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CVE-2025-50228

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

SSRF in Jizhicms User Evaluation, Message, and Comment

CVE-2025-50228

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized access to internal network resources via server-initiated requests

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Jizhicms v2.5.4 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the User Evaluation, Message, and Comment modules, allowing user-supplied URLs to be requested by the server.

If an attacker can submit crafted URLs in these features, they may be able to make the application server initiate arbitrary HTTP requests, potentially reaching internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in Jizhicms v2.5.4 where user-controlled input in the User Evaluation, Message, and Comment modules can influence outbound HTTP requests made by the server.

It typically manifests when these modules:

  • Accept URLs or remote resource references from end users
  • Perform server-side fetches (e.g., link previews, avatar resolution, content fetching) without strict validation
  • Run in environments where the web server can access internal network resources or sensitive cloud infrastructure endpoints

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing Jizhicms endpoints related to User Evaluation, Message, or Comment functionality.
  • Required access: Ability to submit or edit data in these modules (often unauthenticated or low-privileged user accounts, depending on site configuration).
  • Trigger point: Application logic that processes user input and performs outbound HTTP requests (e.g., when saving or rendering evaluations, messages, or comments).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application trusts user-supplied URLs and forwards them to internal HTTP client logic without constraining destination hosts, protocols, or IP ranges, enabling the server to act as a proxy to arbitrary targets.

Why this happens

This issue stems from insufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied URLs before they are used in server-side HTTP requests.

Functionality in the User Evaluation, Message, and Comment modules likely accepts input fields that can contain URLs or remote references and passes them directly or semi-directly into an HTTP client.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF):

  • The server exposes an HTTP request capability to external users.
  • The destination of that request is influenced by attacker-controlled data.
  • The application does not enforce strict allow-listing, deny-listing of internal ranges, or protocol restrictions.

As a result, attackers can coerce the server into initiating requests to targets that would otherwise be unreachable from the outside, such as internal services, management interfaces, or metadata APIs.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP-based services that are not directly exposed to the internet.
  • Interaction with cloud provider metadata services, which may lead to credential exposure.
  • Port scanning or service enumeration of internal network segments via blind SSRF techniques.
  • Bypassing IP-based access controls on administrative or monitoring interfaces.
  • Leveraging SSRF as a stepping stone to further vulnerabilities (e.g., exploiting internal web apps).
  • Potential exfiltration of sensitive data returned by internal endpoints, if responses are propagated back to the attacker.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining where the server can make outbound HTTP requests and reducing trust in user-supplied URLs:

  • Prefer allow-list based destination control:
  • Only permit outbound HTTP requests to a small, explicit set of trusted domains or endpoints required by application features.
  • Implement robust URL validation:
  • Reject or normalize user input before use.
  • Resolve hostnames and verify that resulting IPs are not in private, loopback, link-local, or otherwise sensitive ranges.
  • Block non-HTTP/HTTPS schemes and URLs with embedded credentials.
  • Introduce network-level egress controls:
  • Use firewall rules, security groups, or service meshes to restrict outbound traffic from the web server to necessary destinations only.
  • Apply least privilege and isolation:
  • Run the application in isolated network segments.
  • Separate roles for components that need external access from those that do not.
  • Minimize or redesign features that fetch remote resources on behalf of users, preferring client-side approaches when feasible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly relies on review of both code and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for HTTP client usage (e.g., cURL, Guzzle, file_get_contents with URLs, custom HTTP libraries) where the target URL is influenced by request parameters or untrusted fields in the User Evaluation, Message, or Comment modules.
  • Flag patterns where URL validation is absent, minimal, or relies solely on string checks without DNS/IP validation.
  • Examine any link preview, embed, or remote content-fetch features for unbounded URL handling.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Verify that outbound egress from web tiers is restricted by infrastructure policies.
  • Ensure there are guardrails in CI/CD for new code that introduces external HTTP requests.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor logs and network telemetry for unusual outbound requests to internal IP ranges, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints.
  • Configure anomaly detection around patterns of many distinct outbound destinations initiated by user-facing endpoints.

Automated SAST tools and security linters can be configured to identify common SSRF anti-patterns, while DAST tools can probe user-controlled URL parameters to detect SSRF behavior under controlled conditions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Cherry-toto/jizhicms
github.comgithub.com/Cherry-toto/jizhicms/issues/104
jizhicms.cnjizhicms.cn

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how publicly exposed the affected modules are and what level of interaction they allow. If anonymous or low-privileged users can submit User Evaluations, Messages, or Comments containing URLs, the SSRF may be broadly exploitable against any internet user who can reach the site.

Not necessarily. If the site permits unauthenticated submissions or registrations for the affected modules, an attacker could exploit SSRF with minimal or no authentication. Where these actions require logged-in accounts or specific roles, exploitation would require that same level of access.

The strongest pattern is to remove or tightly constrain server-side fetching of user-specified URLs. Where such behavior is required, enforce strict allow-listing of acceptable domains, validate resolved IP addresses to block internal ranges, and support these controls with network-level egress restrictions so the application cannot reach sensitive internal or metadata endpoints.

Treat any user-controlled URL as untrusted data. Design architecture so that external fetches are limited and mediated, adopt coding standards that require allow-lists and IP validation for outbound requests, and include SSRF-focused checks in code review, static analysis, and security testing pipelines. Ensuring that infrastructure also enforces outbound restrictions provides a second line of defense even if application-level controls fail.

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