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CVE-2025-52025

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

SQL Injection in GetServiceByRestaurantID Endpoint of

CVE-2025-52025

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Unauthorized Data Access and Modification via Arbitrary SQL Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Aptsys gemscms POS Platform backend (through 2025-05-28) contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the GetServiceByRestaurantID endpoint, where attacker-controlled input is concatenated directly into dynamic SQL.

By submitting crafted values in the id parameter, an attacker may execute arbitrary SQL statements, potentially reading, altering, or deleting backend database data without authorization.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs within the backend API of the Aptsys gemscms POS Platform, specifically in the GetServiceByRestaurantID endpoint that looks up service data by a restaurant identifier.

It is relevant when:

  • The endpoint is reachable over a network (e.g., Internet or internal LAN),
  • The id parameter is sourced from user-supplied HTTP request data,
  • The backend builds SQL queries dynamically by string concatenation,
  • No central query parameterization or input validation layer is consistently enforced on this endpoint.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/HTTPS request interface to the GetServiceByRestaurantID API endpoint.
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to the POS backend (could be remote, internal, or via a compromised POS client).
  • Trigger point: The id parameter is processed and interpolated into a SQL query string, which is then executed by the database.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application directly embeds unvalidated user input into SQL syntax without parameterized queries or robust server-side validation, allowing the attacker to alter the structure of the executed SQL.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command.

The GetServiceByRestaurantID endpoint constructs SQL commands by concatenating the id parameter into a query string, treating it as trusted data.

Because no parameter binding or proper escaping is applied, attacker-controlled characters such as quotes, operators, and SQL keywords modify the intended query logic.

This pattern reflects the broader bug class where application code mixes control (SQL syntax) and data (user input) in the same string, failing to enforce a strict separation via parameterization.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive data from restaurant, customer, or transaction tables (e.g., order histories, pricing, or internal identifiers).
  • Modification of existing records, including tampering with configuration, pricing, or transaction details.
  • Deletion of data, potentially causing loss of transaction history or operational disruption.
  • Bypassing of application-level authorization checks by directly querying or manipulating protected tables.
  • Potential pivot into other parts of the infrastructure if stored credentials or tokens are retrieved from the database.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing a strict boundary between SQL code and data, and minimizing trust in incoming parameters:

  • Use parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database interactions so that the database treats user input strictly as data.
  • Centralize data access through a query builder or ORM that defaults to parameterization and discourages raw SQL concatenation.
  • Apply server-side validation and normalization for identifiers like id (e.g., enforcing numeric or UUID formats) before they are passed to the data access layer.
  • Limit database account privileges following the principle of least privilege, ensuring the application user cannot perform unnecessary operations (e.g., DROP, ALTER).
  • Implement a consistent secure coding guideline for database access, and treat any ad-hoc query string construction as a high-risk pattern requiring security review.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection and verification of this issue through multiple lenses:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag dynamic SQL string concatenation involving request parameters (such as id) in the POS backend codebase.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, search for raw SQL assembly, especially in controller or service layers that handle HTTP parameters, and verify they use parameterized APIs.
  • Dynamic testing: Use parameter tampering and fuzzing against the GetServiceByRestaurantID endpoint to identify anomalous SQL error responses or data leakage patterns.
  • Runtime monitoring: Inspect database logs for suspicious queries containing user-supplied values embedded as SQL syntax, or spikes in failed queries that resemble injection attempts.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate pre-merge checks or CI policies that block new code introducing unparameterized SQL or direct string interpolation into queries.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/ReverseThatApp/4a6be2b9b2ba39d38c35c8753e0afd39

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on deployment. If the GetServiceByRestaurantID endpoint is exposed over the network (for example, to POS clients or external services), any party that can reach the endpoint may attempt SQL injection using crafted id values.

The attacker generally needs only the ability to send HTTP/HTTPS requests to the affected endpoint. No database credentials are required, because the injection occurs through the application's existing database connection.

The most robust fix is to refactor the endpoint to use parameterized queries or ORM-based data access where the id parameter is bound as a value, not concatenated into SQL. Complement this with strict server-side validation to ensure id conforms to expected formats.

Adopt a standard data access layer that enforces parameterization by default, establish coding guidelines that prohibit string-based SQL concatenation, incorporate automated static analysis in CI, and require security-focused code review for any changes touching database query logic.

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