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CVE-2025-50196

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in Chamilo vchamilo Plugin

CVE-2025-50196

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via OS Command Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Chamilo's vchamilo plugin allows attacker-controlled data in the main_database POST parameter to be passed to the operating system shell.

When exploited, this can enable execution of arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the web server process on affected Chamilo deployments.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Chamilo learning management system installations using the vchamilo plugin, specifically the editinstance.php view under /plugin/vchamilo/views/.

The issue occurs when the main_database POST parameter is processed in a way that influences underlying system-level operations, likely including shell or command-line invocations, without robust sanitization or strict parameterization.

Systems where the web server user has broad file system or network permissions are at elevated risk because successful exploitation executes within that security context.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP POST interface to /plugin/vchamilo/views/editinstance.php on a Chamilo server.
  • Required access: Ability to submit crafted HTTP POST requests; in some deployments this may require being an authenticated user with access to plugin administration or instance edit functionality.
  • Trigger point: Processing of the main_database POST parameter during handling of the edit instance action.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled data from main_database is incorporated into an OS command or shell invocation without sufficient encoding, escaping, or parameterization, allowing injected shell metacharacters or command fragments to be interpreted by the operating system.

Why this happens

The root cause maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

In this pattern, application logic constructs command-line strings or shell invocations and concatenates user-controlled values—here, the main_database parameter—directly into those commands.

Because the code does not rigorously validate or constrain the parameter to an expected safe format (e.g., a simple identifier or hostname), attacker-supplied shell syntax is interpreted by the OS when the command is executed.

This creates a data-to-code boundary violation where untrusted input is treated as executable shell content.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the web server process.
  • Reading or modification of sensitive data accessible to the application user account.
  • Deployment of web shells or backdoors on the Chamilo server.
  • Pivoting to other internal services reachable from the compromised host.
  • Disruption of LMS availability through system-level changes or resource exhaustion.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command construction from untrusted input and enforcing strict boundaries between data and executable content:

  • Replace shell-based integrations with safer, parameterized APIs (e.g., direct database drivers or language-native libraries) that do not invoke the OS shell.
  • If OS commands are unavoidable, use APIs that pass arguments as arrays without shell interpretation and avoid any dynamic shell invocation features.
  • Constrain the main_database parameter to a well-defined whitelist or strict schema (e.g., fixed set of identifiers, validated hostnames) and reject anything outside expected patterns.
  • Apply robust input validation and output encoding for all parameters that could influence system-level operations, logging and failing closed on unexpected input.
  • Run the web server and Chamilo components with least-privilege accounts and minimal OS capabilities to reduce impact if a flaw is exploited.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can use a combination of code-centric and behavior-centric approaches to spot this vulnerability class:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to detect use of shell-executing functions (e.g., exec, system, shell_exec, passthru, backticks) where arguments contain HTTP parameters like $_POST['main_database'] or other user-controlled data.
  • Code review: During manual review, flag any concatenation of request parameters into command strings, and confirm that any system interaction is either parameterized or isolated from user input.
  • Security testing: Use dynamic application security testing (DAST) or manual penetration testing to send crafted payloads through the editinstance.php endpoint and monitor for anomalous behavior or command execution.
  • Runtime monitoring: Implement host-based intrusion detection or command auditing (e.g., process creation logs) to identify suspicious command patterns originating from the web server process.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/afdbd4bb9a9ea17b7740559dd4e05aa13b16480d
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/e343c764493b457c82d1e85b91a3655b093767ed
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/releases/tag/v1.11.30
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/security/advisories/GHSA-qfvp-xg47-m7m2

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the vulnerable editinstance.php endpoint and control the main_database POST parameter can attempt exploitation over the network, subject to authentication or access controls that may be in place.

It depends on how Chamilo and the vchamilo plugin are configured. In many cases, editing instances is restricted to authenticated or privileged users, so an attacker might need at least some level of access. Administrators should assume that any user able to access the edit functionality could attempt to abuse it.

Remove shell-based command construction altogether for this code path and rely on safe, parameterized APIs that do not involve the OS shell. Where system calls are absolutely necessary, pass arguments as discrete parameters and ensure that main_database is restricted to a tightly validated set of allowed values.

Adopt secure coding practices that prohibit direct concatenation of user input into OS commands, enforce centralized input validation and whitelisting for high-risk parameters, and use automated code scanning and security-focused code reviews to catch command injection patterns before deployment.

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