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CVE-2025-46070

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Certificate Validation in Automai BotManager

CVE-2025-46070

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Automai BotManager 25.2.0 contains an issue in the BotManager.exe component where TLS/certificate validation is not performed correctly, allowing an attacker to impersonate a trusted endpoint.

Under these conditions, a remote attacker may be able to deliver malicious content or instructions that BotManager.exe executes, leading to arbitrary code execution on the affected system.

Affected context

The vulnerability manifests in environments where Automai BotManager 25.2.0 is deployed and BotManager.exe communicates with remote endpoints over supposedly secure channels.

It is relevant when the application relies on TLS or similar mechanisms to authenticate servers or services, but performs incomplete or incorrect certificate checks (for example, skipping hostname verification, not validating trust chains, or accepting self-signed certificates without policy).

The risk increases in network contexts where attackers can influence network routing, DNS resolution, or present malicious endpoints that appear to the client as legitimate.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-facing communications initiated by BotManager.exe to remote services (e.g., controllers, update servers, or APIs) over TLS or similar secure protocols.
  • Required access: Ability to position a malicious server or perform a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack on the BotManager traffic path (for example, via local network access, compromised Wi‑Fi, DNS spoofing, or control of an upstream proxy).
  • Trigger point: BotManager.exe establishing a "secure" connection and trusting the attacker-controlled certificate or endpoint due to lax validation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Because certificate validation is incomplete or incorrect, the client does not adequately verify the authenticity of the remote endpoint, allowing attackers to impersonate trusted services and supply data or commands that are processed in a way that can execute arbitrary code.

Why this happens

This issue corresponds to CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation, where the software uses a cryptographic protocol to secure communication but does not correctly verify the peer's certificate.

Typical patterns include disabling certificate validation, ignoring hostname mismatches, accepting any certificate signed by an untrusted or overly broad authority, or failing to check revocation status.

When BotManager.exe establishes a secure channel under these conditions, it incorrectly assumes that any TLS-protected connection is trusted, allowing adversaries who can present a certificate (often self-signed or improperly chained) to masquerade as a legitimate server.

Because subsequent logic appears to trust the remote party fully, data, configuration, or instructions received from the spoofed endpoint can be processed as if they came from a trusted source, leading to behaviors such as arbitrary code execution.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary code in the context of the BotManager process.
  • Complete compromise of the host running Automai BotManager, depending on BotManager.exe privileges.
  • Unauthorized deployment or execution of scripts, bots, or automation tasks.
  • Exfiltration or tampering with automation workflows, credentials, or sensitive data handled by the tool.
  • Use of the compromised system as an entry point for wider lateral movement within the environment.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing strict certificate validation and secure communication defaults:

  • Ensure all outbound and inbound TLS connections perform full certificate validation, including hostname verification, chain validation against a trusted root store, and appropriate key usage checks.
  • Avoid disabling certificate checks for convenience (e.g., "trust all certificates" flags, debug-only toggles left enabled, or custom handlers that bypass validation callbacks).
  • Restrict trusted certificate authorities to a minimal, well-controlled set, and consider certificate pinning for critical control-plane communications to reduce impersonation risk.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to BotManager.exe so that, even if a connection is misused, the process has limited access to the operating system and sensitive resources.
  • Segment network access so that BotManager can only communicate with explicitly authorized control servers or APIs, and monitor unexpected outbound connections.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can concentrate on both code-level and operational indicators:

  • Static analysis: Search for API usages that disable or override certificate checks (e.g., custom certificate validation callbacks that always succeed, flags to ignore SSL errors, configuration options that permit self-signed certificates without policy).
  • Code review: Examine network connection logic, especially in BotManager.exe's update, licensing, and control communication paths, looking for missing hostname verification, lack of CA validation, or acceptance of arbitrary certificates.
  • Configuration review: Check deployment and runtime settings for options that weaken TLS security, such as "ignore SSL errors," development test modes, or broad trust of local certificate stores without restrictions.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use network monitoring and intrusion detection to flag connections from BotManager to unexpected domains or IP ranges, especially when encrypted sessions are established to unrecognized endpoints.
  • Automated security testing tools or SAST/DAST products can help identify improper certificate validation patterns and insecure TLS configurations during development or CI.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/ZeroBreach-GmbH/776dd7e927d9b2f8ef10807abe124f8e
automai.comautomai.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be, provided an attacker can convince BotManager.exe to connect to a malicious endpoint they control or can position themselves in the network path to perform a MitM attack. Improper certificate validation removes key safeguards that normally prevent such impersonation.

Not necessarily. An attacker primarily needs network-level influence, such as control over DNS, Wi‑Fi, or a proxy, or the ability to host a server that BotManager.exe is tricked into contacting. Local privileges on the victim host are not a prerequisite if network positioning can be achieved.

The most robust fix pattern is to implement strict certificate validation across all secure connections, including full chain validation, hostname verification, and rejection of untrusted or malformed certificates. Where possible, combine this with certificate pinning for critical control endpoints and remove any code paths that bypass validation.

Prevention involves adopting secure-by-default communication practices: use well-vetted TLS libraries, prohibit disabling certificate checks in production code, enforce security coding guidelines around certificate handling, and include automated checks in CI that flag lax TLS verification patterns. Regular security reviews of network and update mechanisms can also catch misconfigurations before release.

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