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CVE-2025-54816

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

Missing Authentication in Real-Time Application Interfaces

CVE-2025-54816

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A WebSocket endpoint that does not enforce proper authentication allows any unauthenticated party on the network to establish a persistent connection.

Attackers can abuse this weakness to read sensitive real-time data streams or invoke privileged actions over the WebSocket channel, potentially escalating privileges and compromising the wider system.

Affected context

This vulnerability typically appears in applications that expose WebSocket endpoints for real-time features such as dashboards, notifications, chat, trading, or control interfaces.

It arises when the WebSocket handshake or subsequent messages are not tied to a verified user identity, or when the application incorrectly assumes that a prior HTTP authentication context automatically applies to WebSocket connections.

Any deployment where WebSockets are accessible over the network without session validation, token checks, or equivalent authentication controls may be affected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible WebSocket endpoint (often over wss:// or ws://).
  • Required access: Ability to reach the WebSocket URL (e.g., from the public internet, internal network, or through a browser).
  • Trigger point: Establishing a WebSocket connection without being challenged for valid credentials or session state.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server does not verify the caller's identity during the WebSocket upgrade or fails to enforce authentication/authorization on subsequent messages, allowing any client to connect and act as an authenticated user.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

The WebSocket endpoint exposes operations and data that are security-relevant—such as reading sensitive information or triggering state-changing actions—without first requiring a trustworthy authentication step.

Conceptually, the WebSocket channel is treated as if it were inherently trusted, but no mechanism (session cookie validation, bearer token verification, mutual TLS, API key, or comparable method) is consistently applied at connection time or per message.

This design flaw results in critical functionality being accessible to any network client, regardless of identity.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive real-time data transmitted over WebSockets.
  • Execution of privileged actions (e.g., administrative operations, configuration changes, or transactions) without valid credentials.
  • Privilege escalation by impersonating higher-privilege users or system components.
  • Lateral movement by leveraging the compromised WebSocket channel to pivot into other parts of the application.
  • Full system compromise if WebSocket operations can control security settings, user accounts, or core business workflows.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating WebSocket endpoints as protected APIs and enforcing identity and authorization consistently:

  • Require robust authentication during the WebSocket handshake, such as validating session cookies, signed tokens (e.g., JWT), or client certificates before accepting the upgrade request.
  • Bind the WebSocket connection to a clearly identified user or service principal, and reject connections that do not present valid credentials.
  • Enforce fine-grained authorization for each operation or message type exposed over the WebSocket, applying the same access control rules used for equivalent HTTP endpoints.
  • Centralize authentication and authorization logic so that new WebSocket routes inherit secure defaults rather than requiring opt-in protection.
  • Limit the data exposed over WebSockets to the minimum needed for the feature and avoid streaming highly sensitive information when possible.
  • Run WebSocket services under least-privilege backend accounts so that a compromised channel cannot trivially control the entire environment.

How teams detect issues like this

Potential detection strategies include:

  • Static analysis: Search for WebSocket initialization handlers or upgrade routes that lack authentication checks, session validation, or token verification before accepting connections.
  • Code review: Inspect WebSocket controllers and message handlers to ensure they reuse existing authentication/authorization middleware or equivalent security components used for REST endpoints.
  • Security testing: Use automated tools or scripts to connect to WebSocket endpoints without credentials and observe whether data or actions are accessible; incorporate this into regular penetration testing and CI pipelines.
  • Policy enforcement: Define engineering standards requiring all real-time endpoints to implement explicit auth checks, and enforce these via linters, code owners, or pre-merge security gates.
  • Runtime monitoring: Log WebSocket connection attempts and associated identity context, and alert on anonymous or anomalous connection patterns, especially to high-privilege channels.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-022-08.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-022-08

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the WebSocket endpoint is reachable over the internet or from untrusted networks, attackers can remotely connect without authentication and interact with the exposed functionality.

Typically only network-level access to the WebSocket URL is required. No valid user account or prior authentication is needed if the endpoint fails to enforce identity checks.

Apply the same authentication and authorization logic used for your standard HTTP APIs to all WebSocket endpoints. Require a valid session or token at connection time, bind the connection to that identity, and enforce per-operation authorization.

Define WebSocket security as part of your architecture baseline: mandate auth on all real-time channels, centralize connection handling through secure middleware, include WebSockets in threat models and security checklists, and validate coverage through automated tests and code review guidelines.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.