Summary
A SQL Injection vulnerability in the Awie export modules of Centreon Infra Monitoring allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary SQL into backend database queries.
When untrusted input is concatenated directly into SQL commands without proper neutralization, an attacker may read, modify, or destroy monitoring data and potentially impact the wider infrastructure relying on Centreon.
Affected context
This vulnerability exists in Centreon Infra Monitoring's Awie export modules where user-supplied parameters are used to build SQL queries.
It is relevant in deployments where:
- The Centreon web interface is exposed over a network
- The Awie export functionality is enabled and reachable without prior authentication
- Application code constructs SQL queries using dynamic strings derived from HTTP request values
In such contexts, specially crafted request parameters can alter the structure of the underlying SQL statements executed by the application.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-exposed Centreon Infra Monitoring web interface, specifically the Awie export modules endpoints.
- Required access: No prior authentication required; any network client that can reach the vulnerable endpoints may attempt exploitation.
- Trigger point: HTTP requests that influence database queries used for export operations (e.g., filters, sorting, or selection parameters).
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into SQL commands without robust parameterization or neutralization, allowing the attacker to inject SQL fragments that change the original query's semantics.
Why this happens
The core issue aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
In the affected Awie export modules, dynamic SQL statements are constructed by concatenating raw request parameters into query strings, or by otherwise failing to bind user input as data-only parameters.
Without strict use of prepared statements, type-safe bindings, or rigorous input validation, special characters such as quotes, comment delimiters, or SQL operators are interpreted as part of the SQL syntax instead of literal data.
This design pattern breaks the intended separation between control (the SQL query) and data (user input), allowing attackers to insert or modify clauses like WHERE, UNION, or UPDATE, or to terminate the original query and append new statements where the database driver and configuration permit.
Potential impact
- Unauthenticated reading of sensitive data stored or referenced by the Centreon database, including monitoring configuration and potentially credentials or connection details.
- Modification or deletion of monitoring data, alerts, and configuration records, which could blind operators to real issues.
- Corruption of export results, leading to inaccurate reporting and operational decisions based on tampered data.
- Escalation to broader infrastructure compromise if stored secrets, tokens, or administrative accounts in the database are accessed or altered.
- Potential denial of service against the monitoring system through destructive SQL operations.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on removing unsafe query construction patterns and reducing trust in all externally sourced input:
- Replace dynamic string-based SQL with parameterized queries or prepared statements in the data access layer so that user values are always treated as data, never as query syntax.
- Introduce a strict input handling layer for Awie export parameters:
- Whitelist-validate expected values (e.g., numeric IDs, bounded date ranges, enumerated sort fields).
- Reject or sanitize any unexpected or malformed input early in request processing.
- Encapsulate all database access in a data access abstraction that enforces parameter binding by default, making it difficult for developers to accidentally introduce concatenated SQL.
- Apply principle of least privilege to the database account used by the export modules so that even if a query is manipulated, its capabilities (such as
DROP,ALTER, or cross-database access) are minimized. - Where possible, implement read-only roles for reporting and export functionalities to limit destructive operations from that code path.
- Establish secure-by-default coding guidelines that prohibit inline SQL with untrusted data and require peer review for any new query-building logic.
How teams detect issues like this
Detecting and preventing similar SQL Injection flaws can be supported by several complementary practices:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters with rules that flag:
- Direct string concatenation or interpolation involving SQL commands and request parameters.
- Use of database APIs without parameter binding when user-controlled data is present.
- Code review patterns: During peer reviews, scrutinize:
- Any new or modified SQL queries, especially in web-facing modules like exports or reports.
- Uses of ad hoc query builders, string formatting functions, or ORM raw-query escape hatches.
- Runtime monitoring: Deploy application and database logging to:
- Capture abnormal query patterns (e.g., unexpected
UNION, comment markers, or tautological conditions). - Correlate suspicious requests with resulting SQL for forensic analysis.
- Security testing: Integrate:
- Automated DAST tools that probe export endpoints with SQL Injection payload variations.
- Targeted manual penetration testing of Awie export functionality during each major release.
- Policy enforcement: Define development policies that:
- Mandate parameterized access layers for all database operations.
- Require security sign-off for modules that expose reporting or export capabilities.

