Summary
An improper input validation flaw in the VPN modules of the TP-Link Archer AXE75 v1.6 router allows an authenticated adjacent attacker to delete arbitrary files on the device.
When abused, this can remove critical system files and disrupt core router services, resulting in service interruption or degraded network functionality for connected users.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the VPN-related modules of the TP-Link Archer AXE75 v1.6 router firmware (up to and including build 20250107).
It is exposed when authenticated users on the local or adjacent network can invoke VPN functionality that accepts user-controlled parameters for file operations.
In this context, file paths or identifiers are not sufficiently validated before deletion, allowing paths outside their intended scope to be targeted.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Router web interface/API handling VPN configuration or management operations.
- Required access: Authenticated access to the router (e.g., admin or other authenticated role) from an adjacent or local network segment.
- Trigger point: Invocation of VPN module endpoints or actions that accept a user-controlled reference to files intended for cleanup or management.
- Why exploitation is possible: The firmware trusts user-supplied input for file selection without enforcing strict validation or confinement to an allowed directory or file set, enabling arbitrary file paths to be passed to deletion routines.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper input validation (CWE-20) in file management logic within the VPN modules.
The code appears to accept user-controlled values that influence which files are deleted, but does not robustly constrain these values to a safe, predefined set or directory.
As a result, paths or tokens intended only for limited internal use can be manipulated to reference arbitrary files on the filesystem, and the deletion operation proceeds without adequate authorization or scope checks.
Potential impact
- Deletion of critical system files, potentially rendering VPN functionality or other router services inoperative.
- Interruption of network connectivity or degraded performance for clients relying on the router.
- Loss of configuration data, requiring manual reconfiguration or factory reset.
- Increased exposure to further attacks if security-relevant files (such as logs or certain controls) are removed.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on tightening input handling and restricting file operations within the firmware:
- Apply strict validation and normalization to all user-supplied file identifiers or paths, rejecting any that do not match an expected whitelist or schema.
- Constrain deletion logic to operate only on files in specific, hardcoded directories, using server-side mapping rather than direct path input from clients.
- Use indirect references (e.g., IDs or handles) mapping to known file locations instead of accepting raw paths from the user.
- Enforce least-privilege for file operations in the VPN modules, ensuring they can only affect data needed for VPN functionality and not broader system components.
- Design management endpoints so that destructive actions require explicit, narrowly scoped operations rather than generic file deletion primitives.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can rely on both code-level and behavioral indicators:
- Static analysis rules that flag use of user-controlled input in file system operations (e.g., unlink, remove, delete) without prior normalization and whitelisting.
- Code review checklists that specifically examine administrative and VPN management endpoints for direct use of client-provided paths or filenames.
- Policy-based checks in CI/CD that prevent merging changes where file operations derive directly from HTTP parameters, form fields, or JSON bodies.
- Runtime monitoring or logging that records file deletions with contextual information, enabling detection of abnormal patterns such as system directories being targeted.

