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CVE-2025-52468

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Chamilo CSV User Import

CVE-2025-52468

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Session hijacking, account abuse, and unauthorized actions via malicious script execution in authenticated users' browsers

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Chamilo's CSV user import feature insufficiently sanitizes the "Last Name", "First Name", and "Username" fields, allowing embedded script content to be stored in user profiles.

When an authenticated user later views an affected profile, the stored payload may execute in their browser, enabling actions in the context of their authenticated session.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in Chamilo deployments that use the CSV import functionality to batch-create or update user accounts.

It manifests when user-supplied values in CSV fields—specifically "Last Name", "First Name", and "Username"—are accepted without sufficient HTML/JavaScript output encoding before being rendered in the profile interface.

Environments where CSV files come from semi-trusted or unvalidated sources (e.g., bulk imports prepared by different departments, automated scripts, or external partners) are particularly exposed.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application user management module, specifically the CSV import endpoint or feature.
  • Required access: Ability to upload or submit a CSV file that will be processed by Chamilo (often requiring at least instructor, administrator, or delegated management privileges).
  • Trigger point: Viewing a user profile that contains the malicious data in the "Last Name", "First Name", or "Username" fields.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Imported values are stored and later rendered into HTML pages without consistent context-aware output encoding or filtering, allowing attacker-controlled markup or script to be interpreted by the browser.

Why this happens

This issue stems from improper neutralization of user-controlled content when moving data from storage to an HTML-rendered context.

The CSV import pipeline accepts raw field values and persists them as profile attributes. When profiles are displayed, these attributes are inserted into the page without robust, context-aware escaping or HTML encoding.

This maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting), where text fields that should be treated as plain data are instead rendered as potentially executable content.

Potential impact

  • Malicious JavaScript execution in the browser of any authenticated user viewing the tampered profile.
  • Session hijacking or theft of authentication tokens and cookies (where not protected by additional flags or mechanisms).
  • Unauthorized actions performed on behalf of victims, such as modifying course content, changing settings, or managing users.
  • Exfiltration of sensitive information displayed in the UI (e.g., user details, course data, internal messages).
  • Creation of self-propagating or worm-like payloads that inject XSS into additional profiles or content where the victim has privileges.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically combines defensive output handling, input hardening, and principle-of-least-privilege patterns:

  • Apply strict, context-aware output encoding for all user-controlled fields before inserting them into HTML, attributes, or JavaScript contexts, treating profile attributes as untrusted regardless of source.
  • Normalize and constrain imported fields to expected character sets and formats (e.g., letters, digits, limited punctuation), rejecting or neutralizing characters that have no legitimate use in names or usernames.
  • Centralize HTML encoding logic so that every display path for user profile data inherently applies proper escaping, rather than relying on individual call sites.
  • Separate display concerns from storage: store raw data if necessary, but ensure that all rendering layers encode or sanitize based on the output context (HTML body, attribute, URL, etc.).
  • Restrict who can perform CSV imports and ensure that such privileged actions are logged and monitored, reducing the likelihood and impact of malicious imports.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for similar vulnerabilities through a mix of code-level and operational techniques:

  • Use static analysis rules or linters to flag direct insertion of user-controlled variables into templates or HTML output without a standard encoding function.
  • During code review, inspect CSV import and profile rendering paths for consistent use of a centralized escaping API and for any cases where raw data is output directly.
  • Employ dynamic application security testing (DAST) or automated web scanners configured to probe CSV import and profile views with XSS probes, validating that payloads are neutralized.
  • Monitor application logs and administrative actions for unusual or frequent CSV imports, especially from uncommon sources or at odd times, and correlate with subsequent error patterns or user complaints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/790ef513aceacae6fe5b6641145901f04c7992dd
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/releases/tag/v1.11.30
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/security/advisories/GHSA-hc3c-8p55-xh4r

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on who can perform CSV imports. In many deployments, this capability is limited to administrators or staff roles; if those accounts are compromised or misused, stored XSS payloads can be planted and later executed in other users' browsers.

Typically, yes, they need sufficient privileges to upload or submit a CSV file that Chamilo processes. However, in some workflows CSVs may be prepared by others and handed off to an administrator, which can be abused via social engineering.

The most robust fix is to enforce centralized, context-aware output encoding for all user-controlled fields, combined with strict normalization and validation of CSV-imported fields so that they only contain characters appropriate for names and usernames.

Adopt a secure templating and encoding strategy where all data is considered untrusted by default, enforce rigorous input validation on bulk-import paths, and integrate both automated XSS checks and manual security reviews into changes that affect data import or UI rendering flows.

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