/

CVE-2025-50229

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in Jizhicms Product Editing Module

CVE-2025-50229

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise / Remote Code Execution (environment-dependent)

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Jizhicms v2.5.4 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the product editing module, where user-controlled data is incorporated into database queries without adequate safeguards.

An attacker who can submit crafted input to this module may execute arbitrary SQL commands against the application's database, leading to data exposure, tampering, or full database compromise under typical configurations.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in Jizhicms v2.5.4 within the product editing functionality, likely exposed through administrative or content-management interfaces.

It is triggered when user-supplied fields—such as product attributes, metadata, or identifiers—are incorporated into SQL statements without robust parameterization or validation.

The risk is highest in deployments where this module is reachable over the network and the database account used by the application has broad privileges (e.g., read/write or administrative rights).

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints associated with the product editing module in Jizhicms.
  • Required access: Ability to interact with the affected endpoint; this may be as an authenticated CMS user (e.g., editor/admin) or, depending on configuration, via exposed forms or APIs.
  • Trigger point: Submission of specially crafted input into product editing fields that are used to construct SQL queries (e.g., product ID, name, category, or other parameters).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The backend logic appears to concatenate or interpolate user-controlled values directly into SQL statements instead of using strongly-typed, parameterized queries and robust input handling, enabling alteration of query structure.

Why this happens

This issue stems from building SQL queries in an unsafe manner, where untrusted input is combined with query text before being sent to the database engine.

Instead of using parameterized statements or an ORM that separates data from code, the application likely uses string concatenation or interpolation to assemble SQL, allowing attackers to inject additional SQL syntax.

This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (SQL Injection), a class of vulnerabilities where user input is not properly constrained or encoded before being interpreted as part of a database command.

Potential impact

  • Retrieval of sensitive data from arbitrary database tables, including user information and configuration data.
  • Modification or deletion of product records and other business-critical data.
  • Creation or escalation of user accounts or roles within the application (if corresponding tables can be manipulated).
  • Bypass of authentication or authorization checks via tampered queries.
  • Potential execution of database-specific commands (e.g., loading files, invoking stored procedures), which may lead to remote code execution depending on the database and environment configuration.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on separating data from code and reducing trust in all user-controlled input.

Pattern-based mitigation strategies include:

  • Adopting parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database interactions, avoiding any string concatenation of SQL and user input.
  • Using a well-audited ORM or query builder that enforces parameter binding by default and discourages raw SQL where possible.
  • Applying strict server-side validation and normalization of all product-related fields, restricting them to expected formats, lengths, and value ranges.
  • Implementing principle of least privilege for database accounts, ensuring the application's database user only has the minimal required permissions and cannot perform administrative operations.
  • Centralizing query construction patterns so that secure patterns are reused and unsafe ad hoc SQL is discouraged.
  • Introducing defensive defaults, such as disallowing dynamic table or column names derived directly from user input.

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying this type of issue benefits from both preventive and detective controls.

Common detection approaches include:

  • Static Application Security Testing (SAST): Configure rules to flag dynamic SQL construction patterns, such as string concatenation that includes request parameters or unsanitized variables.
  • Code review practices: During manual review, pay special attention to data access layers and controller logic around product management, looking for any use of raw SQL with interpolated variables.
  • Database activity monitoring: Use logging or monitoring tools to detect anomalous queries, such as those containing unexpected keywords (e.g., UNION, OR 1=1, DROP) originating from application accounts.
  • Input fuzzing and dynamic testing: Execute automated tests that inject common SQL meta-characters and patterns into product editing endpoints to observe unusual errors or behavioral changes.
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD: Establish coding standards that require parameterized queries, enforced through linters or automated review tools integrated into the build pipeline.

Sources

SourceLink
jizhicms.cnjizhicms.cn
gist.github.comgist.github.com/4iFei/14ad89c3b44348dd575bf5ae0ed5a19c
github.comgithub.com/Cherry-toto/jizhicms
github.comgithub.com/Cherry-toto/jizhicms/issues/105

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how exposed the product editing interface is. In many CMS deployments, this module is accessible to authenticated users such as editors or administrators. If an attacker can obtain or abuse such access, the vulnerability can often be exploited reliably and repeatedly. In misconfigured environments where the endpoint is more broadly reachable, the exploitation scope widens significantly.

In typical setups, product editing is restricted to authenticated users with content-management privileges. However, if those privileges can be phished, brute-forced, or misused, the vulnerability becomes practical to exploit. Some deployments may expose similar functionality via APIs or plugins in ways that lower the access barrier, so the exact requirement is deployment-specific.

The most robust fix is to refactor affected code to use parameterized queries or ORM-based data access everywhere that SQL is used, ensuring that user input is always treated as data, never as executable query text. This should be combined with strong server-side validation for all product-related fields and a review of database privileges to ensure that even if an injection slipped through, the blast radius would be minimized.

Prevention relies on embedding secure coding practices into the development lifecycle: enforce parameterized queries as a non-negotiable standard, use frameworks that discourage raw SQL, introduce automated checks in CI to detect unsafe patterns, and train developers to recognize injection risks. Complement these controls with periodic security reviews and targeted testing around data access layers, especially for modules handling complex content such as products, orders, or user accounts.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.