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CVE-2024-58396

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in YouDataSum CPAS Audit V4

CVE-2024-58396

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File Read and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in YouDataSum CPAS Audit Management System V4 allows unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the fileId parameter and request files outside the intended download directory. If the affected endpoint is reachable and insufficiently validates file paths, attackers may read sensitive system or application files.

A path traversal vulnerability in YouDataSum CPAS Audit Management System V4 allows unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the fileId parameter and request files outside the intended download directory. If the affected endpoint is reachable and insufficiently validates file paths, attackers may read sensitive system or application files.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the CPAS Audit Management System V4 plugin download functionality, particularly the /cpasm4/plugInManController/downPlugs endpoint. It may be present where the fileId parameter is incorporated into filesystem paths without sufficiently restricting traversal sequences or resolving the final path against an approved directory.

The vulnerability occurs in the CPAS Audit Management System V4 plugin download functionality, particularly the /cpasm4/plugInManController/downPlugs endpoint. It may be present where the fileId parameter is incorporated into filesystem paths without sufficiently restricting traversal sequences or resolving the final path against an approved directory.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP GET request to the plugin download endpoint
  • Required access: Typically none beyond network reachability because the endpoint may accept unauthenticated requests
  • Trigger point: Processing of the fileId parameter
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled path components may be interpreted as filesystem navigation rather than as a constrained file identifier
  • Attack surface: HTTP GET request to the plugin download endpoint
  • Required access: Typically none beyond network reachability because the endpoint may accept unauthenticated requests
  • Trigger point: Processing of the fileId parameter
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled path components may be interpreted as filesystem navigation rather than as a constrained file identifier

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper limitation of a user-controlled path, which maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'). The application appears to treat the fileId value as part of a filesystem path without reliably canonicalizing it and enforcing that the resolved path remains within the intended download directory. This insecure pattern can allow relative path components to escape the approved location.

The underlying issue is improper limitation of a user-controlled path, which maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'). The application appears to treat the fileId value as part of a filesystem path without reliably canonicalizing it and enforcing that the resolved path remains within the intended download directory. This insecure pattern can allow relative path components to escape the approved location.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may read operating-system files such as account or configuration data
  • Application secrets, credentials, or tokens could be exposed
  • Sensitive audit or deployment information may be disclosed
  • Exposed files could support further attacks against the application or its hosting environment
  • Attackers may read operating-system files such as account or configuration data
  • Application secrets, credentials, or tokens could be exposed
  • Sensitive audit or deployment information may be disclosed
  • Exposed files could support further attacks against the application or its hosting environment

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct filesystem path interpretation from user input and reducing file access privileges.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Accepting opaque, server-generated file identifiers instead of client-supplied paths
  • Resolving requested files against a fixed base directory and verifying the canonical result remains within that directory
  • Rejecting traversal markers, encoded traversal variants, absolute paths, and unexpected separators as a defense-in-depth measure
  • Applying allowlists for permitted files and file types
  • Running the application with only the filesystem permissions required for its function
  • Avoiding disclosure of detailed filesystem errors in responses

Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct filesystem path interpretation from user input and reducing file access privileges.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Accepting opaque, server-generated file identifiers instead of client-supplied paths
  • Resolving requested files against a fixed base directory and verifying the canonical result remains within that directory
  • Rejecting traversal markers, encoded traversal variants, absolute paths, and unexpected separators as a defense-in-depth measure
  • Applying allowlists for permitted files and file types
  • Running the application with only the filesystem permissions required for its function
  • Avoiding disclosure of detailed filesystem errors in responses

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for path traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying user input used in filesystem APIs
  • Code review checks for path concatenation, canonicalization, and containment validation
  • Dynamic testing with traversal representations, encoded separators, and absolute-path variants in non-production environments
  • Web application firewall or gateway policies that detect suspicious traversal patterns
  • Access-log review for unusual fileId values, repeated file-download probing, or requests for operating-system paths

Automated security testing and code review tools can help identify unsafe file path handling before deployment.

Organizations can look for path traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying user input used in filesystem APIs
  • Code review checks for path concatenation, canonicalization, and containment validation
  • Dynamic testing with traversal representations, encoded separators, and absolute-path variants in non-production environments
  • Web application firewall or gateway policies that detect suspicious traversal patterns
  • Access-log review for unusual fileId values, repeated file-download probing, or requests for operating-system paths

Automated security testing and code review tools can help identify unsafe file path handling before deployment.

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the affected download endpoint is network-accessible and accepts unauthenticated requests. The practical scope depends on deployment exposure and network controls.

The described behavior indicates that authentication may not be required. Network access to the endpoint and the ability to influence fileId are the key conditions.

Use server-side opaque identifiers mapped to approved files, enforce canonical-path containment, and apply strict allowlists rather than trusting client-supplied paths.

Review every user-controlled value used in filesystem operations, add traversal-focused security tests, apply least-privilege file permissions, and monitor download endpoints for anomalous path requests.

It may be remotely exploitable when the affected download endpoint is network-accessible and accepts unauthenticated requests. The practical scope depends on deployment exposure and network controls.

The described behavior indicates that authentication may not be required. Network access to the endpoint and the ability to influence fileId are the key conditions.

Use server-side opaque identifiers mapped to approved files, enforce canonical-path containment, and apply strict allowlists rather than trusting client-supplied paths.

Review every user-controlled value used in filesystem operations, add traversal-focused security tests, apply least-privilege file permissions, and monitor download endpoints for anomalous path requests.

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