Summary
Centreon Infra Monitoring contains an OS command injection issue in the backup configuration parameters, where high-privileged users can append custom instructions to the backup setup.
Under certain configurations, this allows crafted backup parameters to break out of expected command syntax and execute unintended shell commands on the underlying system.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the backup configuration functionality within the administration setup modules of Centreon Infra Monitoring.
It manifests when user-supplied backup parameters are incorporated into system-level commands without robust sanitization or proper argument handling.
Installations where administrative or high-privilege accounts can adjust backup settings, especially in shared or multi-admin environments, are more exposed to risk.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web-based administration interface for Centreon Infra Monitoring backup configuration.
- Required access: A high-privilege authenticated account capable of modifying backup parameters.
- Trigger point: Execution of the backup process after saving maliciously crafted backup parameters.
- Why exploitation is possible: The backup configuration values are concatenated into OS-level commands without consistently neutralizing shell metacharacters or enforcing strict argument boundaries, allowing injected fragments to be interpreted as additional commands.
Why this happens
This issue stems from constructing shell commands by concatenating user-controlled strings directly into command lines, rather than treating them as separate, safely-escaped arguments.
When backup parameters are interpolated into a shell context without rigorous escaping, quoting, or the use of safe process-spawning APIs, special characters such as ;, &&, or other metacharacters can alter the intended command structure.
Conceptually, this maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, where input that should be data is instead interpreted as executable shell syntax.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Centreon service or underlying system user.
- Unauthorized access to or modification of monitoring configuration and collected telemetry.
- Exfiltration or tampering of backup data and configuration files.
- Establishment of a foothold for lateral movement within the monitored infrastructure.
- Disruption of monitoring services through destructive commands or resource exhaustion.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on reducing or eliminating the possibility that user-supplied backup parameters are interpreted as shell syntax:
- Prefer process execution APIs that accept argument arrays (e.g.,
execve-style, or high-level wrappers that bypass the shell) and avoid command-line string concatenation. - Treat backup parameters strictly as data by enforcing strong allowlists for expected formats, paths, and flags, rejecting unexpected characters and metacharacters.
- Apply rigorous input validation and canonicalization before using values in any command context, stripping or rejecting shell-special characters where they are not strictly required.
- Limit the privileges of the account used to run backup operations so that, even if commands are misused, the blast radius remains constrained.
- Design administrative interfaces to expose only pre-defined backup options rather than arbitrary free-form command fragments.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify and monitor for this class of issue using several complementary approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure linters or SAST tools to flag string-based shell invocations that incorporate user-controlled input, especially in backup and administrative modules.
- Code review: During manual review, look for patterns where backup settings or other configuration values are interpolated into shell commands, particularly with direct concatenation or templating.
- Policy enforcement: Establish secure coding guidelines that mandate non-shell-based process spawning and explicit argument separation for system calls.
- Runtime monitoring: Use system-level auditing or EDR solutions to detect unusual command executions originating from the monitoring service process, focusing on atypical tools or network operations.

