Summary
Cohere North AI v1.1.5 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its WebSocket endpoint. Under conditions where the endpoint exposes data without adequately enforcing access controls or response isolation, an attacker may obtain information that should remain restricted.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments of Cohere North AI v1.1.5 that expose the affected WebSocket endpoint. Risk depends on how the endpoint handles authentication, authorization, connection state, and the data returned over WebSocket messages.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The WebSocket endpoint
- Required access: Ability to reach or establish a connection to the endpoint; additional authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing a WebSocket connection or request that causes information to be returned
- Why exploitation is possible: Inadequate access control or response isolation may allow data to be disclosed to an unauthorized client
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an information exposure condition in WebSocket request handling. Data may be returned without sufficiently verifying that the connected client is authorized to receive it or that the response is limited to that client's permitted scope. This maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.
Potential impact
- Attackers may access sensitive application or session information
- Exposed data could support further attacks against users or services
- Confidentiality of messages or WebSocket-related state may be reduced
- Organizations could experience privacy, compliance, or operational consequences
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in client-controlled WebSocket state and enforcing authorization at the point where data is selected and returned.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying authentication and per-resource authorization to WebSocket connections and messages
- Returning only data explicitly permitted for the authenticated principal
- Isolating connection state between users, tenants, and sessions
- Avoiding sensitive data in responses unless it is required for the operation
- Using least-privilege service identities and narrowly scoped data access
- Enforcing secure defaults for unauthenticated, expired, or malformed connections
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for WebSocket handlers that return data before authorization
- Review of connection lifecycle, tenant isolation, and session-to-user mapping
- Tests that attempt to access another user's or tenant's data through an otherwise valid connection
- Runtime monitoring for unusual WebSocket access patterns, repeated enumeration, or responses exceeding expected scope
- Policy enforcement requiring authorization decisions at every sensitive data access point

