viewing of RSS feeds belonging to other users.
- Exposure of users' reading habits, subscribed sources, and potentially sensitive metadata.
- Loss of privacy and potential leakage of private or internal-only content syndicated via RSS.
- Increased attack surface for targeted phishing or profiling based on feed contents.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on tightening access control logic and minimizing overbroad token privileges:
- Ensure that every feed access path performs strict authorization checks, binding tokens and sessions to a specific user identity and scope.
- Avoid using global or "master" tokens that implicitly grant broad access without fine-grained permission checks.
- Treat anonymous viewing as a narrowly scoped feature, explicitly restricting it to designated public or default feeds.
- Apply the principle of least privilege to all authentication token mechanisms, limiting what each token type can access and for how long.
- Regularly review authentication and authorization flows, including "convenience" access paths, to verify that they align with documented privacy expectations.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can focus on both code and runtime behavior:
- Static analysis & code review: Look for endpoints that return feed data but lack clear user- and role-based checks; identify code paths where master or global tokens bypass per-user authorization.
- Authorization policy review: Verify that access-control rules explicitly restrict feed retrieval to the owning user unless content is marked public.
- Logging & monitoring: Enable detailed logging of feed access, including which user or token is associated with each request, and alert on anomalous cross-user access patterns.
- Automated tests: Add regression tests that attempt to access other users' feeds with anonymous or master-style tokens to ensure isolation is enforced.

