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CVE-2025-46115

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Denial of Service via Improper Input Validation

CVE-2025-46115

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Denial of Service via Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-400

Impact:

Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

open5gs v2.7.3 contains an input validation and resource handling flaw in its processing of PDU Session Modification Request messages.

A remote attacker who can send crafted 5G control-plane traffic may trigger excessive processing or erroneous state transitions, causing denial of service for affected subscribers or core components.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the 5G core control-plane logic of open5gs when handling PDU Session Modification Request messages.

It is relevant in deployments where open5gs is exposed to untrusted or semi-trusted user equipment (UE) traffic over N2/N3 interfaces, or where test tools and simulators can inject arbitrary NAS/NGAP messages.

The issue is triggered during normal session lifecycle management—specifically when modifying existing PDU sessions—if malformed or boundary-condition message fields are not robustly validated or rate-limited.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: 5G core control-plane interfaces that receive PDU Session Modification Request messages (e.g., from gNB/UE via N2/NGAP/NAS).
  • Required access: Ability to act as, or influence, a UE or RAN element that can send crafted PDU Session Modification Requests to the open5gs core.
  • Trigger point: Processing of a specially crafted or repeated PDU Session Modification Request targeting existing or partially established PDU sessions.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation does not fully validate message structure or value ranges (CWE-20) and does not adequately bound the resources consumed or states created when handling abnormal input (CWE-400), allowing an attacker to drive the system into a resource exhaustion or error state.

Why this happens

At its core, the bug stems from insufficient validation of externally supplied protocol messages combined with a lack of strict resource management.

The PDU Session Modification Request handler appears to assume that incoming messages follow expected state and value constraints, and proceeds with processing even when fields are malformed, inconsistent, or crafted to stress internal data structures.

This aligns with CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), where input from an untrusted source is not checked rigorously before use, and CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption), where responding to such input can consume excessive CPU, memory, or session state until service degrades or fails.

Potential impact

  • Service disruption for one or more subscribers whose PDU sessions cannot be established or modified reliably.
  • Exhaustion of CPU, memory, or other resources on the open5gs control-plane components, leading to broader core network instability.
  • Inability of legitimate UEs to establish or maintain data connectivity while the attack is ongoing.
  • Potential cascading failures in dependent network functions that rely on timely PDU session signaling.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on strengthening protocol robustness and bounding resource usage:

  • Apply strict input validation for all fields in PDU Session Modification Requests, rejecting messages that are malformed, inconsistent with session state, or outside expected ranges.
  • Enforce protocol state checks to ensure messages are only processed when sessions are in valid states, with defensive handling for unexpected transitions.
  • Implement rate limiting and per-UE/session quotas to prevent a single source from driving excessive signaling or resource allocation.
  • Isolate and harden control-plane components using least-privilege principles and resource limits (e.g., CPU/memory cgroups, process-level ceilings) so abnormal traffic cannot exhaust the entire host.
  • Favor secure defaults in configuration, such as limiting exposure of core interfaces to only trusted or well-controlled RAN segments and test environments.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection typically combines protocol-aware monitoring and code-centric review:

  • Use static analysis or manual code review to identify message handlers that lack comprehensive field validation, state checks, or resource bounds when processing PDU Session Modification Requests.
  • Introduce unit and integration tests with malformed and boundary-condition PDU Session messages to detect crashes, timeouts, or excessive resource use.
  • Monitor control-plane logs and metrics for spikes in PDU Session Modification failures, repeated error codes, or abnormal growth in session-related data structures.
  • Deploy network-level anomaly detection or IPS rules that flag or throttle suspicious patterns of PDU Session Modification traffic (e.g., high rates from a single UE, unusual parameter combinations).
  • Integrate protocol fuzzing into CI/CD to continually exercise the 5G NAS/NGAP handling paths and catch regressions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open5gs/open5gs/issues/3858

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can generate or control 5G signaling traffic that reaches the open5gs core (for example by operating a UE, simulator, or compromised RAN element) can exploit the flaw remotely.

Typically, the attacker needs the ability to participate in the signaling path—often as a UE or emulator—rather than traditional application-layer authentication. The exact access requirements depend on how tightly the RAN and core network are controlled.

The safest pattern is to enforce strict, protocol-compliant validation on all PDU Session Modification Request fields, verify that messages are consistent with current session state, and ensure that any unexpected or malformed messages are cleanly rejected without heavy processing or persistent state changes.

Adopt a defensive design approach for telecom protocol handlers: apply thorough input validation, model protocol state machines explicitly, impose resource and rate limits per UE/session, and incorporate fuzzing, static analysis, and targeted code reviews into the development lifecycle for all message-handling paths.

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