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CVE-2025-53828

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

SSRF (CWE-918) enabling code execution in ownCloud

CVE-2025-53828

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via SSRF

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in the SharePoint for ownCloud integration allows an administrator to coerce the application into making arbitrary network requests.

Under certain configurations, these forged requests can be chained into arbitrary code execution on the underlying ownCloud Classic server, turning a misused integration feature into a remote attack path.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in deployments of ownCloud Classic that use the SharePoint for ownCloud application prior to version 0.4.1, typically corresponding to ownCloud 10 installations before 10.15.3.

It becomes relevant when administrative users can configure SharePoint connection endpoints and the ownCloud environment exposes sensitive internal services, metadata endpoints, or command interfaces over HTTP.

The risk is higher in setups where the ownCloud server can reach internal networks or local management interfaces that are not otherwise exposed to direct user access.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The SharePoint integration endpoints and configuration UI exposed within ownCloud Classic.
  • Required access: Administrative privileges within ownCloud to manipulate SharePoint configuration or crafted URLs.
  • Trigger point: Application-initiated HTTP requests from the server to targets derived from attacker-controlled configuration or parameters.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server blindly trusts and forwards administrator-provided URLs, allowing requests to internal or sensitive services that may in turn expose functionality leading to arbitrary code execution.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-918, where a server functionality designed to fetch remote resources is abused to target arbitrary endpoints.

In this case, the SharePoint integration logic does not sufficiently constrain or validate the destinations it will contact on behalf of an administrator, treating configuration input as inherently trustworthy.

Because the server's network position and privileges often differ from those of a user's browser, these unbounded requests can reach internal services, metadata APIs, or command endpoints, which can be leveraged to escalate the SSRF into remote code execution.

Potential impact

  • Attackers with administrative access may trigger arbitrary HTTP requests from the ownCloud server to internal or external systems.
  • SSRF can be used to probe internal network topology and discover services not directly exposed to users.
  • Internal management or metadata endpoints may be abused to gain arbitrary code execution on the ownCloud host.
  • Successful exploitation could lead to full compromise of the ownCloud instance and potentially adjacent services reachable from that host.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on reducing trust in configurable endpoints and constraining server-initiated HTTP requests.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing strict allowlists or pattern-based validation for remote integration URLs, limiting them to known SharePoint hosts and protocols.
  • Blocking or tightly restricting access from application code to internal address ranges, loopback interfaces, and cloud metadata endpoints.
  • Separating integration components into network segments with reduced reachability to sensitive management services.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to the ownCloud process and associated service accounts, so that even if SSRF occurs, downstream services cannot trivially be turned into code execution channels.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically relies on identifying unbounded outbound HTTP request logic and anomalous request patterns.

High-level approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag code paths where user- or admin-controlled URLs are passed directly into HTTP clients without allowlist enforcement or normalization.
  • Code reviews focused on integration modules, looking for SSRF indicators such as support for arbitrary hosts, lack of IP range checks, and absent protocol restrictions.
  • Network monitoring for unusual outbound connections from the ownCloud server, especially to internal IP ranges or metadata services, and enforcing egress policies that block unexpected destinations.
  • Use of automated application security testing tools that specifically probe for SSRF behavior in configurable integrations and remote resource fetchers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/owncloud/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-4m66-rpfj-m5f6

Frequently asked

questions

No. The described issue requires administrative privileges in ownCloud; however, once an attacker has such access, SSRF can significantly widen their effective attack surface and may lead to code execution.

Exploitation generally requires an ownCloud administrator account or equivalent capability to configure the SharePoint integration, since the SSRF is driven by attacker-controlled endpoints in that configuration.

The most robust fix pattern is to strictly constrain where the server can send requests: enforce allowlists for integration targets, block internal and loopback ranges, and remove any functionality that allows arbitrary host or protocol selection when it is not strictly needed.

Future prevention relies on designing integrations so that outbound requests are limited to vetted domains, incorporating centralized URL validation, and enforcing network-layer egress controls, combined with regular security reviews of any feature that issues HTTP requests on behalf of users or administrators.

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