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CVE-2025-59022

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Missing Authorization in TYPO3 CMS TCA Data Deletion

CVE-2025-59022

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Authenticated Data Destruction / Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A missing authorization check in the TYPO3 CMS recycler module allows backend users with recycler access to delete records from any TCA-defined database table, even if they lack permission for those tables.

Under these conditions, an internal attacker can purge critical site data and effectively make the website unavailable by mass-deleting content and configuration records.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in TYPO3 CMS installations where:

  • Backend users are granted access to the recycler module, and
  • Critical application data is stored in TCA-defined tables, and
  • Authorization checks are expected to restrict which tables each user may manage.

In such environments, the recycler's ability to operate across TCA tables is not properly constrained by per-table permissions, allowing misuse within the backend context.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: TYPO3 backend interface (recycler module).
  • Required access: Valid authenticated backend account with permission to use the recycler module (e.g., editor, admin-like roles, or misconfigured custom roles).
  • Trigger point: Performing delete operations through the recycler module against records stored in TCA-defined tables.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The recycler's deletion logic fails to enforce granular authorization checks per table, trusting that recycler access alone implies permission to delete records across all TCA tables.

Why this happens

The core issue is a missing or incomplete authorization check on deletion actions performed through the recycler module.

Instead of evaluating whether the current backend user is allowed to delete records from a specific TCA table, the implementation effectively couples "access to recycler" with the ability to delete any TCA-managed data.

This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where a security-relevant operation (data deletion) is exposed without verifying that the caller has the necessary privileges for the exact resource (the specific table and records).

Potential impact

  • Deletion of critical content records, causing partial or full site outages.
  • Removal of configuration or system tables, potentially breaking core CMS functionality.
  • Large-scale loss of customer, business, or transactional data stored in affected tables.
  • Extended denial of service while backups are restored or data is manually reconstructed.
  • Erosion of trust and potential compliance issues due to data integrity violations.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on tightening authorization boundaries and hardening backend roles:

  • Ensure that deletion operations are consistently protected by fine-grained, per-table authorization checks, not just module-level access.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to backend roles: only grant recycler access to trusted administrative accounts where absolutely necessary.
  • Introduce dedicated capabilities for "delete in recycler" that can be configured separately from more benign content-editing rights.
  • Implement defense-in-depth controls such as soft-delete with restricted hard-delete paths, or additional confirmation steps for destructive operations on high-value tables.
  • Periodically review TCA permissions and role definitions to minimize unnecessary access to sensitive tables.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor this class of issue using a combination of review and runtime insights:

  • Code review / security assessment: Look for destructive actions (delete, purge, hard-delete) that are guarded only by module-level or route-level checks, without per-resource permission validation.
  • Static analysis: Configure rules that flag operations performing deletes by table name or generic TCA access where no explicit authorization check precedes the operation.
  • Logging and monitoring: Capture detailed audit logs from the backend, especially recycler usage, including user ID, table name, and record identifiers for each deletion event.
  • Policy enforcement: Use automated checks in CI/CD to verify that sensitive TCA tables require explicit capabilities for deletion, and that indirect deletion paths (like recyclers or mass actions) respect those capabilities.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/336d6f165458a0ce32d8330999ab9ab6a5983d20
github.comgithub.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/a6604db66499710f72ae6e7006beb14ad0913aae
github.comgithub.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/efb9528f9882ac924c40598ebd8508479e9950a3
typo3.orgtypo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-003

Frequently asked

questions

No. Exploitation requires a valid TYPO3 backend account with access to the recycler module. However, low-privileged or misconfigured accounts could still leverage it to cause severe data loss.

The attacker must be an authenticated backend user who can log into the TYPO3 backend and access the recycler module. They do not need explicit delete permissions for the individual tables they target; the vulnerability bypasses those per-table checks.

Enforce strict, per-table authorization checks before performing any deletion and ensure that recycler functionality respects the same permission model used elsewhere in TYPO3. Align the recycler's delete behavior with existing access control rules so that having recycler access alone is not sufficient to delete from every TCA table.

Treat every destructive operation as security-sensitive, require explicit permission checks tied to the specific resource, and centralize authorization logic so modules like recyclers or bulk actions cannot bypass it. Combine least-privilege role design, regular permission audits, and automated tests that assert correct access control behavior for critical operations and tables.

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