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CVE-2025-50881

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Code Injection RCE in Use It Flow Admin Moniteur Endpoint

CVE-2025-50881

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Code Injection / Remote Code Execution

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on the application server

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The flow/admin/moniteur.php script in the Use It Flow administration website before version 10.0.0 contains a code injection flaw where user-controlled data from the action parameter is incorporated into a string and executed using eval().

Because only the substring before the first ( is validated with method_exists(), an attacker can append arbitrary PHP code, leading to remote code execution with the privileges of the web server process, even without strong authentication.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the Use It Flow administration interface, specifically in the flow/admin/moniteur.php script that processes GET requests.

The issue is present when the application:

  • Exposes the admin monitoring endpoint over HTTP(S)
  • Reads the action URL parameter directly from user input
  • Builds a PHP code string from this parameter and executes it with eval()
  • Relies on a method_exists() check that only examines the portion of the parameter before the first ( character

In environments where access to the admin area is weakly protected, shared, or exposed to the internet, exploitation becomes significantly more practical.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface on the flow/admin/moniteur.php endpoint.
  • Required access: Unauthenticated or trivially authenticated access to the admin monitoring script, depending on how the instance is deployed and protected.
  • Trigger point: A crafted GET request containing a malicious action parameter value that includes a valid-looking method name before (, followed by attacker-controlled PHP code appended after it.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The script performs a method_exists() check only on the substring before the first parenthesis, incorrectly assuming the rest of the string is safe. It then passes the full action-derived string to eval(), allowing the appended code to be interpreted and executed by the PHP engine.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic code injection pattern aligned with CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').

Instead of dispatching actions via a fixed, whitelisted map or using built-in dynamic invocation safely, the application constructs PHP code from user input and executes it with eval().

The method_exists() call is misapplied: it validates only the leading token (the part before () rather than enforcing that the entire action value conforms to a safe, predefined structure.

As a result, an attacker can pass an action value that satisfies the superficial method check while smuggling arbitrary PHP code after the first parenthesis, which eval() will execute within the application's runtime context.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary PHP code with the privileges of the web server process
  • Full compromise of the affected web application and its data
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting application configuration and user data
  • Planting web shells or backdoors for persistent access
  • Pivoting to other internal systems reachable from the compromised server
  • Disabling or tampering with logging and security controls on the host

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on removing dynamic code execution and constraining action dispatch:

  • Eliminate eval() from the request handling path; use direct function/method calls or a static dispatch table that maps allowed action values to known handlers.
  • Enforce strict whitelisting of permissible actions, treating any unknown or malformed action parameter as an error rather than attempting to interpret it.
  • Normalize and validate the action parameter as pure data (e.g., alphanumeric identifiers only), avoiding any interpretation as PHP code.
  • Separate user input from execution logic by using structured routing or controller patterns instead of building invocation strings.
  • Run the web server and PHP interpreter with least privilege, limiting filesystem and system-level capabilities to reduce the impact of a successful exploit.
  • Restrict network exposure of the admin interface (e.g., IP allowlists, VPN-only access, strong authentication) so that only trusted operators can reach moniteur.php.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection often combines code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Scan for the use of dangerous constructs such as eval(), assert() with variable input, create_function(), or preg_replace() with the /e modifier, especially when they are fed from request parameters.
  • Code review: Flag any pattern where routing or action dispatch logic is built from raw user input (e.g., $action = $_GET['action']; eval($action);) and verify that validation covers the entire input, not just a prefix.
  • Security testing: Use dynamic application security testing to probe the action parameter for evidence of code execution, monitoring responses and side effects on a staging environment.
  • Runtime monitoring: Inspect logs and application telemetry for unusual action values, unexpected errors, or execution traces indicative of injected code paths. Web application firewalls can help detect and block obviously malicious payloads, though they should not be the primary defense.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/0xdeadbit/CVE-2025-50881

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the flow/admin/moniteur.php endpoint is exposed to the internet and not strongly access-controlled, an attacker can exploit it by sending crafted GET requests. In locked-down deployments where the endpoint is only reachable from a management network, the exposure is limited to that environment.

Not necessarily. The description indicates that exploitation is possible by an unauthenticated or trivially authenticated attacker. The actual requirement depends on how the admin interface is protected in a given deployment; weak or shared credentials make exploitation much easier.

Remove the use of eval() for handling the action parameter and replace it with a strict, whitelisted dispatch mechanism that maps known action identifiers to specific functions or methods. Ensure that user input is treated purely as data, not as executable PHP code.

Avoid dynamic code execution constructs in production code, especially in request handlers. Adopt a development policy that forbids eval() and similar APIs except in tightly controlled, audited scenarios. Complement this with secure coding guidelines, static analysis rules targeting dangerous functions, and peer review practices that scrutinize any logic involving user-controlled routing or command construction.

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