Summary
A weakness in the CephX authentication protocol uses unauthenticated AES-128-CBC encryption with a hard-coded initialization vector, making authentication tickets malleable. An attacker with a low-privilege CephX key who can observe protocol traffic may forge credentials or alter service tickets to obtain elevated or cluster-wide access.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Ceph deployments that use the affected CephX ticket authentication behavior. Risk is higher when an attacker already possesses a valid low-privilege CephX credential and can observe or influence authentication traffic between clients, monitors, and services. The lack of ciphertext authentication allows encrypted ticket contents to be modified without reliable integrity verification.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: CephX authentication traffic and ticket processing
- Required access: A valid low-privilege CephX key or equivalent CephX permissions
- Additional condition: Ability to observe relevant CephX traffic or interact with a monitor
- Trigger point: Processing of forged or modified authentication and service tickets
- Why exploitation is possible: AES-CBC encryption is used without message authentication, and predictable encryption behavior can support ticket forgery or privilege-related field manipulation
Why this happens
The protocol encrypts authentication tickets with AES-128-CBC without an authenticated encryption mechanism or a separate integrity check, while also relying on a hard-coded initialization vector. CBC ciphertext is malleable: controlled changes to encrypted blocks can produce corresponding changes in decrypted data. Because ticket contents are not reliably authenticated before authorization decisions are made, altered identity or privilege fields may be accepted. This behavior maps to CWE-327, which covers the use of broken or risky cryptographic practices.
Potential impact
- An attacker may forge credentials for privileged Ceph entities.
- An attacker could escalate from a low-privilege CephX identity to broader service permissions.
- An attacker may obtain unauthorized access to object, block, or file storage resources.
- An attacker could gain cluster-wide control or disrupt storage operations.
- Confidential data may be exposed, modified, or destroyed.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on replacing unauthenticated encryption with
authenticated encryption or an equivalent design that provides confidentiality,
integrity, and replay protection.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use the vendor-provided remediated protocol implementation through the normal organizational patch-management process.
- Reject tickets that fail cryptographic integrity or freshness checks.
- Eliminate hard-coded initialization vectors and ensure nonces or IVs are generated and managed safely.
- Limit CephX identities to the minimum permissions required for their workloads.
- Restrict access to monitor and service traffic through network segmentation and protected management paths.
- Rotate potentially exposed credentials and review authorization policies after suspected tampering.
- Treat authentication tickets and cryptographic keys as sensitive material with controlled storage and access.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis and protocol reviews that identify CBC encryption without an authentication tag or MAC.
- Code review signals such as hard-coded IVs, direct ciphertext manipulation, or authorization decisions based on unauthenticated decrypted fields.
- Configuration and policy checks that identify broadly privileged CephX identities or unnecessary access to monitor traffic.
- Network monitoring for unusual authentication failures, repeated ticket exchanges, or unexpected privilege changes.
- Audit-log correlation for low-privilege identities accessing manager, MDS, OSD, or cluster-administration functions.
- Automated security review tools that flag weak cryptographic constructions and missing integrity protection.

