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CVE-2025-50193

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in Chamilo LMS import Plugin Endpoint

CVE-2025-50193

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Server (via OS Command Injection)

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Chamilo LMS versions prior to 1.11.30 contain an OS command injection vulnerability in /plugin/vchamilo/views/import.php, reachable via the to_main_database POST parameter.

When this parameter is improperly handled, an attacker can inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands under the web server's privileges on the hosting server.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Chamilo installations using the vchamilo plugin's import functionality exposed at /plugin/vchamilo/views/import.php.

It becomes relevant when HTTP POST requests containing the to_main_database parameter are accepted and processed without rigorous server-side validation or proper command execution safeguards.

The issue is most critical on internet-facing LMS deployments where attackers can reach the vulnerable endpoint over the network.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP POST requests to /plugin/vchamilo/views/import.php.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted POST requests to the Chamilo application (typically network-level access; authentication requirements depend on local configuration of the import feature).
  • Trigger point: Handling of the to_main_database POST parameter during the import workflow, where its value is incorporated into an OS-level command or shell invocation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input from to_main_database is passed into a command execution context (e.g., shell, system utility) without proper sanitization, escaping, or use of safe APIs, allowing attackers to break out of expected parameters and inject arbitrary commands.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic OS Command Injection pattern (CWE-78).

Application logic in import.php appears to construct or invoke system-level commands using data taken directly from the to_main_database POST parameter.

Rather than treating this input as untrusted data and strictly constraining it to a fixed, validated set of values, the code likely concatenates or interpolates it into a shell command or passes it to an API that spawns a shell.

This pattern enables attackers to supply metacharacters (such as command separators) or additional arguments, causing the system to execute unintended commands and exposing the host environment.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary operating system commands under the web server or PHP runtime user.
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting application and user data stored on the server.
  • Pivoting to other internal systems reachable from the Chamilo host.
  • Installing web shells or backdoors for persistent access.
  • Disrupting availability of the LMS by stopping services or consuming system resources.
  • Escalating privileges if combined with local misconfigurations or kernel vulnerabilities.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on eliminating direct command construction from user input and constraining any necessary system interactions:

  • Prefer high-level, language-native APIs or database drivers instead of invoking shell commands for import or maintenance tasks.
  • If external utilities must be used, construct command invocations using parameterized APIs that avoid shell interpretation and do not rely on string concatenation.
  • Strictly validate the to_main_database parameter against an allowlist of expected values or modes, rejecting anything outside this controlled set.
  • Normalize, type-check, and limit all request parameters related to import operations (e.g., booleans, enums, fixed identifiers) rather than accepting free-form strings.
  • Run the web server and PHP interpreter with least-privilege accounts and minimize their ability to interact with sensitive OS resources.
  • Restrict network access to administrative or import-related endpoints where feasible, for example by placing them behind VPN or admin-only interfaces.

These defensive patterns reduce the likelihood that any one endpoint can be abused for arbitrary command execution.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for this class of vulnerability and its exploitation through:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag the use of command execution functions (e.g., exec, system, shell_exec, backticks, proc_open) where arguments are influenced by HTTP request parameters, particularly in files such as import.php.
  • Code review: Manual inspection of import and plugin-related code paths for string concatenation into shell commands and lack of allowlist validation for operational flags or modes.
  • Web application firewalls (WAF): Generic signatures for command injection patterns (e.g., presence of ;, &&, ||, backticks, or redirection operators in parameters like to_main_database), tuned to monitor and alert rather than blindly block at first.
  • Runtime monitoring: Logging of anomalous process spawns from the web server user (e.g., unexpected shells or utilities started during import operations) and correlation with HTTP request logs.
  • Policy enforcement: CI/CD checks that prevent merging code introducing new shell-command invocations tied to user-controlled input, enforced via secure coding guidelines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/afdbd4bb9a9ea17b7740559dd4e05aa13b16480d
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/releases/tag/v1.11.30
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/security/advisories/GHSA-hvpp-6mp9-frx4

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the vulnerable endpoint is accessible over the network, an attacker can send crafted POST requests to attempt command injection without needing local server access. Whether authentication is required depends on how the import functionality is configured in the specific Chamilo deployment.

The attacker needs the ability to reach /plugin/vchamilo/views/import.php and submit POST data with the to_main_database parameter. If the import feature is restricted to authenticated or administrative users, attackers would first need those credentials or another way to access that endpoint.

The most robust fix is to remove direct shell command usage for this workflow and replace it with safe, high-level APIs that do not interpret user input as commands. Any remaining system interactions should use parameterized execution without passing user-controlled strings through a shell, combined with strict allowlist validation of operational parameters.

Adopt secure coding practices that prohibit building shell commands from request parameters, enforce centralized input validation guidelines, and include automated checks for dangerous command-execution patterns in code review and CI pipelines. Limiting access to sensitive plugin endpoints and running services with least privilege further reduces the impact of any residual issues.

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