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CVE-2025-52026

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Information Disclosure / Cryptographic Weakness

CVE-2025-52026

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure / Cryptographic Weakness

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-327

Impact:

Account Compromise and Unauthorized Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Aptsys gemscms backend exposes a list of cashier accounts, including MD5-hashed passwords, via an unauthenticated /srvs/membersrv/getCashiers API endpoint.

Because MD5 is a broken cryptographic function, attackers can often recover plaintext passwords from these hashes, enabling unauthorized logins and access to POS or backend operations.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in deployments of the Aptsys gemscms backend platform that expose the /srvs/membersrv/getCashiers endpoint over a network without strong access controls.

The issue is present when:

  • The endpoint is reachable without authentication
  • The response includes cashier account details (names, emails, usernames)
  • Passwords are stored and returned as MD5 hashes

In such environments, any remote party able to reach this endpoint can retrieve sensitive account and credential data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internally reachable HTTP(S) API endpoint at /srvs/membersrv/getCashiers
  • Required access: No prior authentication or special privileges; only network connectivity to the backend service
  • Trigger point: Sending a basic HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The endpoint is not protected by authentication or authorization checks
  • Sensitive account metadata and MD5-hashed passwords are included in the response payload
  • MD5 hashes can often be reversed using precomputed tables, rainbow tables, or cracking tools, turning the exposure into practical credential disclosure

Why this happens

The vulnerability stems from a combination of information exposure and use of a weak cryptographic hash for password storage.

Conceptually, this maps to:

  • CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information): The backend returns sensitive data—usernames, emails, and password hashes—through an unauthenticated endpoint that should not disclose such information to arbitrary callers.
  • CWE-327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm): Passwords are stored using MD5, a cryptographic hash function that is widely considered broken for security-sensitive use cases.

Architecturally, the system treats an administrative-style listing endpoint as publicly accessible and couples it with insecure credential storage, which together convert nominally "hashed" passwords into effectively recoverable plaintext credentials.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may recover cashier passwords from MD5 hashes and log in as legitimate users.
  • Compromised cashier accounts could be used to initiate or manipulate POS transactions.
  • Attackers could gain access to backend management functions exposed to cashier roles or shared accounts.
  • Reuse of the same password on other systems could enable credential stuffing attacks across external services.
  • Exposure of names, emails, and usernames could facilitate phishing, social engineering, or targeted attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically combines access control hardening with secure credential handling:

  • Restrict sensitive listing endpoints so they require strong authentication and role-based authorization, limiting access to trusted administrative users.
  • Avoid returning password hashes—regardless of algorithm—from any API response; design responses around operational needs, not internal storage structures.
  • Migrate password storage to a modern, adaptive password hashing scheme (e.g., bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2) with per-password salts and appropriate work factors.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to service and user roles so that compromise of a single account yields minimal backend capabilities.
  • Minimize and audit the number of components and services that can access raw credential data, even in hashed form.

These patterns help reduce both the likelihood and impact of credential exposure through misconfigured or overly permissive endpoints.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar issues using a mix of automated and manual approaches:

  • API inventory and testing: Enumerate backend endpoints and validate which ones return user or credential-related data; pay particular attention to endpoints that do not require authentication.
  • Static analysis and code review: Flag controllers or routes that expose user lists, login credentials, or any password fields in responses; verify that all such endpoints enforce authentication and appropriate authorization checks.
  • Cryptography usage review: Search the codebase for calls to MD5 or other legacy hashing functions used for passwords or authentication tokens, and treat them as high-priority findings.
  • Logging and monitoring: Monitor for suspicious or high-volume access to sensitive endpoints, especially from untrusted networks or unusual IP ranges.
  • Security testing in CI/CD: Integrate API scanning and policy checks into pipelines to block deployments where sensitive fields (like password hashes) appear in unauthenticated responses.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/ReverseThatApp/4a6be2b9b2ba39d38c35c8753e0afd39

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can reach the /srvs/membersrv/getCashiers endpoint over the network can exploit this issue, since it does not require authentication and directly returns sensitive data.

Only basic network access to the backend service is required. No valid user account or prior authorization is needed to retrieve the cashier list and associated MD5 password hashes.

The safest pattern is to protect all endpoints that expose user account data behind strong authentication and authorization, remove password hashes from all API responses, and ensure that stored passwords use modern, adaptive password hashing algorithms rather than MD5.

Implement secure API design guidelines that forbid exposing credential material in responses, enforce authentication by default for non-public endpoints, define coding standards for cryptography usage (disallowing MD5 for passwords), and routinely review API behavior and cryptographic choices through security testing and code review.

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