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CVE-2025-29165

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Privilege Management in D-Link DIR-1253 MESH

CVE-2025-29165

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Privilege Escalation to Administrative Control of the Device

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A privilege escalation vulnerability in D-Link DIR-1253 MESH firmware allows an attacker to leverage the /etc/shadow.sample component to gain higher-level privileges on the device.

Under certain configurations where this sample shadow file is exposed or misused, an attacker with limited access may be able to obtain or escalate to administrative control of the router.

Affected context

This issue arises in D-Link DIR-1253 MESH routers running firmware version V1.6.1684 where the /etc/shadow.sample component is present and interacts with authentication or account management logic.

The risk is highest when the device is reachable over the network, uses default or weak credentials, or exposes configuration/backup interfaces that may rely on or reveal this sample credential file.

Environments that integrate the router into larger networks, especially where the router has administrative access to upstream infrastructure, are more exposed to downstream impact.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-facing router management or related services that reference /etc/shadow.sample, or local system access on the device (e.g., via another flaw).
  • Required access: At minimum, low-privileged or indirect access to router interfaces or files; in some scenarios, knowledge of default values or the ability to manipulate configuration/backup flows is needed.
  • Trigger point: Use of the vulnerability occurs when the device processes account data, applies default credentials, restores configuration, or otherwise relies on /etc/shadow.sample for authentication or user provisioning.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Privileges are not properly separated and protected; reliance on a sample shadow file, misconfigured permissions, or incorrect integration with authentication flows allows attacker-controlled or predictable account data to be accepted as trusted, leading to higher privilege than intended.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where the system fails to correctly enforce boundaries between user roles and administrative functions.

In this case, the /etc/shadow.sample component is treated in a way that either exposes sensitive password hashes or allows the creation or manipulation of credentials that inherit elevated privileges.

Rather than strictly segregating configuration samples, password stores, and live authentication data, the firmware appears to blur these trust boundaries, allowing a lower-privileged actor to gain administrative permissions through this file or its associated logic.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could escalate from a low-privileged account to full administrative access on the router.
  • The attacker may gain control over router configuration, including DNS, firewall, and routing rules.
  • Compromise of all network traffic traversing the router through interception, redirection, or modification.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks on internal network hosts.
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets or use for large-scale scanning and DDoS activity.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening privilege boundaries and treating credential-related files as highly sensitive.

High-level defensive patterns include:

  • Ensuring sample or template files (such as shadow.sample) cannot be used as active credential stores or sources of privileged accounts.
  • Applying strict filesystem permissions and ownership so that only the minimal set of processes can read or write password or shadow files.
  • Separating configuration samples from live authentication data, and validating that restore/import operations cannot introduce unintended privileged users.
  • Enforcing strong, unique administrative credentials during initial setup, and disabling or removing any default/sample accounts.
  • Reducing the router's exposed management surface (e.g., disable remote management unless strictly required, restrict access to trusted networks or VPN).
  • Running web and management services with least privilege and clear separation between low-privilege session states and administrative operations.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and researchers can look for this class of issue using a combination of firmware and configuration analysis:

  • Static firmware analysis: Inspect filesystem images for shadow.sample-like files; review scripts and binaries that read or copy these into live credential stores, looking for code paths that do not enforce privilege separation.
  • Configuration and backup review: Analyze backup/restore formats for embedded hashed passwords or patterns that map back to sample files or default credentials.
  • Access control verification: During security testing, validate whether low-privileged or unauthenticated users can trigger flows that alter or replace account data based on sample templates.
  • Automated policy checks: Use SAST tools or custom rules to flag firmware build scripts and configuration management code that references sample shadow files or bypasses proper authentication checks.

Sources

SourceLink
codeberg.orgcodeberg.org/zuhri/advisory/src/branch/main/CVE-2025-29165
github.comgithub.com/twentysevns/Vuln-IoT-Reports/blob/main/DLINK/DIR-1253/README.md
dlink.comdlink.com/en/security-bulletin/
zuh.rezuh.re/cve/2025-29165/

Frequently asked

questions

The exploitability depends on how the router is deployed. If remote management is exposed to the internet or weak/default credentials are used, an external attacker may be able to abuse the /etc/shadow.sample behavior. In more locked-down environments, an attacker might first need some form of local or low-privileged access.

Not necessarily. In some scenarios, knowledge of default or sample-based credentials, or the ability to influence configuration restore or initialization flows, may be enough. However, in other deployments, at least some level of access to management interfaces or the filesystem may be required.

The most robust pattern is to remove or strictly isolate sample credential files from any live authentication path, enforce proper permissions on all credential stores, and ensure that account creation or restoration logic never implicitly trusts template or default data for privileged roles.

Design router and embedded firmware with clear privilege boundaries: treat all shadow/password files as high-risk assets, enforce least privilege for management services, forbid default or sample credentials in production flows, and regularly perform security reviews of authentication and configuration mechanisms during development and firmware release processes.

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